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Abstract 
 
 
Analysing individual motivations, organisational characteristics, security 
pressures and societal factors, this thesis focuses on organisational 
motivations for the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese civil war 
(1975-1990). It examines why some of the non-state armed organisations 
(or militias) involved in the war included women as fighters whereas others 
did not. This thesis is the first comprehensive analysis of the topic, and the 
first study which takes into account the roles of women in all major militias 
involved in the war, including the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), 
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement (Fatah), Lebanese Kataeb Party (Kataeb), Lebanese 
Forces (LF), Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Amal Movement (Amal).  
This thesis is based on semi-structured interviews with 69 former male and 
female fighters, party members, civil society representatives, researchers 
and journalists. Fieldwork was conducted during four one- to six-week-long 
field visits to Lebanon between the summer of 2015 and autumn 2016. 
Moreover, four (auto)biographies of former female fighters were included 
in the analysis.  
This thesis argues that the main reason for female participation in the 
militias involved in the Lebanese civil war was women’s insistence to be 
included. Organisational barriers to women’s inclusion in those militias that 
were not entirely in favour of female participation, such as the militias of the 
(centre) right, was overcome due to the security context. Overall, societal 
opposition to female participation remained relatively high, which is why 
(compared with other conflict contexts) the overall number of female 
fighters was not higher.  
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Jennifer Philippa Eggert 
 
“When the war started, I was ready”1 
 
Organisational motivations for the inclusion of female fighters 
 in non-state armed organisations during the Lebanese civil war (1975-
1990) 
 
Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
1.1 | Women, war and political violence 
 
Female participation in political violence2 is considered a deviance of the 
norm in most societies worldwide (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). This is the 
case in most state militaries (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000), and even more so in non-
state armed groups3 (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). Nevertheless, women have 
been actively involved in many violent conflicts worldwide, often in combat 
                                                          
1  The title is a quote by one of the female fighters interviewed as part of this study 
(interviewee 31). It stresses the importance of the factor this study found to be the most 
important reason for the involvement of female fighters in the militias during the Lebanese 
civil war; namely women’s high motivation and their insistence to be included. 
2  I use the terms ‘political violence’ and ‘violent conflict’ interchangeably, while 
acknowledging that there is a difference between ‘political violence’ and ‘conflict’ (Kalyvas, 
2006).  
3  When I speak of ‘non-state armed groups’ or ‘non-state armed organisations’ in 
this thesis, I mean non-state armed groups with a political agenda. This is to distinguish 
between non-state armed political groups and other non-state violent actors such as gangs 
or other criminal organisations which do not have any political aims. In the Lebanese 
context, non-state armed political groups involved in the Lebanese civil war are usually 
referred to as militias, which is why I use the two terms interchangeably. 
2 
 
roles in non-state armed organisations (Henshaw, 2016). Why do women 
become involved in non-state political violence? What are the reasons for 
non-state armed political groups to decide to involve women in combat 
roles? This thesis argues that in the case of the Lebanese and Palestinian 
militias involved in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), the main reason for 
female participation as fighters4 was the women’s insistence to be included 
in combat roles. Organisational barriers to female participation as fighters in 
militias that were not entirely in favour of female participation were 
overcome in most militias when faced with extreme security pressures (due 
to the intensifying security context). Overall, societal opposition to female 
participation remained high hence why when compared with other conflict 
contexts, the overall numbers of female fighters remained relatively low. By 
tackling these questions, this thesis addresses a number of gaps in the 
existing literature on violent conflict in general, and on female perpetrators 
of political violence more specifically. 
In analyses of women’s roles and experiences during war and violent 
conflict, it is often assumed that women are primarily victims of political 
violence (Cunningham, 2003, Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). At times, their roles 
                                                          
4  I use the terms ‘fighter‘ and ‘combatant‘ interchangeably to describe individuals 
directly participating in combat. For individuals involved in supportive roles, I use the terms 
‘militant’ or ‘militia member’. There is however, a grey area concerning fighters and 
civilians. For the purpose of this study, I do not consider individuals who are involved in one-
off violent acts to be fighters. 
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as potential actors for positive change, peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation are also stressed. These ascribed roles as either ‘the victim’ 
or ‘the peacemaker’ to women in relation to political violence are linked to 
deeply entrenched notions of women being intrinsically and essentially 
peace-loving and innocent (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). It is true that in large 
parts of the world, women are amongst the most vulnerable members of 
society, and are often perceived to be disproportionally exposed to violence 
during violent conflict and war5. However, women are also often actively 
involved in inciting, enabling and perpetrating violence during times of 
conflict and war. In fact, women’s numbers in non-state armed organisations 
with a political agenda have increased across much of the world (Henshaw, 
2016). This is true for groups across the ideological spectrum. Far-right, left-
wing, animal liberation, Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Islamist groups have all 
included female fighters (Cunningham, 2003, Eager, 2008, Bloom, 2011, 
Henshaw, 2016). Female political violence is indeed a global phenomenon, 
as women have taken on combat roles in groups operating in the Americas, 
Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Cunningham, 2003, Eager, 2008, 
Bloom, 2011, Henshaw, 2016). Within non-state violent political groups, 
                                                          
5  This narrative has been challenged by some scholars, such as Adam Jones (2004), 
who points to the fact that most fighters at times of violent conflict are men and argues that 
men are, in fact, more affected by violent conflict than women. 
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women’s roles cover a wide range of different activities – with some 
assuming leadership roles. 
Women’s long-standing and increasing involvement in political violence (not 
just as supporters but also as agents of violence) stands in stark contrast to 
the lack of attention the topic receives in mainstream academic literature on 
political violence (Henshaw, 2016). Most publications on political violence 
overlook the roles and experiences of women during war and violent conflict 
(Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). If women’s roles are taken into account at all, 
they are often presented as being only victims or peacemakers (Gentry and 
Sjoberg, 2015). A notorious example is Sageman’s theory of terrorist cells 
which he dubbed “bunches of guys” (2008) – as though women did not play 
a role in many groups carrying out terrorist (and other political) violence. 
Similar lacuna can be found in mainstream conflict studies literature, which 
focuses on civil wars and rebel groups (Kalyvas, 2006, Weinstein, 2006, Gurr, 
2012, Staniland, 2014, Arjona et al., 2015). This is the case despite a small 
but emerging trend in both conflict and terrorism studies, which increasingly 
take into account women’s experiences and gender at times of violent 
conflict and war (Welland, 2016). 
These gaps in much of the literature should be of concern. Firstly, 
intellectually, it is highly unlikely one can fully understand a social 
phenomenon without taking into account the role of all of the actors 
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involved. We cannot understand political violence without making room in 
our analyses for the women who contribute to it. Secondly, from a practical 
point of view, this academic blindness with regards to female violence is 
mirrored in a lack of gender-sensitive conflict transformation, counter-
extremism, counter-terrorism, peacebuilding and disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes (Eggert, forthcoming, 
2017). Non-state armed political actors worldwide are increasingly relying 
on female fighters – and yet, the states and civil societies affected by their 
violence do not seem to have adapted to this change in tactics (Cunningham, 
2007, Satterthwaite and Huckerby, 2012). In order to contribute to putting 
an end to violent conflict and to help former fighters reintegrate into their 
societies (so that they can contribute to rebuilding healthy, peaceful and 
striving communities), it is essential to understand what made these groups 
and individuals resort to specific forms of violence, and in this case, what it 
was that led armed groups to include specific violent actors in the first place. 
By asking why non-state armed organisations employ female fighters, this 
study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the strategies 
adopted by non-state armed actors.   
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1.2 | Existing research on female fighters   
 
The tendency to overlook the role of female perpetrators of violence at 
times of war and violent conflict in the general literature on political violence 
is mirrored in the literature on the Lebanese civil war. Over forty years after 
the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 and more than twenty-five 
years after its end in 1990, a substantial body of literature on the war, its 
causes, development and different actors, exists. Both local and 
international scholars have published extensively on the war (see, for 
example, Fisk, 2001, Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012, Hanf, 2014). However, the 
question of women is rarely examined. There is hardly any literature on 
women, even less so on female combatants during the Lebanese war. Some 
suggest women did not play any role in the outbreak and sustainment of the 
war, and that it was only men who were to blame for the violence inflicted 
on the country and its inhabitants (Shehadeh, 1999, Karamé, 1995). Only a 
handful of publications (most of them of article-length only) examine the 
roles women played in the militias – either as supporters or perpetrators of 
violence (Peteet, 1991, Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 1999, André-Dessornes, 
2013, Parkinson, 2013). However, none of these systematically address the 
question of why some of the militias decided to employ women in military 
roles whilst others continued to allocate non-military roles only to them. 
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Also, they do not focus on all of the major non-state players during the war 
but highlight the roles of women in some of the groups only.6  
Although Lebanon-specific publications on the topic are rare, in recent years, 
a sound body of relevant literature on other conflict contexts has developed, 
which will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three. This literature can help 
shed light on the question of female roles and involvement in the militias 
during the Lebanese civil war. In this study, I use both conflict/war and 
terrorism studies literature – not because I believe the organisations 
described in this thesis were (or were not) terrorist actors, but because I 
believe the divide between conflict and terrorism studies is largely an 
artificial one, as will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
Relevant literature includes publications on the causes and mechanisms of 
why people get involved in violent conflict around the world (such as Taylor 
and Horgan, 2006, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler, 2006, McCauley and 
Moskalenko, 2011). Whilst this body of literature does not usually take into 
account the role of women and mostly focuses on the individual (as opposed 
to the group) level, it still provides us with a framework for studying how 
                                                          
6  The main militias during the Lebanese civil war included Lebanese leftist, 
Palestinian leftist, Christian and Shia groups. Karamé (1995) focuses on the role of women 
in the Christian militias, whereas Shehadeh (1999) compares the contribution of women in 
the biggest Christian militia, the Lebanese Kataeb Party (or Kataeb for short) with women’s 
roles in the Shia groups Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Both completely omit the roles of 
women in the leftist and Palestinian militias. Peteet (1991) and Parkinson (2013) focus on 
female members of Palestinian organisations only. André-Dessornes (2013) examines 
female suicide attackers, which were mostly deployed by the SSNP. 
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and why non-state armed groups include female combatants. Further 
understanding of how female involvement occurs is provided by the strand 
of literature focusing on female perpetrators of political violence in other 
conflict contexts. A substantial number of studies of female political violence 
has been published in the last few decades, both from a conflict/war studies 
(Reif, 1986, Burgess, 1989, Vázquez, 1997, Shikola, 1998, Shayne, 1999, 
Bernal, 2000, West, 2000, Alison, 2003, Sajjad, 2004, Parvati, 2005, Bernal, 
2006, Viterna, 2006, Hamilton, 2007, Coulter, 2008, Eager, 2008, Alison, 
2009, Gayer, 2009, Parashar, 2009, Ortega, 2012, Roy, 2012, Shekhawat, 
2012, Van Hauwermeiren, 2012, Katto, 2014, Cohen, 2013, Parashar, 2014, 
Magadla, 2015, Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015, Veneracion-Rallonza, 2015, 
Henshaw, 2016) and a terrorism studies perspective (Weinberg and Eubank, 
1987, Cunningham, 2003, Victor, 2003, Berko and Erez, 2007b, Berko and 
Erez, 2007a, Schweitzer, 2007, Von Knop, 2007, Cunningham, 2008, Eager, 
2008, Gonzalez-Perez, 2008, Jacques and Taylor, 2008, Sixta, 2008, 
Speckhard, 2008, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, Jacques 
and Taylor, 2009, Alison, 2009, Cunningham, 2009, O'Rourke, 2009, 
Cunningham, 2010, Bloom, 2011, Bloom et al., 2012, Gentry and Sjoberg, 
2015, Henshaw, 2016, Davis, 2017). Much of this literature focuses on 
individual cases rather than group motivations. However, some of these 
studies can help us to understand why non-state armed organisations decide 
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to employ female fighters. Analysing existing publications, I identify three 
explanations which can be found in the literature on female perpetrators of 
non-state political violence, namely: (1) individual motivations, (2) 
organisational characteristics, and contextual pressures – which for the sake 
of clarity, I divide into (3) the security context and (4) societal aspects. 
 
1.3 | Research question and aims  
 
Women were involved in a variety of roles in nearly all of the political parties 
and militias7 during the Lebanese civil war. They assumed a number of 
supportive roles such as logistics, first aid, cooking and washing for male 
fighters, telecommunications, intelligence gathering, recruitment, PR and 
communications, and almost all militias employed female fighters 
(interviewees 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66). Some had 
separate female units (such as the Lebanese Forces (LF)), whereas in others, 
                                                          
7  Many political parties in Lebanon either had a separate militia at the beginning of 
the war or they formed one after the war broke out. In some cases, the lines between the 
party and the militia became blurred after the outbreak of the war, which led some 
interviewees to speak of “politico-military organisations” (interviewee 18). For the sake of 
clarity, I only use the names of the parties in this thesis and specify whether I speak about 
the party or the militia, when necessary. 
10 
 
men and women fought in mixed units (Shehadeh, 1999: 156, Duplan and 
Raulin, 2015: 9). The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) did not include any 
official female fighters at all. The Amal Movement (or Amal for short) did not 
include any female combatants before 1978, and even then, involved 
women in combat against Israel only. How can this variation be explained? 
Why did some non-state armed organisations operating during the Lebanese 
civil war include women in combat activities whilst others did not? Why was 
the percentage of female fighters higher in some militias than in others? And 
how can we explain variation over time and in different locations? In order 
to shed light on this question, the four existing explanations which can be 
found in the literature on female political violence will be examined in regard 
to Lebanon. For all involved groups, I will demonstrate (in a dedicated 
chapter of this thesis), the extent to which individual motivations and 
women’s insistence to be included, organisational characteristics, the 
security context and societal aspects played a role in the group’s decision-
making on the involvement of women in combat activities.  
When I started the project, the focus was only on the group’s decision-
making. However, during fieldwork, I realised that women’s motivation to 
join the fight played an equally important role. Omitting the individual 
perspective from the analysis would thus not have allowed me to fully 
11 
 
explain the phenomenon and therefore Chapter One focuses on individual 
motivations. 
The research objective of this study was two-fold. Firstly, I intended to 
generate new data on organisational motivations for the inclusion of female 
fighters in non-state armed groups, as this is a field of study that remains 
relatively under-researched (Henshaw, 2016), both in general, and even 
more so with regards to the time period of the Lebanese civil war. By 
contributing to the scarce literature on female militia members in the 
Lebanese civil war, this study aims to contribute to the literature on the civil 
war in Lebanon by adding a discussion of the reasons for the inclusion of 
female fighters in the various militias involved in the war. The generation of 
new data and exploration of new cases is of paramount importance in the 
study of political violence due to a tendency to focus on the same group of 
over-researched cases (Dolnik, 2013b: 4, Ranstorp, 2013: 51). This leads us 
onto the second aim of my research. Whilst the focus of this study is on 
militias operating during the Lebanese civil war, I hope that its findings will 
help advance the study of female political violence and terrorism more 
generally. In a field of study where many publications tend to focus on the 
same group of over-researched cases, adding a new group of cases and new 
data has the potential to stimulate existing discussion and prompt new 
debates. Finally, I hope that not only researchers but also practitioners 
12 
 
working in conflict prevention, conflict transformation and 
counterterrorism, will benefit from my research, as it is impossible to 
develop informed strategies to effectively prevent and counter political 
violence and limit its destructive effects, without fully understanding the 
decision-making of the actors involved.  
 
1.4 | Methodological approach 
 
In order to answer the research question, I carried out a small-n comparative 
study focusing on seven non-state armed groups in a single country case 
study. I decided to conduct a qualitative study for three reasons: (1) to gain 
a deeper understanding of a highly complex issue, (2) to generate much 
needed data on the selected cases and (3) to ensure the internal validity of 
the generated data. In terms of epistemology, I am approaching this 
research from a largely positivist perspective, whilst acknowledging that 
interpretivist and constructivist positions are also valid and important. I will 
refer to and rely on publications by scholars studying female political 
violence within an interpretivist framework. However, on a theoretical level, 
the main aim of this thesis is to contribute to theories on involvement in 
political violence and on organisational decision-making, and not to gender 
theory.  
13 
 
The main focus of this thesis lies on seven organisations; namely, the 
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Lebanese Kataeb Party (Kataeb), the 
Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Amal Movement (Amal).8 The cases examined 
in this study were selected with the aim to include the widest spectrum of 
militias involved in the civil war in terms of ideology, aims, size and age. LCP, 
PFLP, Fatah and PSP, along with several other leftist groups, were members 
of the leftist Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was opposed by 
the Christian Lebanese Front (LFr). Kataeb and later the LF, as well as several 
smaller Christian militias, were members of the LFr. LNM and LFr were the 
two main – adversarial – alliances at the beginning of the war. Moreover, 
the Amal Movement was close to but not formally allied with the LNM. I thus 
included all major players except for Hezbollah and the Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party (SSNP) in this study. Despite several attempts to contact 
Hezbollah whilst in the field, it was not possible to gain access to any former 
fighters or party members. However, I include the Amal Movement which to 
a certain extent, shares some similarities and a common past with Hezbollah 
and has the added advantage of having been in existence since 1974/5, 
unlike Hezbollah, which was only founded in the mid/early 1980s – ten years 
                                                          
8  An overview of the different militias is included in the appendix. 
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into the Lebanese civil war (Norton, 1987, Norton, 2014). Gaining access to 
former SSNP members also proved to be very challenging. In both cases, one 
of the main reasons for the difficulty in accessing these two groups was their 
continued military involvement in the war in Syria. 
The findings presented in this study are based on fieldwork in Lebanon 
undertaken during four research trips (1.5 months in July/August 2015, 1 
month in December 2015/January 2016, 1.5 months in July/August 2016 and 
1 week in October 2016). Overall, I conducted 64 interviews with 69 male 
and female former fighters, party members, researchers, journalists and civil 
society representatives, with expertise on the civil war, on the involved 
parties and militias and on the role of women before and during the war. 
Moreover, I analysed the (auto)biographies of three former female fighters 
(Sneifer, 2006, El Murr, 2014, Duplan and Raulin, 2015). 
 
1.5 | Findings 
 
Numbers, percentages and roles of women in the militias 
 
Women participated in all of the militias involved in the Lebanese civil war. 
They were included as nurses, cooks, cleaners, laundry women, smugglers, 
administrators, political organisers, spies, fighters, commanders, recruiters, 
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liaison contacts, as well as in telecommunications and PR (interviewees 1, 2, 
4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66). Moreover, they were also 
employed as suicide attackers against the Israeli occupying forces, mostly in 
the SSNP (André-Dessornes, 2013). Identifying exact numbers and 
percentages is difficult, if not impossible, as several interviewees stressed 
(interviewees 2, 7, 8, 44). This is due to the secretive (and often highly 
unorganised) nature of many non-state armed groups, and the fact that 
many militias either did not keep any archives during the war or archival 
holdings were destroyed during the war or in the post-war years 
(interviewees 2, 7, 8, 44). Any figures, both on the overall numbers of 
fighters and the percentage of female militia members, can thus only be 
rough estimates. Based on triangulation of interview data with the highly 
limited information available from secondary literature, I estimate that (at 
the beginning of the war) the overall number of fighters in the LCP was 
between 3000 and 6000 (interviewees 1, 2, 7; Badran, 2008), the percentage 
of female militants between 20 and 60% (interviewees 1, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 
32, 54), and the percentage of female fighters up to 15% (interviewees 1, 22, 
23, 27, 31, 32, 54). The PFLP was a small militia, with only a few hundred 
fighters at the beginning of the war (interviewees 67, 68, 69). The 
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percentage of female fighters is likely to have been slightly lower than in the 
LCP (interviewees 61, Badran, 2008). The percentage of female fighters in 
Fatah was considerably lower than in the PFLP (interviewees 1, 14, 18, 52 
61, 67, 68, 69). At the beginning of the war, Kataeb had between 4000 and 
6000 fighters (interviewees 1, 7, 55, 57, Badran, 2008). Of these, an 
estimated 2-7.5% were female fighters, with the exact figure probably being 
more in the lower end of the scale (interviewees 2, 16, 41, 44, 55, 57). In the 
case of Amal, numbers were probably very low as well. 
 
Individual motivations: women’s insistence to be included 
 
Contrary to the findings of some scholars working on female participation in 
other contexts, coercion did not play a role during the civil war in Lebanon. 
The women who participated in the war did so out of their own choice. Faced 
with the extreme security context and perceived injustice at the outbreak of 
the war, women were highly motivated and insisted that they be included in 
combat positions. This was the most important factor in bringing about 
female participation in the militias. It is unlikely that women had participated 
as fighters, if it had not been for the women insisting to be included. The 
women involved in the militias largely shared the same motivations as men. 
A minority of interviewees mentioned gender-specific motivations, such as 
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the fight for women’s liberation and gender equality. As far as individual 
backgrounds are concerned, there were no major differences between the 
men and women who joined the militias involved in the war. They were 
often young and many had personal links to the militias – either through 
friends or family members. For many, non-violent activism was a pathway 
into violent roles. The fact that women’s rights and gender equality were de 
facto not a priority for many militias did not stop women from joining.  
 
Organisational characteristics 
 
After women’s insistence to be involved, the second most important factors 
were organisational characteristics. When the women insisted on being 
included as fighters, they were included in those militias that believed in 
women’s rights and gender equality. This explains the high percentages of 
female involvement in the LCP, PFLP and the Communist Action Organisation 
(CAO) – a small communist LNM militia. Those militias with both secular and 
religious influences with a more ambiguous position on women’s roles, such 
as Kataeb, Fatah and Amal, saw a lower level of female involvement. In the 
same vein, the main reason why women were not included as fighters in the 
militias of the PSP was the party’s de facto gender ideology. The case of the 
PSP stresses the importance of looking beyond official labels when assessing 
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an organisation’s gender ideology and instead taking into account de facto 
practices. Similarly, the reason Amal did not allow women to join as fighters 
until 1978 was the gender ideology the group ascribed to. Amal’s gender 
ideology allowed female participation in combat only under very specific 
conditions. It prescribed that female involvement in combat was only 
permitted in a situation of defence against an external invader – the 
resistance against whom was perceived as legitimate in religious terms. 
Internal structure and dynamics also played a role in facilitating female 
involvement in the militias. The militias of the far-left (including the LCP, CAO 
and PFLP) whose leadership was in favour of female participation, included 
women from the outset. In those organisations whose leadership was 
undivided in their opposition to female deployment, women did not 
participate in combat (namely in the PSP and in Amal before 1978). In the 
militias in which the leadership was divided (such as in Kataeb and Fatah), a 
window of opportunity for women’s involvement was opened. Lastly, nearly 
all organisations which deployed female fighters had had a long tradition of 
engaging women in separate women’s units. Several interviewees saw this 
factor as crucial in the later participation of female militia members in 
general, and female combatants in particular, as it provided women with a 
space to gain political experience and confidence before the war started. As 
far as external relations of the militias are concerned, the Lebanese left was 
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clearly inspired by the role of the women in the Palestinian revolution. 
Female members of the Christian militias, however, did not have similar role 
models for female involvement, which is likely to be another factor 
contributing to the relatively low numbers of female fighters in the Christian 
militias.  Lastly, organisational aims, age and size did not play any significant 
role, as both organisations with domestic aims as well as those with an 
international agenda included female fighters. There is some evidence that 
the specific project for the nation-state the various militias were fighting for 
played a role in the inclusion of female fighters.   
 
The security context 
 
In those militias with organisational characteristics that were not conducive 
to the inclusion of female combatants (including organisational gender 
ideology and the leadership’s position on female employment in combat) 
female participation was nevertheless rendered possible due to security 
pressure. Ideological considerations were overcome when the militias were 
confronted with increasing security pressures. The same security pressures 
and perceived injustice that had led individuals to join the militias at the 
beginning of the war facilitated female involvement on the organisational 
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level. The evolving levels of female involvement throughout the war 
illustrate this clearly.  
 
Societal factors 
 
The main reason why female participation in combat remained relatively 
low, especially when compared with other conflict contexts, was high levels 
of societal opposition to female involvement in the war. Lebanon had 
started to undergo a process of development towards a more gender-
progressive society in the 1960s and 1970s. These trends were amplified by 
the war; however, Lebanon remained a comparatively gender-conservative 
society, with relatively high levels of opposition to female involvement in 
combat. While there was considerable intra- and inter-community variation, 
overall most Lebanese did not see a role for women on the frontlines. Those 
militias that defied communal gender norms and expectations by involving 
women in combat roles, navigated their relations with the communities with 
a number of tactical steps, both on a practical and a narrative level, in order 
to prevent negative reactions from the communities.  
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1.6 | Civil war(s) in Lebanon  
 
Before moving on to the overview of the structure of this thesis, I will provide 
a brief discussion of the different phases of the Lebanese civil war, its main 
actors and the debate about its causes. This section is not intended to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the war and its causes, which is already 
covered by others (Fisk, 2001, Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012). Instead, it aims 
to provide sufficient context for the activities of the militias whose decision-
making I analyse in this study.  
 
Phases of the war 
 
The Lebanese civil war lasted for almost sixteen years, from 1975 to 1990. It 
can be divided into four stages.9 When describing the different stages of the 
war it is imperative to take into account regional differences, as different 
parts of the country were subjected to fighting and occupation at different 
times and to various degrees.    
                                                          
9  For an alternative analysis of the different stages of the war, see Hirst, 2010: 102-
103. 
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Phase 1: Spring 1975 to Summer / Autumn 1976  
 
It is generally assumed that war in Lebanon was ignited by two incidents –
the shooting of protesting fishermen in Saida in February 1975, and armed 
clashes between members of the Christian militias on the one side and 
Palestinian militants on the other in Ain al-Rummaneh in East Beirut in April 
of that year (Abul-Husn, 1998: 2). David Hirst, however, describes these 
rightly as the last two of a series of violent incidents leading to the outbreak 
of war (Hirst, 2011: 99-102). This first stage of the war was dominated by 
fighting between Palestinian and Lebanese leftist militia members in one 
camp and Christian militia members in the other camp (Mackey, 2006: 157, 
Hirst, 2011: 109-110). As Hirst argues, “in the initial phase, 1975-6, it was the 
civil war that predominated”, with Lebanese actors leading the way (Hirst, 
2010: 108-109). Regional politics did not play a major role yet (Hirst, 2010: 
108-109). The first phase was marked by massacres – mostly in Beirut, such 
as during the Black Saturday massacres in December 1975 and mass killings 
in Karantina, Maslakh, Damour and Tel el-Zaatar in 1976 (Mackey, 2006: 164; 
Hirst, 2010: 114), as well as inner-city fighting, such as during the Battle of 
the Hotels in Beirut in late 1975 and early 1976 (Hirst, 2010: 111). The city 
was divided along what was called the Green Line – a demarcation line 
dividing Beirut into a majority Muslim part in the West and a majority 
23 
 
Christian part in the East (Mackey, 2006: 165). Towards the end of this first 
stage of the war, the fighting largely turned from battles over ideology to 
fighting over petty interests (Mackey, 2006: 162-163). The first phase of the 
war ended with an invasion by the Syrian army, which happened over three 
stages from April to October 1976 (Hirst, 2010: 114). Finally, a diplomatic 
intervention of the Arab world resulted in a ceasefire (Hirst, 2010: 114-115). 
 
Phase 2: Early 1977 to Summer 1982  
 
The Syrian intervention and following ceasefire ended the war, but not the 
crisis. The grievances which had led to the outbreak of the war in Spring 1975 
were not addressed (Mackey, 2006: 166-167; Hirst, 2010: 115), and the 
Syrians were “unwilling and unable to suppress the various militias” 
(Johnson, 2001: 224). In fact, in some parts of the country, namely the South, 
the fighting actually intensified. Bomb explosions and assassinations took 
place in other parts of the country too. Winslow argues that what had 
changed was the following: 
 
[A]fter 1976, Lebanese were not pitted against other 
Lebanese to win control over the whole Republic. Instead 
they fought to carve out a piece of the country either for 
themselves or as proxies in the regional competition for 
strategic control (Winslow, 1996: 212).  
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Overall, the phase from 1977 to 1982 can be seen as a “sullen three-way 
stalemate” between Christian militias, Lebanese and Palestinian leftists, and 
the Syrians (Mackey, 2006: 173). Militias of the different camps started to 
turn against each other, as seen for example, in the intra-Christian fighting 
that resulted in the massacres of Ehden in the Summer of 1978 and Safra in 
the Summer of 1980. Musa Sadr, the leader of the Amal Movement, 
disappeared on a visit to Libya in August 1978 (Mackey, 2006: 201). He has 
been celebrated as a martyr by large parts of the Lebanese Shia community 
since and continues to inspire Shia-dominated political parties (and their 
militias during the war), such as Amal and Hezbollah. In March 1978, the 
Israeli army carried out its first big invasion, named Operation Litani by the 
Israelis, into the South of Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal, the UN sent 
UNIFIL troops to patrol the border (Mackey, 2006: 173). However, the 
conflict in the South was not resolved, and skirmishes between the Lebanese 
army, pro-Israeli Christian militias such as Saad Haddad’s South Lebanon 
Army (SLA), the Israeli army and Palestinian militants and their Lebanese 
allies, continued.  
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Phase 3: Summer 1982 to Spring 1985 
 
In June 1982, after years of low-scale conflict along the Lebanese-Israeli 
border between the Israeli army, their Lebanese allies and Lebanese and 
Palestinian opponents, the second major Israeli invasion of Lebanon took 
place (Mackey, 2006: 175-176). The invasion had three main aims: (1) to 
destroy the infrastructure of the PLO, (2) to establish a new political order in 
Lebanon under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel – one of the senior 
members and leaders of Kataeb and the LF, in order to (3) reach an Israeli-
Lebanese peace treaty and drive the Syrian army out of Lebanon (El-Solh, 
2004: 339-340). The invasion was based on an agreement between Bashir 
Gemayel and his supporters and the Israeli regime. However, asked by the 
Israelis to storm West Beirut which was held by Lebanese and Palestinian 
leftist militias, Bashir Gemayel’s LF refused (Hirst, 2010: 149 – 150). In the 
following weeks, the Israeli army besieged and shelled West Beirut until the 
Palestinian political leadership, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), agreed to leave the country in August, facilitated by the American 
government (Winslow, 1996: 233-234, Mackey, 2006: 178- 181). As planned, 
Bashir Gemayel was elected President in September. However, he was 
assassinated shortly afterwards (Mackey, 2006: 181 – 182). In response to 
the killing, Christian Lebanese militias supported by the Israeli army 
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committed the massacres of the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps 
in Beirut (Mackey, 2006: 183-184, Hirst 2010: 154-160). These developments 
led the French, Italian and US American troops – who had been on the 
ground to monitor the evacuation of the PLO, to re-enter Beirut (Winslow, 
1996: 235). This Multinational Force remained in the country until a major 
attack by Hezbollah killed over 300 French and US American soldiers in 
October 1983 (Hirst, 2010: 194-196). Israel then pulled out of most of 
Lebanon at the end of 1982 (Mackey, 2006: 244). However, it continued to 
occupy an extended “security zone” in the South, which included Saida – one 
of Lebanon’s three major cities, until June 1985. In 1985, after “three years 
of increasingly brutal occupation”, the Israelis left all of the South of Lebanon 
except for a smaller buffer zone near the border (Hirst, 2010: 196-204). It 
was during this time that Hezbollah, a new Shia Islamist militia, was formally 
founded by former members of the Amal Movement, even though some 
analysts date the formation of the group to the early 1980s (Hirst, 2010: 187; 
Mackey, 2006: 206-207). In the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal from 
their positions in the Shouf Mountains in late 1983, fighting broke out 
between the PSP militia and their leftist allies – supported by Syria and the 
PLO on one side, and the LF, the Lebanese Army and Israel on the other. 
During the Mountain War, French and Americans intervened in support of 
the Christian militias (Mackey, 2006: 189-190). 
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Phase 4: June 1985 to Autumn 1990  
 
During the last five years of the war, Lebanon went through a particularly 
destructive phase of fighting. Former allies increasingly turned against each 
other, and intra-sectarian battles resulted in some of the bloodiest parts of 
the war (Hirst, 2010: 208). While kidnappings of Lebanese had been a 
frequent occurrence since the beginning of the war, now kidnappings of 
foreigners also increased considerably (Hirst, 2010: 225, Mackey, 2006: 213 
– 221). 
 
The fighting went on and on. But less and less, now, did it 
serve any discernible military or strategic purpose; it was 
more and more the institutional, the pathological, activity of 
a self-perpetuating warrior caste divorced from the society, 
and its conflicting causes, which had spawned it (Hirst, 2010: 
207). 
 
 
One example of fighting between former allies and even members of the 
same militia, is the confrontation between two fractions of the LF following 
the failed Tripartite Accord at the end of 1985 – a Syrian-brokered attempt 
at ending the war and ensuring Syrian hegemony by bringing together 
leaders of the LF, Amal and the PSP (Winslow 1996: 251, 254-256). Another 
example of intra-alliance and intra-sect fighting is the War of the Camps, 
which started in the spring of 1985 and prompted the Syrian army to enter 
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West Beirut in 1987 and 1988 to save their ally Amal, from their opponents 
(which included Palestinians, their leftist allies, and Hezbollah) (Hirst, 2010: 
233-236, Mackey, 2006: 250-252, 256, Winslow, 1996: 265). In 1988, the 
term of Amin Gemayel (who had been elected after the assassination in 1982 
of his brother Bashir), as President of the Republic, ended.  The parliament, 
as well as “the outside powers which traditionally influenced its choice”, 
could not agree on a new president and so for a brief period of time, the 
country had two rival governments (Hirst, 2010: 209). In October 1989, in 
the resort of Taif in Saudi Arabia, “[c]onciliation and mediation by a high-
profile and authoritative Arab League committee […] were finally successful” 
(Abul-Husn, 1998: 5). Lebanese deputies approved a Charter of 
Reconciliation and elected a new president (Winslow, 1996: 274). However, 
the fighting continued, until President Hrawi called for support from the 
Syrian army (Winslow, 1996: 276-279), which invaded the country and 
stopped the fighting in October 1990 (Hirst, 2010: 213-214). In the following 
months, “[w]ith the help, and sometimes under the control, of the Syrian 
army”, the new regime disarmed and dissolved all militias, except for 
Hezbollah (Hirst, 2010: 215-216). 
 
Key non-state armed political actors  
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At the beginning of the war, two main camps were opposing each other. Key 
non-state armed actors included the members of the LNM – which 
comprised of Lebanese and Palestinian socialist, communist and Arab 
Nationalist organisations, and the LFr – which brought together Christian 
parties and militias (El-Solh, 2004: 324, Abul-Husn, 1998: 3-5). Moreover, 
some organisations were not formally part of the LNM but politically close 
to it. This includes the Amal Movement – which, despite not formally being 
a member, coordinated its activities with the LNM in the beginning of the 
war (Abul-Husn, 1998: 4). In short, the LNM fought for a new socio-economic 
and political order, for an end of Maronite domination of the political 
system, and for Palestinian rights and their armed presence in Lebanon 
(Traboulsi, 2012). The LFr on the other hand, fought for the preservation of 
the status quo in the country and against the presence of armed Palestinian 
groups in Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2012). While these were the alliances at the 
beginning of the war, in the later stages, many former allies started turning 
against each other, which resulted in bloody intra-alliance and even intra-
group fighting. In the 1980s, a new group of non-state actors emerged – 
namely parties with a distinctive Islamist agenda, such as Hezbollah (Norton, 
2014).   
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Causes of the war  
 
More than twenty-five years after the end of the war (which lasted from 
1975 to 1990), there is no single narrative of what caused the war. An 
overview of the different causes will be provided here for context. The most 
commonly cited causes of the war include sectarian divisions, political 
factors, economic aspects and external factors. Most academic authors 
highlight the multitude of reasons that led to war in Lebanon and maintain 
that singling out one reason would be an over simplification (Winslow, 1996, 
Abul-Husn, 1998, Fisk, 2001, Mackey, 2006, Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012). 
Some also stress that while several main themes might have been at stake, 
different antagonisms played a role at the various stages of the conflict, 
depending on the “ebb and flow of the issue in dispute” (Abul-Husn 1998: 2-
3).  
The Lebanese civil war has often been described as religious in nature 
(Johnson, 2001: 21), with authors presenting it as “just another round of 
conflict in a sectarian system” (Johnson, 2001: 23). Indeed, 
“[i]ntercommunal tension has been a feature of the modern state of 
Lebanon since its creation” in 1920 (Abul-Husn, 1998: 2-3), and the Lebanese 
civil war did have a sectarian dimension. However, the majority of analysts 
agree that the war was not fundamentally a religious conflict (Abul-Husn, 
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1998: 2-3; see also Bechara, 2003: 32, Mackey, 2006: 93-94). The fact that, 
especially in the West, it was assumed early on that the civil war was fought 
about religious questions (Mackey, 2006: 91) is likely to be a reflection of 
widespread assumptions about Lebanon and the Middle East rather than the 
actual nature of the conflict. Indeed, many Western interpretations of 
conflict in the Middle East continue to be read through a colonial lens, 
essentialising and othering the region and its peoples as violent, uncivilised 
and primordial (Said, 1979, Zelizer et al., 2002, Little, 2008, Khalidi, 2010).  
Another strand of literature on the Lebanese civil war, highlights political 
factors. Lebanon’s political leaders had developed a very specific political 
power-sharing agreement and conflict regulation mechanism which 
“offered each community an opportunity to contribute to the political 
process in the country according to its numerical weight” (Abul-Husn, 1998: 
3-4). The lack of flexibility of this particular form of confessionalism 
contributed to the increasing alienation of Lebanese Arab Nationalists and 
leftists (El-Solh, 2004: 334, Abul-Husn, 1998: 3-4). According to this approach 
of explaining the war, hostilities broke out over divergent interests in 
changing the “existing power-sharing formula” (Abul-Husn, 1998: 3). 
Leftists’ calls for the “establish[ment of] a new economic and political order” 
and for reforms had been made since the early 1970s (El-Solh, 2004: 331). 
The “polarisation of the Lebanese parties along a left-right dichotomy”, and 
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between those who “wanted a secular state with social, economic and 
political reforms and those who support[ed] ‘traditional chieftains, urban 
notables, business tycoons’ who run the system” had become increasingly 
pronounced (Mackerey, 2006: 161, El-Solh, 2004: 331, Hirst, 2010: 89). 
Related to this were competing Lebanese nationalisms and the question of 
whether Lebanon was (to be) closer to the Arab or Western world (Johnson, 
2001: 24, El-Solh, 2004: ix, 2-9, Mackerey, 2009: 158). 
Not many analysts focus on economic reasons for the war (Traboulsi, 2007, 
who analyses the war from a political economy perspective, is a notable 
exception). This remains the case even though one of the triggering events 
of the war was the killing of the politician and activist Marouf Saad, who was 
killed at a demonstration of fishermen addressing economic grievances in 
Saida in early 1975 (Mackey, 2009: 156). Authors taking into account 
economic factors highlight the fact that the LNM and its allies did not only 
call for a new political order but also for economic reforms (Mackey, 2006: 
161), and that one of the reasons especially Palestinians and Shia Muslims 
engaged in the war was to challenge the traditional clientelist system that 
preserved economic interests of two dominating societal groups – the 
Maronites, and, to a lesser degree, Sunni Muslims (Johnson, 2001: 5-7; see 
also Mackey, 2006: 95-103). Others believe that the country’s economic 
marginality made it more prone to conflict (Winslow, 1996: 3) or point to the 
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role economic factors played in fuelling the war once it had started (Johnson, 
2001: 226). 
Lastly, another frequently quoted cause for the war is external factors, 
pointing to (1) the activities of Palestinian organisations and (2) the role of a 
number of Middle Eastern states as well as general developments in the 
region. The main external actors were Syria, the Palestinians and Israel 
(Abul-Husn, 1998: 4), even though one could argue that the Palestinians 
were only semi-external, considering that large parts of the community had 
fled to Lebanon as a result of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and had been 
refugees in the country since then. Since the expulsion from their homeland 
in 1948, Palestinian militants had used Lebanon as a base in their fight 
against Israel, and Israel often targeted Lebanon in its preventive, pre-
emptive and retaliatory operations (Mackey, 2006: 142, 150, Hirst, 2010: 92, 
95). In 1969, decades of oppression of Palestinians in Lebanon led to the 
intifada of the camps (Hirst, 2010: 76-78), during which Palestinians and 
leftist Lebanese – who had been radicalised by the 1967 Israeli-Arab war and 
internal discord within the Lebanese state and society, confronted the 
Lebanese army (Hirst, 2010: 90, 96-97, Mackey, 2006: 144-145). The 
Lebanese government had tried to discipline or destroy the Palestinian 
organisations to no avail and so in autumn 1969, in the Egyptian-brokered 
Cairo Agreement, it agreed to Palestinian militias operating from Lebanese 
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soil (Hirst, 2010: 94). This was seen as threat to national interests by the 
Maronite elite, especially since many of the Palestinians were Sunni Muslims 
and thus had the potential to contribute to an imbalance of the traditional 
sectarian makeup of the Lebanese state and society. In fact, many deprived 
Sunnis, Shia, Druze and some “Christian intellectuals who shared the 
revolutionary aspirations of the Palestinian movement” sympathised with 
the Palestinians and their cause (Mackey, 2006: 143). The Christian Kataeb 
party started to strengthen their already existing militia, with others joining 
in (Hirst, 2010: 98, Mackey, 2006: 145-146). The situation intensified when 
the PLO was expelled from Jordan in September 1970 and made Lebanon 
their new political base (Mackey, 2006: 147). In 1975, one of the two 
triggering events of the war (the other being the killing of Marouf Saad in 
Saida), involved Palestinian fighters in the massacre of Ain Al-Rummaneh. 
However, the degree to which the Palestinian presence in Lebanon 
contributed to the outbreak of the war is contested. On the one hand, some 
suggest that external factors “exacerbated but did not cause the conflict” 
(Abul-Husn, 1998: 131). On the other hand, there is the claim that “had it 
not been for the PLO’s militarization of Lebanese politics (and the responsive 
militarization of the Maronites), all the socioeconomic and confessional 
tensions in Lebanon could have been contained by the Lebanese state” 
(Johnson, 2001: 24). The Lebanese civil war had a distinct regional dimension 
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– and not just because of the involvement of the Palestinian militias (Hirst, 
2010: 102-103). In addition to Syria and Israel, the states of Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Libya (and later Iran), were directly or indirectly involved (Hirst, 
2010: 108; El-Solh, 2004: 300-301). This outside support – which each militia 
involved in the conflict benefitted from, intensified and prolonged the 
conflict, especially since the supporting states were often entangled in inter-
Arab discord and rivalries (Mackey, 2006: 247, Abul-Husn, 1998: 4). As 
Johnson rightly put it, “[i]t would be naïve to think that the Lebanese fighters 
were innocents manipulated by outside forces,” but they could not have 
fought as long and as fiercely without the support of regional states 
(Johnson, 2001: 225-226). The relation between Lebanese militias and their 
outside supporters was often one of mutual exploitation, purely to the 
perceived benefit of their own group or state (Winslow, 1996: 6).  
 
1.7 | Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. After Chapter One, this introduction, 
Chapter Two provides a detailed review of relevant existing literature and 
outlines the theoretical framework from which this study is approached. I 
discuss existing literature and highlight the contribution to knowledge this 
study makes. I show that in much of the literature on political violence, the 
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question of female combatants has been omitted and that most 
contributions from the (limited) body of literature on female political 
violence focuses on the individual level only, without taking into account 
what causal factors drive an organisation to allow female participation in 
combat. I also discuss the theoretical framework used for the purpose of this 
study and show how theories on involvement in political violence and on 
organisational decision-making and behaviour in non-state armed groups 
can help us to understand organisational motivations for the inclusion of 
female fighters. In Chapter Three, I discuss methodological choices I have 
made and what the epistemological assumptions underpinning my research 
are. The study of political violence can be approached via a range of different 
approaches; in this chapter, I explain why I have decided to conduct a 
comparative small-n study examining the two groups of cases I have chosen 
to look at in this study. I also give an overview of the adopted research 
method, the general research context as well as practical questions including 
case selection, sampling and access. Two separate sections are dedicated to 
data management and analysis as well as researcher reflexivity and ethics.  
In Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, I examine the four explanations that 
can be found in the literature of why non-state armed organisations decide 
to allow female fighters within their ranks. Each of these chapters discusses 
the findings of my research in regard to existing literature on organisational 
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decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters, comparing and 
contrasting findings of my research with claims in the existing literature. 
Chapter Four is dedicated to individual motivations and the reasons why 
women decided to join the militias and insist on their inclusion as fighters. I 
examine the extent to which coercion played a role in the recruitment of 
female fighters, look at the women’s backgrounds, and examine if there 
were any differences between men’s and women’s motivations. Chapter 
Five looks at organisational characteristics and the role organisational 
ideology, aims, age, size and internal dynamics played in the groups’ 
decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters. Chapter Six analyses the 
role of the security context in which an organisation operated. I examine to 
what extent claims made in the existing literature that non-state armed 
organisations employ women to avoid detection, seek attention or assert a 
position can be confirmed with regards to groups operating during the civil 
war in Lebanon. Chapter Seven is dedicated to the importance of societal 
and communal norms and expectations within the society a non-state armed 
organisation is based or operating in. I highlight which factors facilitated 
women’s participation in the militias, which factors inhibited it, and how the 
militias managed communal gender expectations that conflicted with their 
organisational strategies. Chapter Eight is the conclusion in which I 
summarise the findings of my research, analyse the interplay between the 
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four different factors, describe limitations of the study, make 
recommendations for policy and practice, and sketch scope for future 
research. Before that, in the next chapter, I will provide a critical analysis of 
existing relevant literature and outline the theoretical framework of my 
research.  
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Chapter 2 | A Multi-Level, 
Process- and Context-Focused 
Approach 
 
Before embarking on the empirical analysis of why non-state armed groups 
operating during the Lebanese civil war decided to include female fighters, 
this chapter discusses the theoretical framework adopted (part I below). It 
also reviews the existing literature on organisational motivations for the 
inclusion of women in non-state armed groups (part II). This chapter 
discusses the strengths and limitations of different theoretical approaches 
to the study of women’s involvement in political violence, and organisational 
decision-making behind female participation in violent conflict. It shows how 
combining several of these approaches allows for a multi-level, process-
focused and context-based approach, which helps avoid some of the pitfalls 
associated with studies of political violence.  
 
Bridging the divide between conflict and terrorism studies 
 
With regards to existing literature, one aim of this study is to contribute to 
bridging the divide between conflict and terrorism studies. Despite both 
disciplines focusing on non-state armed political violence (often studying the 
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same violent conflicts and armed groups), the literature tends to be very 
segregated. With regards to the topic of female political violence, the divide 
is particularly strong. Many scholars working on female political violence 
within a terrorism studies framework do not quote previous works by 
academics who approach the topic from a conflict studies perspective (see 
for example Cunningham, 2003, Victor, 2003, Berko and Erez, 2007b, Berko 
and Erez, 2007a, Schweitzer, 2007, Von Knop, 2007, Cunningham, 2008, 
Jacques and Taylor, 2008, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, 
Jacques and Taylor, 2009, O'Rourke, 2009, Cunningham, 2010, Bloom, 2011, 
Davis, 2017). To a certain extent, the same is true for conflict studies scholars 
(notable exceptions include Hamilton, 2007, Eager, 2008, Alison, 2009, 
Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015, Henshaw, 2016). Whilst it is understandable that 
different groups of scholars feel that the work of some academics is more 
relevant to their research than that of others, it is perplexing that the divide 
between the two disciplines often results in the complete omission of the 
work of the other group – even when both work on the same non-state 
armed groups and conflicts. 
Although most of the organisations I analyse in the empirical part of this 
study are not usually referred to as terrorist groups, I draw on literature from 
both conflict and terrorism studies. By doing so I join a number of 
researchers who contend that the distinction between “terrorist” actors on 
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the one hand, and other non-state perpetrators of political violence on the 
other hand, is often artificial as most non-state armed groups (and indeed 
many state actors as well), resort to a number of different violent tactics 
(Ness, 2005: 357, Khalil, 2013, Moghadam et al., 2014).  
Part I | Involvement in political violence: a theoretical 
framework 
 
Female involvement in political violence remains a comparatively under-
researched sub-field of studies of violent conflict (Henshaw, 2016). One 
major criticism of existing studies is their lack of theoretical foundations 
(Alison, 2009). Many interpretivist studies of female political violence work 
within feminist theory or gender studies frameworks, and include detailed 
discussions of these frameworks (examples include Peteet, 1991, Vázquez, 
1997, Shayne, 1999, West, 2000, Alison, 2009, Parashar, 2009, Roy, 2012, 
Shekhawat, 2012, Katto, 2014, Parashar, 2014, Magadla, 2015, Veneracion-
Rallonza, 2015). Positivist studies of female political violence on the other 
hand, often lack a sound theoretical basis (see for example Cunningham, 
2003, Berko and Erez, 2007a, Berko and Erez, 2007b, Cunningham, 2008, 
Speckhard, 2008, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008, Bloom, 2011).  Positivist 
empirical studies on female political violence typically include a section on 
either the history of the term terrorism, or on the particular conflict context 
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they focus on (see for example Cunningham, 2003, Berko and Erez, 2007a, 
Berko and Erez, 2007b, Cunningham, 2008, Bloom, 2011). Unless the study 
takes a feminist theory approach, a refined theoretical framework that goes 
beyond a terminological or historical discussion of terrorism or political 
violence is often missing.  
This underrepresentation of theory can be found not just in empirical studies 
on female involvement in political violence, but also in empirical studies on 
involvement in political violence in general (Jackson, 2007). Traditionally, 
studies of political violence – especially those undertaken from a terrorism 
studies angle, have been extremely theory-heavy – often without including 
any empirical evidence (Dolnik, 2013b). On the other end of the spectrum, 
many mainstream empirical studies of the topic are characterised by the 
tendency to not include a rigourous theoretical framework. So while many 
mainstream studies on involvement in political violence are almost 
exclusively theory-based, many empirical studies of the topic lack an explicit 
theoretical foundation. As highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, most 
mainstream literature on involvement in political violence overlooks the role 
of women. Combining general theories on involvement in violent conflict 
with explanations of female political violence allows us to develop a 
theoretical framework for empirical studies on women’s involvement in 
violent conflict. Combined, the two sets of theories have the potential to 
43 
 
overcome the problem of including theory in empirical studies on the topic. 
For this reason, I merge general theories on involvement in political violence 
(which often overlook the roles of women) and explanations of female 
political violence (which often lack a robust theoretical basis), in this chapter. 
Since both theories on involvement in political violence in general and those 
studies focusing on women’s involvement tend to focus on the individual 
(rather than the organisational) level, I combine the two sets of theories with 
organisational decision-making approaches. This will be discussed in section 
two of this chapter.  
This thesis does not aim to explicitly contribute to feminist theory or gender 
studies; rather, it takes an empirical interest in gender and women’s studies. 
This approach is mainly due to the particular research question I am asking 
in this thesis, and the fact that I am interested in causes for organisational 
decision-making on female involvement, rather than on the meaning 
attached to their participation. In taking this approach, I join a number of 
other scholars working on female political violence (including Cunningham, 
2003, Cunningham, 2008, Speckhard, 2008, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 
2008, Cunningham, 2010, Bloom, 2011, Parkinson, 2013).  
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2.1 | Theories on involvement in political violence 
 
Existing debates on involvement in political violence have tended to evolve 
around four broad themes, which all highlight different aspects of how and 
why involvement in violent conflict can be explained. These include: (1) the 
question of structure vs. agency, (2) greed vs. grievances, (3) psychological 
vs. rational explanations, and (4) context-based and process-based 
approaches. These approaches are not always mutually exclusive. Indeed, in 
some cases, there is considerable overlap, with some analysts combining 
insights from different schools of thought to develop our understanding of 
involvement in political violence.10 For the sake of clarity, I will look at the 
key elements of the different approaches separately in the following section. 
 
Structure or agency 
 
Debates on involvement in political violence in the literature focusing on 
insurgencies, rebellions, revolutions and civil war were traditionally 
dominated by state-centric theories. Leading authors, such as Skocpol 
                                                          
10 The terms involvement, recruitment or mobilisation on the one hand, and 
radicalisation on the other, are often used indiscriminately, suggesting they describe the 
same process. However, as John Horgan (2013) has pointed out, involvement in political 
violence does not necessarily require radicalisation nor is radicalisation followed by 
involvement in political violence in all cases. This is why I use the more neutral term 
involvement in political violence, which can – but does not necessarily need to – be 
paralleled by a process of radicalisation. 
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(1979) and Goodwin (2001), considered the state, its capabilities and the 
political context states create as key factors in how political violence can be 
explained. Studies of political violence often focused on states rather than 
individuals or organisations (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012: 143). In recent years, 
state-centric approaches were increasingly criticised for their failure to take 
into account the agency and autonomy of individuals and organisations 
involved in political violence (Staniland, 2014: 3-4). Research on civil wars 
has witnessed a shift away from quantitative, cross-national comparisons to 
more qualitative, sub-national studies (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012: 143), often 
combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. A similar shift from 
studies focusing on states to research on individuals and organisations 
occurred in the field of terrorism studies. Whilst terrorism studies focused 
very much on state terrorism in its earlier stages, the unit of analysis now is 
mostly individuals and, to a lesser degree, organisations (Horgan and Boyle, 
2008, Jackson, 2008). Similarly, recent studies focusing on civil war and rebel 
movements stress the importance of taking into account the roles of 
individuals and organisations (as well as communities), in the study of 
political violence (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012, Guichaoua, 2012, Gutierrez 
Sanin, 2012, Arjona et al., 2015). However, the question of which roles 
structure and agency play is still being debated in the conflict studies 
literature, often now with a focus on organisations rather than states (see 
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for example Weinstein, 2006: 20-22). The focus in these debates lies on the 
question of whether it is organisational characteristics or deliberate 
decision-making which shape the behaviour of non-state armed groups. 
These debates on structure or agency in the conflict studies literature reflect 
very similar debates that have been led in the field of terrorism studies since 
the 1980s, when Crenshaw discussed the role organisational characteristics 
and external constraints play in the decision-making of, as she calls them, 
terrorist groups (Crenshaw, 1987). 
 
Psychological approaches and rational perspectives 
 
While state-centric and structuralist theories had a place in early debates on 
terrorism (Horgan and Boyle, 2008), another set of theories had an even 
wider impact on debates in involvement in political violence in the field of 
terrorism studies. Psychological approaches to the analysis of involvement 
in political violence have been drawn upon, mostly by terrorism scholars, 
since the 1960s and 1970s (see for example Hubbard, 1971, Laqueur, 1977, 
Post, 1990). Many earlier studies of this strand of literature attempt to 
explain involvement in political violence by focusing on supposed 
psychological problems on the individual level (Hubbard, 1971, Laqueur, 
1977, Post, 1990). As per this approach, individuals and organisations that 
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perpetrate political violence are characterised by their irrational behaviour. 
They are essentially different from individuals and organisations not 
involved in political violence. In this vein, the field was long characterised by 
attempts, especially by scholars with a background in psychology, to identify 
profiles and specific psychological features of perpetrators of political 
violence. While psychological approaches to the explanation of terrorism 
had its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, they remain largely influential, 
particularly in the media and non-academic discourses. 
In recent years, these earlier psychological approaches to political violence 
have been increasingly criticised. Empirical studies on political violence 
stress that most individuals involved in terrorism (or other forms of political 
violence) are not inherently different to those not involved in violent 
movements (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler, 2006, Sageman, 2008, Horgan, 
2009). Instead of essentialising perpetrators of political violence, more 
recent empirical studies stress that elements of rationality can be identified 
in the decision-making and behaviour of perpetrators of political violence. 
Rather than focusing on (supposed) psychological problems, rational 
approaches contend that, on a psychological level, individuals (and 
organisations) that perpetrate political violence are not inherently or 
essentially different than people who do not get involved in political 
violence. They stress that even seemingly irrational actions such as suicide 
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bombings can be guided by rational motives (Hafez, 2007: 218, Hassan, 
2011: 48, 50). An illustrative example in this context is a study by 
Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2006), which explains why the decision to join 
(and stay involved with) an illegal organisation can, despite the related costs, 
constitute a rational decision to the individual, by focusing on the perceived 
inner logic of high-risk behaviour: 
 
[T[he perceived spiritual payoffs outweighed the risks and 
costs associated with activism for those who chose to 
participate. Indoctrinated individuals viewed activism and 
even risk itself as means to achieve salvation and entrance 
into Paradise. […] From this perspective, the strategy of high 
cost/risk is strategically rational (Wiktorowicz and 
Kaltenthaler 2006: 302). 
 
In their study, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler focus on a religious group. 
However, there is no doubt that secular sets of beliefs can be just as strong 
and powerful as those based on religious interpretations.  
Most leading terrorism studies scholars now concede that the actions of 
perpetrators of political violence are characterised by elements of rationality 
(Horgan, 2009, Dalton and Asal, 2011, Shapiro, 2013). The discipline of 
conflict studies has undergone a very similar process, with theories stressing 
the alleged irrationality of rebels and insurgents being increasingly replaced 
by approaches that underline elements of rationality in the behaviour of 
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non-state armed groups and their members (Lichbach, 1998, Guichaoua, 
2012, Gurr, 2012). Nevertheless, despite such studies, the assumption that 
perpetrators of political violence are irrational (or even mentally disturbed) 
remains widespread. This claim is particularly common when speaking of 
female perpetrators of (political) violence (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). It is 
linked to highly simplistic and often inaccurate depictions of female 
perpetrators of political violence, which are based on widespread gender 
stereotypes (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). These gendered assumptions 
continue to dominate some of the academic literature on involvement in 
political violence, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.   
Some terrorism studies authors have developed and redefined the 
psychological explanations discussed here since the 1990s. Rather than 
implying that involvement in political violence can be explained by 
psychological disorders, they now often focus on how contextual factors, 
such as state violence and ongoing violent conflict, affect and motivate 
individuals and organisations to support violent movements (Horgan, 2005, 
Taylor and Horgan, 2006). These theories thus overlap with a similar 
approach in the conflict studies literature, which focuses on the role of 
grievances and greed. 
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Grievances or greed? 
 
The extent to which grievances or greed play a role in the involvement of 
political violence has been debated in the conflict studies literature for 
decades, and increasingly so since more state-centric theories are declining.  
on the decline. Gurr, one of the pioneering advocates of the grievances 
approach, focuses on the role one particular grievance, namely relative 
deprivation, plays in involvement in political violence (Gurr, 1971). His 
explanation, which he has since further refined (Gurr, 2012), is often 
juxtaposed with the position of scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 
who instead stress the importance of greed, or in other words, economic 
interests and materialistic benefits, in involvement in political violence. To a 
certain extent, these approaches overlap with the explanation focusing on 
rational vs. psychological motivations, with the grievances approach sharing 
similarities with psychological explanations and the greed approach partially 
overlapping with more rational approaches.  
The dichotomy of the greed vs. grievances debate has been criticised by 
several authors who stress that involvement is more complex than the 
debate implies at times (Guichaoua, 2012: 3-4, Gutierrez Sanin, 2012: 175). 
In the words of Arjona et al., the debate has moved on from focusing on 
“[b]road economistic interpretations concentrating on the material interests 
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of actors” to “more nuanced conceptions of human rationality” (2015: 2). 
Indeed nowadays, even Gurr who developed the relative deprivation 
framework in the 1970s, concedes that his initial analysis was too simplistic 
and that elements of rationality can, of course, be identified in grievances-
based non-state armed movements (Gurr, 2012). One other major criticism 
of the work of Gurr was that grievances alone cannot explain why only a 
fraction of the people experiencing the same relative deprivation decide to 
join non-state armed groups (Gutierrez Sanin, 2012: 190-191). These 
authors stress that in order to fully go beyond the greed/grievance 
dichotomy, it is essential to take into account the role of the organisational 
and societal context (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012: 160, Guichaoua, 2012: 14, 
Arjona et al., 2015). Interestingly, greed is rarely invoked as a reason for 
women to get involved in political violence – an aspect that is also likely to 
be linked to widespread gender stereotypes.  
 
Context-based theories and process-focused explanations  
 
In recent years, increasing calls for the consideration of contextual factors 
have emerged both within the fields of conflict and terrorism studies. In 
conflict studies, these claims are borne out of the desire to overcome the 
dichotomy of the greed or grievances debate (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012: 160, 
Guichaoua, 2012: 14, Arjona et al., 2015). In terrorism studies, the context-
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based approach on involvement in political violence partly builds on the 
psychological approach, albeit in a more refined way, as some authors in this 
broad school have moved away from the initial focus on (assumed) mental 
defects and psychological issues. Instead, they emphasise the importance of 
the specific context an individual, group or community find themselves in 
prior to and during the process of involvement (Horgan, 2005, Taylor and 
Horgan, 2006, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). According to this 
approach, contextual pressures cause grievances, which facilitate and 
motivate involvement in political violence. Another aspect of the role the 
context plays is the fact that contextual factors can also create opportunity, 
such as through personal links to non-state armed groups (Sageman, 2008). 
Similar claims can be found in conflict studies literature, which also stresses 
the role of the societal context and of personal ties to violent networks 
(Arjona et al., 2015).  
The context-based approach is closely linked to, and partially overlaps with, 
process-based explanations of involvement in political violence. The 
process-based approach – which can be found in both terrorism and conflict 
studies literature, is based on the assumption that involvement in political 
violence emerges as part of a process (Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 586). 
Similarly to context-based approaches, this explanation is opposed to 
simplifying accounts and stresses the complex, dynamic and multi-layered 
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nature of this process (Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 587, Staniland, 2014: 5), 
which leads “different people with different backgrounds [to] engage with 
the process in different ways” (Horgan, 2005: 51). Various interrelated 
factors play a role in this process, such as individual social backgrounds, the 
social, political and organisational context, and personal factors (Taylor and 
Horgan, 2006: 590-591, Staniland, 2014: 14, Arjona et al. 2015: 10). The 
process-based approach has its roots in qualitative historical research with 
its emphasis on the importance of detail, sequence and causal mechanisms 
of events (Staniland, 2014: 14).  
 
Summary 
 
Whilst involvement in political violence remains relatively under-
researched, in recent years a substantial body of literature has developed 
which helps shed light on why and how individuals and groups decide to 
engage in political violence. Rational, process-based and context-focused 
explanations in particular provide useful insights into involvement in political 
violence. However, these approaches have a number of limitations. 
First, the roles and experiences of women are usually not included in these 
theories. The vast majority of studies on involvement in political violence 
omit this aspect completely. This is despite the growing involvement of 
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women in non-state armed groups (Henshaw, 2016). Some of the more 
general studies of involvement in political violence (such as those focusing 
on structure vs. agency, greed vs. grievance, rational vs. psychological 
factors as well as context and processes), could potentially be very useful in 
an analysis of why and how female participation occurs. It is one of the aims 
of this study to contribute to overcoming this lacuna in existing literature on 
political violence, by focusing this analysis on the reason why non-state 
armed organisations decided to include women in combat. 
A second limitation is that while general theories on involvement in political 
violence can provide us with a general understanding of how to study female 
involvement in political violence, the framework they provide are necessary 
but not sufficient to understand decision-making on women’s involvement 
in armed organisations. In order to trace which context-based factors were 
decisive and exactly how the processes took shape, in-depth studies 
examining case-specific details are still required. Only this kind of data will 
enable us to explain which of the several factors mentioned in the 
frameworks evoked by previous studies were decisive in the case of non-
state armed groups involved in the Lebanese civil war. It thus remains to be 
seen if, in the case of the militias operating in Lebanon during the civil war, 
decisions on the involvement of female fighters were indeed made on the 
basis of rational considerations, greed or grievances (and, if so, which ones); 
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if women’s involvement was a process (and if so, what factors shaped this 
process); and what role the context, structure and agency played (if any). In 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, I will use empirical findings from my 
fieldwork in Lebanon to consider the theoretical claims provided by previous 
studies. 
Third, theories on people’s involvement in political violence are often 
dominated by a focus on why individuals become involved in political 
violence, while the role of the organisation (and the community or wider 
society) is often neglected. This remains the case despite increasing calls for 
multi-level analyses (Guichaoua, 2012). This individual-bias limits our 
understanding of how and why involvement in political violence occurs, as 
the majority of perpetrators of political violence are members of, or at least 
supported by, a group. This will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.2 | Explaining organisational decision-making 
 
Theories on involvement in political violence provide a useful theoretical 
basis for the study of female inclusion in combat in non-state armed groups. 
However, apart from the fact that the roles of women are generally 
overlooked in this part of the literature, one of the main limitations of 
mainstream theories on involvement in political violence is its heavy 
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individual-bias. With the shift away from state-centric theories and an 
increasing focus on individual and organisational factors (Arjona and 
Kalyvas, 2012, Guichaoua, 2012, Arjona et al., 2015), another relevant 
branch of literature has emerged. It has its roots in the 1980s and focuses 
on decision-making processes in non-state armed organisations. This part of 
the literature argues that non-state armed groups are not essentially 
different from non-violent organisations – such as political parties or 
business companies, which organisational theory has traditionally focused 
on. This – relatively new – strand of the literature thus calls for the study of 
non-state armed organisations through an organisational theory lens 
(Crenshaw, 1985, Oots, 1989, McCormick, 2003, Zwikael, 2007, Asal and 
Rethemeyer, 2008, Dalton and Asal, 2011, Shapiro, 2012, Shapiro and Siegel, 
2012, Hegghammer, 2013, Shapiro, 2013). Theories on organisational 
decision-making overlap with some of the theories on involvement in 
political violence (which were discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter), insofar as they also focus on the rational character of 
organisational decision-making. By focusing on the decision-making of 
groups, this approach offers the additional advantage of overcoming the 
strong individual-bias (which can be found in existing theoretical literature), 
on why involvement in political violence occurs.  
In the following sections, I will provide an overview of these theories and 
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discuss the extent to which this branch of the literature will be used to help 
explain organisational motivations for the inclusion of female fighters in 
non-state armed groups.  
 
Applying organisational theory to the study of non-state armed actors 
 
Organisational theory, which has its roots in sociology, economics and 
political science, is concerned with the study of political or business 
organisations such as companies or bureaucracies (Cunliffe, 2008). Analyses 
tend to include organisational structures, norms, behaviour, dynamics and 
decision-making.  
Organisational theorists working on non-state armed groups oppose many 
non-academic depictions of non-state armed organisations – which tend to 
present violent groups as essentially different from other socio-political 
actors, by often stressing their alleged irrationality. Efforts to view non-state 
armed groups through an organisational theory lens go back as far as the 
mid-1980s and Martha Crenshaw’s work on non-state armed group’s 
behaviour (Crenshaw, 1985, 1987). Crenshaw argues that, just like many 
non-violent organisations, non-state armed groups are characterised by 
their members’ "functionally differentiated roles", collective goals, defined 
decision-making structures and authoritative leadership (Crenshaw, 1985: 
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466). 
Another problematic aspect of some representations of non-state armed 
actors is their depiction as one monolithic unit. Detailed analyses of intra-
group dynamics, for example, are often missing. To a certain extent, this is 
due to the often secretive nature of these groups and the fact that it can be 
difficult to gain access to the inner circle of illegal armed organisations 
(Dolnik, 2013b). However, the lack of analyses focusing on intra-group 
dynamics is also due to a tendency to vilify and essentialise non-state armed 
groups, and to present them as irrational evil actors, rather than depict them 
as the complex organisations they tend to be.  
Taking into account the intra-group structures and dynamics affecting non-
state armed groups is of particular importance when studying organisational 
decision-making processes, as these often have an impact on why and how 
decisions are being made (Crenshaw, 1985, Crenshaw, 1987, Oots, 1989, 
Shapiro, 2012). Applying insights from organisational theory to the study of 
non-state political violence can be helpful in this context as it takes into 
account the organisational decision-making, whilst also acknowledging that 
these organisations are comprised of individuals. Early studies of non-state 
political violence from an organisational theory perspective illustrate how 
analysing external group relations (including coalition forming, outside 
support and external competition), and internal cohesiveness (or the lack 
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thereof), can help us to understand how and why group decision-making 
occurs (Oots, 1989: 148-149).  
One of the main assumptions of the literature that applies organisational 
theory to non-state armed groups is that violent political groups are not 
essentially different from non-violent political or business organisations. In 
this vein, Oots (1989: 149) rightly stresses that it is only their focus on 
(psychological and physical) violence as a strategic and tactical tool which 
distinguishes non-state armed groups from other political organisations. By 
analysing documents produced by non-state armed organisations, Shapiro 
and Siegel come to the same conclusion: 
 
Indeed, groups as diverse as the Polish Underground in 
Warsaw, Red Brigades, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Aum 
Shinrikyo, Fatah, al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in Iraq generated 
paperwork that, were it not for its violent subject matter, 
could have come from any traditional organization (Shapiro 
and Siegel, 2012: 40). 
 
If non-state violent political organisations are indeed organised as any other 
organisation, Oots rightly points out that it can be expected that their 
decision-making is influenced by the same, or similar, motivations than 
those of non-violent political organisations (1989: 150).  
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Studying non-state armed groups as rational actors 
 
 Whilst the notion that perpetrators of non-state political violence exhibit 
pathological features is widespread in media and political discourses (as 
discussed in section one), approaches to the study of political violence based 
on organisational theory stress non-state armed groups’ rational decision-
making. In this regard, they are consonant with other rational approaches to 
the study of political violence such as the theories of involvement in political 
violence discussed above. Both reject notions of irrationality of non-state 
armed individuals’ and groups’ behaviour, because “[t]o assume that 
someone is 'crazy' implies that his or her behavior is neither explainable nor 
predictable” (Oots, 1989: 149-150). If we believe that all non-state armed 
actors’ actions are indeed entirely guided by irrational thinking, it is 
impossible to explain or predict possible behaviour. If that is the case, there 
is no reason to study political violence or the individuals, states and 
organisations involved in them – at least not from a political science 
perspective. On a practical level, to assume that all perpetrators of non-state 
political violence are guided by irrational motivations can even be 
dangerous, as it can lead those opposing them to underestimate non-state 
armed groups’ capabilities – which can result in increased vulnerabilities of 
possible targets of non-state political violence. Another related risk is that 
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ascribing irrational motives to non-state armed groups can lead states to 
eschew political, negotiated settlements of conflict and instead advocate for 
ruthless military responses in the struggle against non-state armed 
organisations – as there is arguably not much point in trying to negotiate 
with inherently irrational actors.  
But what does viewing non-state armed actors as rational actors entail? 
Shapiro (2013: 20) specifies that there are three factors which highlight the 
rationality of non-state armed actors. First, non-state armed organisations 
“match means to ends [...] Second, they examine a limited number of 
options, choosing the one that yields the highest expected gain”. Third, in 
strategic interactions, they “typically consider the impact of their actions in 
a fairly nuanced way” (Shapiro, 2013: 20). Thus, non-state armed 
organisations' behaviour can be considered rational if they adopt a means-
to-ends approach; choose from the number of options known to them the 
one expected to provide them with the highest expected gain; and evaluate 
the expected outcome of their actions and act accordingly. In other words, 
non-state militant organisations are what Shapiro calls "intendedly rational" 
in that they "match means to ends by explicitly comparing the value of 
different actions given limited information about the world" (Shapiro, 2013: 
21).  
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Organisations matter 
 
This study focuses on organisational motivations and decision-making. Many 
existing publications on female political violence are characterised by a 
strong individual-bias. However, for a comprehensive analysis of female 
political violence, a multi-level analysis – taking into account individual, 
organisational and contextual factors, is key, as it is not possible to fully 
grasp the issue of female political violence without considering all factors 
that can potentially play a role in women’s involvement.  
As part of such a multi-level analysis, this study includes a focus on the group 
level. In previous years, there has been some controversy over the role of 
organisations amongst scholars of non-state armed violence. The debate 
between Bruce Hoffmann and Marc Sageman – two leading terrorism 
scholars – on the role of organisations in non-state political violence, is 
illustrative of this disagreement. While Hoffmann (2008) contended that 
hierarchical organisations continued to play a key role and in fact, 
constituted one of the main threats, Sageman (2008, see also Hoffman and 
Sageman, 2008) argued that the influence of hierarchical organisations was 
on the decrease and that there was instead a trend towards loosely 
organised cells and individual actors playing a much more important role.  
While Hoffmann’s and Sageman’s debate focuses on Islamist-inspired 
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organisations, the argument can be extended to other non-state armed 
actors. In fact, in the debate, Sageman explicitly referred to debates on right-
wing extremist actors when applying the term ‘leaderless resistance’ to the 
study of Islamist groups. 
Contributing to the debate between Hoffmann and Sageman, other scholars 
stress that the two positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Acharya 
and Marwah, 2010: 2), as even loosely organised cells of perpetrators of 
political violence are not devoid of any organisation, hierarchy and 
leadership. Thus, organisations continue to matter. Most individuals 
carrying out political violence rely on an organisational network providing 
them with moral, financial and logistical support. Individual motivations are 
crucial because except for cases of conscription (which did not play a role in 
Lebanon, as will be discussed in Chapter Four), without individuals willing to 
take up arms, there will not be any combatants. However, without an 
organisation which agrees to include the individual in its ranks, train, equip, 
finance and support them in their endeavour, the impact an individual 
without direct links to a group can have will remain limited. Individual 
motivation is a necessary but not sufficient condition to carry out high-
impact attacks or implement a long-term strategy. As pointed out by 
Acharya and Marwah, "to produce successful and high impact attacks, 
terrorists do need some form of organization" (Acharya and Marwah, 2010: 
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2). This holds true for both men and women planning to join a non-state 
violent organisation. Thus, examining organisational motivations and 
decision-making is crucial in explaining (female) political violence. 
 
A multi-level approach to the study of organisational decision-making 
 
In order to fully understand non-state political violence, it is essential to 
adopt a multi-level approach, taking into account individual, organisational 
and contextual factors. As discussed above, one of the limitations of existing 
literature on non-state political violence is the strong individual-bias of many 
studies attempting to explain why and how political violence occurs. 
Organisational theory approaches to the study of non-state armed 
organisations can prove helpful when studying decision-making processes 
on involvement in non-state political violence. 
Despite the current focus on individual motivations in much of the literature, 
precedents of multi-level approaches have a relatively long history in the 
study of non-state armed violence. Summarising possible approaches to the 
study of non-state armed groups’ behaviour in 1987, Martha Crenshaw – 
one of the founders of the discipline of terrorism studies, presented two 
competing explanations. Whilst she focuses on terrorist groups, the largely 
undefined and often blurry lines between ‘terrorist’ and other non-state 
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armed groups with a political agenda, makes her findings relevant to other 
types of non-state armed political organisations as well. 
 
It is possible to think in terms of two basic explanations for 
how the conspiratorial organizations that practice terrorism 
behave. [...] The first explanation is based on the assumption 
that the act of terrorism is a deliberate choice by a political 
actor. […] Terrorism is interpreted as a response to external 
stimuli, particularly government actions (Crenshaw, 1987: 
13). 
 
Thus, according to this first explanation, non-state armed organisations' 
behaviour is a reaction to contextual pressures created by the actions (or 
lack thereof) of other actors in the socio-political environment the armed 
organisation finds itself in. According to the second explanation discussed by 
Crenshaw, it is rather intra-group dynamics which have a direct impact on 
armed organisations’ decision-making and behaviour – or as Crenshaw puts 
it, it “focuses on the internal politics of the organization” and non-state 
armed groups’ “behavior represents the outcome of the internal dynamics 
of the organization rather than strategic action” (Crenshaw, 1987: 19). 
This categorisation into contextual and organisational motivations has been 
applied and developed by a number of scholars working on non-state 
political violence. McCormick, for example, acknowledges the existence of 
the two categories Crenshaw describes, calling them strategic and 
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organisational explanations. He adds a third category, that of psychological 
theories which explain non-state political violence through the framework 
of individual psychology (McCormick, 2003) – very similar to the theories 
described in the section on psychological explanations of involvement in 
political violence discussed above.  
Another explanation of non-state armed groups’ behaviour can be found in 
Shapiro’s study on the decision-making of non-state armed groups. His 
detailed typology of terrorist decision-making (Shapiro, 2012: 7-13), includes 
strategic and non-strategic explanations. Strategic theories comprise: (1) 
tactical choices and the strategic environment (taking into account the 
group’s reactions to other relevant actors, such as its opponents and 
supporters), (2) resource constraints (including external and popular 
support), and (3) organisational constraints (such as ideology, size and 
control over territory). Non-strategic challenges, according to Shapiro, 
consist of technological constraints and internal agency problems, such as 
intra-group managerial challenges. Thus, while Shapiro further refines 
previous approaches (such as the ones developed by Crenshaw and 
McCormick), by adding resource constraints to the contextual pressures 
described in previous literature, the individual level is still missing from his 
analysis. This is why, for the purpose of this study, a combination of 
Crenshaw’s, McCormick’s and Shapiro’s typologies will be used, focusing my 
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analysis on individual, organisational and contextual pressures. Mirroring 
existing literature on female political violence and for the sake of clarity, 
contextual pressures will be divided into security-related factors and societal 
aspects. I will discuss this further in the following section on existing 
literature on non-state female political violence. 
 
Summary  
 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on existing theories of: (1) 
involvement in non-state political violence and (2) organisational decision-
making in non-state armed groups. The rational, process-based and context-
focused explanations in particular are useful in this context, as they allow for 
non-state armed actors to be viewed as similar to other individuals and 
groups, and as guided by elements of rationalist thinking. Moreover, this set 
of theories encourages the researcher of political violence to take into 
account the role of the context in involvement in non-state armed groups 
and to view involvement as a process.  
One major limitation of existing theories of involvement in political violence, 
is their strong focus on the individual level. This is why, for the purpose of 
this study, theories on how and why individuals and groups get involved in 
non-state political violence will be combined with theories on organisational 
68 
 
decision-making. These theories draw on insights from economic and 
political organisational theory and have been adapted to the study of non-
state armed groups by a number of conflict and terrorism studies scholars. 
The have the advantage of allowing us to view non-state armed groups as 
the complex organisations which they tend to be. Both sets of theories –  
those on involvement in political violence and those on organisational 
decision-making – complement each other as they are based on very similar 
assumptions, including the belief that perpetrators of non-state political 
violence are intendedly rational actors and that non-state armed actors’ 
behaviour can only be understood through a multi-level analysis.  
After this discussion of the theories underpinning this study, the following 
section of this chapter will provide an overview of existing literature on 
motivations for the inclusion of female fighters in non-state armed groups. 
 
Part II | Existing literature on female non-state political 
violence 
 
As foregrounded in the introduction to this work, in most publications on 
non-state political violence, the roles and experiences of women tend to be 
omitted (Cunningham, 2003, Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015, Henshaw, 2016). In 
studies that include the roles and experiences of women, the focus is often 
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on women’s roles as victims of political violence or possible actors for 
peaceful change, whilst their support of and participation in political 
violence tends to be neglected (Eggert, 2015). In recent years, a number of 
studies focusing on female perpetrators of political violence were published 
(as will be discussed below). However, many of these focus on individual 
motivations and often do not systematically include other levels of analysis, 
such as organisational and contextual factors. The literature on the Lebanese 
civil war is no exception in this regard. Since the civil war, a sound number 
of publications on the war have been published (including, but not limited 
to, Winslow, 1996, Fisk, 2001, Johnson, 2001, El-Solh, 2004, Mackey, 2006, 
Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012, Hanf, 2014). However, none of the major works 
on the war include a systematic analysis of the roles of women. Only a 
handful of publications focus on female militia members or fighters (Peteet, 
1991, Sayigh, 1993, Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 1999, André-Dessornes, 2013, 
Parkinson, 2013). However, none of these systematically compare the 
inclusion of women in the various militias. Karamé’s study focuses on 
women in the Christian militias, while Peteet, Sayigh and Parkinson analyse 
the roles of women in Palestinian militias operating in Lebanon. Shehadeh 
does take a comparative approach; however, she only included Kataeb, 
Hezbollah and Amal in her analysis, thus excluding some of the key militias 
involved in the war. Moreover, Parkinson and Peteet both only focus on one 
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stage of the war – with Parkinson looking at the period from 1982 to 1988, 
and Peteet analysing the pre-1982 situation. André-Dessornes (2013) only 
examines female suicide attackers, which were mostly deployed by the 
SSNP. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, for LNM-associated 
militias, 1982 constituted a major conjuncture point during the war, with 
increased security pressures. If understanding the impact of contextual 
factors on female involvement in the militias is an aim, an analysis of female 
participation in the war would thus benefit considerably by including the 
entire period of the war. 
While the literature on women’s involvement during the war in Lebanon is 
limited, more publications are available on the inclusion of women in other 
contexts. In what follows, I will discuss possible explanations for the 
involvement of female combatants that can be found in existing literature, 
looking at individual motivations, organisational characteristics, security-
related aspects and societal factors. 
 
2.3 | Organisational motivations for the inclusion of 
female fighters 
 
Studies that acknowledge the roles of female combatants in non-state 
armed groups are still the exception in the existing literature on non-state 
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political violence. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of literature on 
female fighters in non-state armed organisations – both from a conflict/war 
and from a terrorism studies perspective (Reif, 1986, Weinberg and Eubank, 
1987, Burgess, 1989, Vázquez, 1997, Shikola, 1998, Shayne, 1999, Bernal, 
2000, West, 2000, Alison, 2003, Cunningham, 2003, Victor, 2003, Sajjad, 
2004, Ness, 2005, Bernal, 2006, Viterna, 2006, Berko and Erez, 2007a, Berko 
and Erez, 2007b, Hamilton, 2007, McKay, 2007, Schweitzer, 2007, Von Knop, 
2007, Coulter, 2008, Cunningham, 2008, Eager, 2008, Gonzalez-Perez, 2008, 
Jacques and Taylor, 2008, Sixta, 2008, Speckhard, 2008, Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, Alison, 2009, Cunningham, 2009, Gayer, 
2009, Parashar, 2009, Cunningham, 2010, Bloom, 2011, Dalton and Asal, 
2011, Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012, Bloom et al., 2012, Ortega, 2012, Roy, 2012, 
Shekhawat, 2012, Van Hauwermeiren, 2012, Cohen, 2013, Katto, 2014, 
Parashar, 2014, Eggert, 2015, Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015, Magadla, 2015, 
Veneracion-Rallonza, 2015, Henshaw, 2016, Davis, 2017). Despite both 
disciplines being concerned with the study of political violence (and often 
even studying the same conflicts and groups), the literature on female 
members of armed groups tends to be very segregated. Existing studies on 
female political violence include a range of different epistemological and 
methodological approaches, as will be discussed in Chapter Three. Analysing 
previous publications on female political violence, four different categories 
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of explanations of organisational motivations for the inclusion of female 
combatants can be identified; namely, individual motivations, security-
related aspects, societal factors and organisational characteristics.  
 
Individual motivations 
 
Most publications on female political violence focus on individual 
motivations. This is the case both for conflict studies and terrorism studies. 
Publications that also systematically take into account organisational 
motivations for the inclusion of female fighters and militants are the 
exception. Notable examples include Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, 
Cunningham, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, Eager, 2008, Cunningham, 2010, Dearing, 
2010, Dalton and Asal, 2011, Henshaw, 2015, Davis, 2017. .   
In the existing literature on women’s motivations to join non-state armed 
groups, several major themes can be identified. Many publications discuss 
the question of coercion or choice, or the extent to which forced 
conscription plays a role in women’s involvement in non-state armed groups 
(Eager, 2008, Henshaw, 2016). Claims of conscription are particularly 
prevalent in the terrorism studies literature and some conflict studies 
publication, notably those focusing on political violence in Africa and, to a 
lesser degree, Asia and South America (Eager, 2008: 128, Alison, 2009-141, 
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Katto, 2014: 544, Parashar, 2014: 137). Other studies stress that coercion 
cannot explain all cases of female participation in non-state armed groups 
and that indeed, the majority of women worldwide join voluntarily 
(Speckhard, 2008: 1018, Henshaw, 2015: 3). Some have argued that a 
process-based approach is essential to fully understand coercion and choice 
in this context, claiming that women might be forced to join, but then decide 
to stay (see also Coulter, 2008: 55, Henshaw, 2015: 14). Another frequently 
discussed question is the claim that differences between men’s and 
women’s motivations to join exist and that women join for “personal” while 
men join for “political” reasons (Victor, 2003, Pedahzur, 2005, Berko and 
Erez, 2007b, Jacques and Taylor, 2008: 231, O'Rourke, 2009: 707-710, 
Bloom, 2011: 145-146, 163, 235-237). This distinction between “personal” 
and “political” reasons has been criticised by some as artificial and 
misleading (Eager, 2008: 4). While some differences between terrorism and 
conflict studies exist (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four), most 
scholars now argue that overall, men and women share the same 
motivations (Schweitzer, 2007: 143, Ness, 2008b: 6-7, Speckhard, 2008: 
1002, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 106, Zedalis, 2008: 50, O'Rourke, 
2009: 684, Cohen, 2013: 368). Nevertheless, some gender-specific 
motivations are claimed to exist. The two most oft-cited differences in men’s 
and women’s motivation are fear of rape and feminist aspirations, such as 
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the wish to free themselves and fight against constraining societal norms 
and expectations (Sajjad, 2004: 6, Bloom, 2005: 163-164, 234, Berko and 
Erez, 2007b: 504-505, McKay, 2007: 171, Schweitzer, 2007, Von Knop, 2007: 
399-400, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008, Eager, 2008: 209, Alison, 2009: 
137, O'Rourke, 2009: 707, Ortega, 2012: 95). Most of the scholars making 
this claim work within a terrorism studies framework.  
  
Security context  
 
The second-most analysed aspect on reasons for female involvement in 
political violence is the security context – which the majority of studies on 
the topic see as one of the main reasons shaping non-state armed groups’ 
decision-making (Cunningham, 2003, Cunningham, 2008, Cunningham, 
2010, Dearing, 2010, Eggert, 2015). According to this explanation, militant 
groups resort to the inclusion of female combatants when under extreme 
stress due to the security situation (Cunningham, 2008: 97).11 This has led 
some to conclude that female employment in combat is often a sign of 
weakness or "desperation", or an indicator that the organisation perceives 
                                                          
11  Cunningham (2008: 88) also points to the affect the security context potentially 
has on society which, due to an escalated (or stagnating) conflict situation, can become 
more willing to accept the inclusion of female combatants. This highlights the 
complexity of the issue and the need to not only consider the role the different levels of 
analysis play but also in what ways they impact each other. 
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more conventional approaches to have failed to produce the desired 
outcome (Dalton and Asal, 2011). The ways in which the security context 
affects organisational decision-making according to the existing literature, 
can be summarised into four categories: female operatives are used to make 
up for a lack of male fighters, to avoid detection, to seek attention or to 
assert their position.  
According to the first explanation, a lack of male manpower leads non-state 
armed groups to include female fighters (Ali, 2005, Bloom, 2005: 6, Von 
Knop, 2007: 401, Cunningham, 2008: 88, Ness, 2008b: 16, Parashar, 2014: 
308). According to this approach, female combatants are employed if the 
body of fighters of a group has been considerably decimated due to an 
increased number of eliminations or incarcerations. Linked to this is the 
assumption that female combatants are more expendable than their male 
counterparts during combat – when they are often used on suicide missions 
(Ali, 2005, Speckhard, 2008: 998), but also after the end of the armed 
struggle, when many former female fighters are pushed back into more 
traditional gender roles and excluded from peace negotiations, institutional 
building and other crucial political and societal processes (Porter, 2003, 
Porter, 2007, UN Women, 2012). Yet another aspect of the lack of 
manpower argument is the claim that women are often used to shame men 
outside of the organisation into joining the armed struggle, again by utilising 
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prevailing gender norms and expectations (Bloom, 2005: 6, Ness, 2008b: 19). 
The second explanation focuses on the inclusion of female fighters in order 
to avoid detection. According to this explanation, if the military forces an 
armed organisation is confronted with are so successful that it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, for the male members of the armed group to 
move freely within their area of operation (and thus carry out their mission), 
the inclusion of women becomes more likely (Cunningham, 2003, 
Cunningham, 2007, Ness, 2008b, Speckhard, 2008, Dearing, 2010). The 
group utilises notions of women's alleged aversion to violence, and the fact 
that cultural norms often prevent thorough searches of women at 
checkpoints (which tend to be mostly staffed by male militaries) 
(Cunningham, 2007: 118, Ness, 2008b: 18).   
Third, the inclusion of women in non-state armed groups has been explained 
with the organisations' attempt to attract the attention of potential 
sympathisers and supporters via the media (Ali, 2005, Von Knop, 2007: 400-
401, Speckhard, 2008, Zedalis, 2008: 50, 57, 62). This is linked to the claim 
that female fighters supposedly “receive eight times the media coverage” 
their male counterparts do (Bloom, 2005: 7), which creates a so-called "CNN 
factor" (Ali, 2005).12  
                                                          
12   On the other hand, media coverage of violent attacks can also contribute to keep 
operations of militants, who are aware that their activities are being monitored by the 
media and the public, in check (Cunningham, 2003, 2008, Bloom, 2011). For example, 
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Fourth, the inclusion of female fighters by non-state armed groups can 
potentially be explained by the group’s need to assert their position in a field 
of competing groups (Crenshaw, 1987: 24, Oots, 1989: 148, McCormick, 
2003: 481-482, Bloom, 2005: 94-97, Hafez, 2007, Alison, 2009). This could 
mean that they decide to include female fighters to stress their 
determination, or that they refrain from including women in order to stress 
their moral superiority or affluence of conventional fighters. 
  
Societal factors 
 
If most of the existing literature stresses the importance of the security 
context in non-state violent organisations' decision-making regarding the 
involvement of female fighters, a considerable number of studies also 
highlight the role of societal factors (Cunningham, 2003, Eager, 2008, Ness, 
2008b, Speckhard, 2008, Dearing, 2010). According to this approach, an 
armed organisation's decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters can 
be explained by how hard it is to overcome societal barriers. It emphasises 
the fact that the women are not just members of an organisation, but also 
belong to a family and a community, whose “social approval and cultural 
                                                          
this could be the case, because they are aware that the public is not in favour of certain 
types of actions such as the inclusion of unconventional actors, the targeting of certain 
groups and individuals or the use of excessive violence. 
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legitimacy are required“ (Dearing, 2010: 1083). According to this 
explanation, an armed group is more likely to include women in combat if, 
in the society they operate or are based in, restrictive gender norms are 
comparatively less wide-spread and women occupy a range of different roles 
in public life. 
The salience of societal barriers has been explained by two factors. First, 
non-state armed organisations rely on the society they operate in and the 
physical, logistic, moral or tacit support of the community. Many non-state 
armed groups do not want to risk losing this support by alienating local 
populations (Dearing, 2010: 1083, 1086). Some groups in Iraq, for example, 
have tried to overcome these barriers by recruiting female fighters from 
abroad (such as, for example, Muriel Degauque – the first Western woman 
to have carried out a suicide attack in Iraq), who have no or limited links to 
the society the militant organisation operates in. Second, the lack of 
encouraging narratives and role models for potential female fighters often 
renders recruitment difficult as there are few examples of pathways into and 
within female political violence.  
There is evidence that contextual pressures related to the security context 
can have an effect on societal norms, particularly in the case of protracted 
conflicts or struggles for national self-determination where, often, questions 
of identity and, thus societal norms, are at stake. For example, Cunningham 
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(2003: 174) argues that domestic or international enforcement and social 
dislocation can impact the social and cultural control conservative societies 
tend to hold over women. If these structures get loosened as a consequence 
of the conflict, a window of opportunity for women to join non-state armed 
movements opens. 
While the majority of publications on female political violence mention 
societal norms as a barrier, and contend that the more involved in political 
and military decision-making women in a society are, the more likely they 
are to join violent organisations as combatants, Dalton and Asal claim the 
exact opposite: ”Where women are more socially empowered and 
autonomous, they are less likely to be involved in terrorism [sic], or, from 
the groups’ view, terrorist organizations are less likely to turn to recruiting 
women as front-line attackers“ (2011: 810). However, Dalton and Asal’s 
study is based on a quantitative approach, and their findings have not been 
tested by more qualitative analyses. It remains to be seen whether the 
different methodological approach Dalton and Asal adopted had an impact 
on the different conclusion they came to, and whether their findings can 
help elucidate female involvement during the civil war in Lebanon.  
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Organisational characteristics 
 
In the existing literature on the inclusion of female fighters in non-state 
armed groups, organisational characteristics are discussed less frequently 
than the security context or societal factors. Nevertheless, most studies 
agree that group-related factors play a role in organisational decision-
making on female participation in combat activities. Notably, many existing 
publications suggest that organisations adhering to a conservative, right-
wing or religious ideology are less likely to include women than secular and 
leftist groups – as the former tend to uphold more restrictive gender images 
(Cunningham, 2003, Ness 2008, Bloom 2011). However, others such as 
Gonzalez-Perez (2008) and Dalton and Asal (2011), contend that deducing 
the likelihood of female participation from a group's ideological orientation 
can be misleading. While Dalton and Asal (2011) state that an organisation's 
ideological background is not decisive at all, Gonzalez-Perez (2008: 125) 
claim that groups with a domestic agenda often demonstrate higher female 
participation than internationally oriented groups. 
In their exploratory comparative study on organisational motivations for the 
involvement of female combatants, Dalton and Asal (2011) find 
organisational size and age rather than ideology to be significant. They claim 
that the bigger and the older an organisation is, the higher their willingness 
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to include female combatants. Dalton and Asal hypothesise this may be due 
to “staffing needs in larger organizations or [...] their greater capability to 
adapt to or adopt new strategic activity sets” (2011: 810). With regards to a 
group's age, they present two possible interpretations:  
 
First, from a broader societal perspective, it is possible that 
organizational age may be related to prolonged ethno-
religious-nationalist struggles that have far-reaching 
mobilizing imputes for both men and women. […] This finding 
could also be interpreted to indicate a tactical evolution 
overtime toward incorporating women as low-cost and high-
impact attacking apparatus as an organizational response to 
stagnation in performance and an escalation in frustration 
resulting from setbacks (Dalton and Asal, 2011: 810). 
 
Another group-related factor mentioned in some parts of the literature 
include external relations with other groups, which form a network of 
competing, cooperating or simply coexisting armed organisations. Bloom 
(2005: 77-78, 94-97) and Ness (2008: 26), for example, point to dynamics 
between different actors in the field.  The extent to which inter-group rivalry 
can indeed explain non-state armed organisations' decision-making, is 
disputed in the literature on political violence (Gupta and Mundra, 2005, 
Hafez, 2007: 216-217, Brym and Araj, 2008, Hassan, 2011: 47-49). Intra-
group structure, dynamics and discord are also often not taken into account 
in the literature on female political violence, even though including them in 
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the analysis of organisational decision-making is crucial as it helps avoid 
treating armed groups as monolithic units and, instead, highlights the 
complex nature of the decision-making process.  
As is the case with societal aspects, there is evidence that internal and inter-
group factors can be affected by a deteriorating or stagnating conflict 
situation (Davis, 2013: 284).  
 
Summary 
 
Most scholars of female political violence contend that contextual pressures 
related to the security context and societal aspects are central in affecting 
non-state armed groups’ decision-making on the inclusion of female 
fighters. Whether more emphasis is placed on the security context or 
societal factors varies from publication to publication, even though overall, 
references to the security context tend to be more widespread in the 
literature.  
Some authors have pointed out that security-related pressures can impact 
societal norms, especially in long-duration or identity-related conflicts 
(Cunningham, 2003, Dearing, 2010). However, while the majority of scholars 
on female political violence seem to agree that societal factors are salient in 
the decision-making on female combatants' participation in combat, there 
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are also critical voices questioning this assumption (such as Dalton and Asal, 
2011).  
There is evidence that societal factors are respected by non-state armed 
groups as long as they do not hinder their strategic success in a given security 
context. This is claimed to be the case for both armed groups which adhere 
to leftist or secular and to conservative, religious or right-wing ideological 
norms. It is noteworthy that in times of extreme stress due to external, 
security-related pressures, even conservative, religious or right-wing groups 
operating in gender-restrictive societies are said to be willing to override 
societal expectations if it allows them to gain strategic advantages. This 
claim is evidenced by a number of contemporary cases, including for 
example, Hamas, the LTTE or ETA (Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, 
Cunningham, 2008, Eager, 2008, Henshaw, 2016). Lastly, existing literature 
claims that organisational size and age play a role in the group's decision-
making process on whether or not to include female combatants. Larger and 
older organisations are said to be more willing to include women in combat 
activities. 
If existing literature identifies a number of variables which can potentially 
explain why non-state armed groups include women in non-state political 
violence, there is a lack of comparative studies which systematically consider 
the claims made in the literature, and trace the process of how decision-
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making on the inclusion of female fighters takes shape.  
 
2.4 | Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview and discussion of the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature that this research project draws upon. In 
the first two sections, I have discussed the theoretical framework adopted 
in this study, which combines insights from previous literature on 
involvement in political violence and on organisational decision-making and 
behaviour. Guided by this framework, I consider female involvement in 
political violence to be a rational process in which the context plays an 
essential role. As far as the debates on greed vs. grievances and structure vs. 
agency are concerned, it remains to be seen which factors were decisive in 
the decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese 
civil war. Based on the framework outlined, I view non-state armed actors 
as rational actors not essentially and inherently different from other, non-
violent individuals and groups. I therefore believe that they will: (1) take a 
means-to-ends approach to their actions, (2) choose from a number of 
possible options the one they expect to provide them with the highest 
expected gain and (3) make predictions of the expected outcome of their 
actions and act accordingly. On the group-level, I view non-state armed 
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organisations as complex units which are subject to change. 
Believing that context matters, I adopt a multi-level approach to the study 
of female political violence, taking into account: (1) individual motivations, 
(2) organisational characteristics, (3) the security context and (4) societal 
factors. This is how the remainder of the thesis is structured. 
The original contribution to knowledge which this thesis makes is the 
analysis of the organisational decision-making of the militias involved in the 
Lebanese civil war. It adds a group of cases to the universe of studies of 
female political violence that has not been studied in as much detail before. 
Moreover, beyond studying reasons for the inclusion of female perpetrators 
of political violence during the Lebanese civil war, I consider existing theories 
on women’s involvement in political violence by applying them to a new 
group of cases. 
In the next chapter, I will provide an overview of the epistemological and 
methodological assumptions made in this study, and a discussion of the 
research strategy and challenges I encountered whilst collecting and 
analysing data for the purpose of this research project.
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Chapter 3 | Conducting field 
research on non-state political 
violence 
 
Reflections on one’s epistemological and methodological approach are an 
essential part of any academic study. This is of particular importance when 
studying a topic such as non-state political violence, where scholars are 
“often accused of employing weak research methods” (Singh, 2013: 141), 
and critical evaluations on the state of the field are rare (Dolnik, 2013b: 1).  
To test hypotheses, this research adopts a small-n comparative study of all 
of the key non-state armed groups involved in the civil war I was able to gain 
access to. It includes organisations associated with the two main camps at 
the beginning of the war; namely, the pro-reform and pro-Palestinian 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) on the one hand, and the pro-status 
quo Christian-dominated Lebanese Front (LFr) on the other. As part of this 
study, accounts of former members of eleven militias were analysed. These 
were: the LCP, Communist Action Organisation (CAO), PFLP, Fatah, PSP, 
Amal, Kataeb, Lebanese Forces (LF), Guardians of the Cedar, Tanzim and 
Tigers militia. However, the focus of this study lies on seven organisations; 
namely, the LCP, PFLP, Fatah, PSP (all LNM), Kataeb, LF (both LFr) and Amal 
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(not formerly associated with any of the two camps, but close to the LNM). 
Of these, the LCP, PFLP, Fatah, Kataeb and LF included female fighters; Amal 
started deploying female fighters from 1978 and the PSP refrained from 
employing women in combat roles.  
The study’s aim is to explain this variation and to highlight organisational 
motivations for female inclusion in combat in the different organisations. 
Existing literature focuses on four explanations for female participation in 
combat: individual motivations, organisational characteristics, societal 
norms and the security context. In turn, this study focuses on what role (1) 
individual motivations, (2) organisational characteristics, (3) the security 
context and (4) societal factors, played in the decision-making of the 
respective groups. Variation over time, in different parts of the country as 
well as within and between various organisations will be considered. 
The first question on individual motivations was added during the field work 
phase, as although I started with the aim of focusing on the group’s decision-
making, I realised later that women’s motivations to join the fight played an 
equally important role. Omitting the individual perspective from the analysis 
would thus not have allowed me to fully explain the phenomenon.  
Researching political violence is often linked to a number of problems – both 
theoretical and practical. In what follows, I will explain and critically reflect 
on expected and actual issues that I encountered during the research 
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process. The aim of this chapter is to “describ[e] in precise, step-by-step 
detail how [I] engaged in fieldwork” (Kenney, 2013: 27) and the research 
process as a whole, in the hope that this transparency – this opening of my 
academic tool box and documentation of how I used the items inside – will 
contribute to the validity and reliability of my findings (Silverman, 2014: 84). 
In the following sections of this chapter, I will first give an overview of the 
epistemological and methodological frameworks I have chosen to work with. 
I outline both advantages and limitations, and the ways in which I attempted 
to mitigate the latter. Section Two then looks at data collection, and Section 
Three looks at data management and analysis. The last section examines 
questions related to research ethics and researcher reflexivity. 
The chapter demonstrates how combining a positivist framework with 
qualitative methods can help to overcome some of the limitations of purely 
positivist, quantitative studies. It illustrates the usefulness of aiming for 
variety when selecting interviewees which, in this case, meant that both 
men and women, former militia members and individuals not associated 
with any of the militias, as well as former members of various militias, were 
interviewed. Lastly, it shows that access to former militia members proved 
to be easier than suggested in some existing publications on armed groups 
– which can be explained with the specific post-war context in Lebanon. 
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3.1 | Epistemology and methodology 
 
As far as the epistemology is concerned, my approach in the context of this 
research is mostly influenced by a positivist stance. However, while in the 
context of this research project, I am more interested in answering a why-
question than focusing on meaning and experiences, I do refer to and rely 
on work conducted by scholars studying female political violence within an 
interpretivist framework. I believe there are "facts" - objective things that 
can be observed and measured - but I am also of the opinion that some 
phenomena need to be interpreted. Context and the meaning of actions are 
important, as everything cannot be measured in strict quantitative terms. I 
am also aware that there is no such thing as an "objective" researcher, and 
that we all bring our personal assumptions into the work we do, which is 
why it is important to maintain a high level of researcher reflexivity 
throughout the research process. In other words, while I am working within 
a positivist epistemological framework, I believe the nature of my research 
requires a pragmatic and reflexive approach.  
The research is situated in the field of conflict studies, but also relies on 
findings from the field of terrorism studies. Traditionally, many terrorism 
scholars have worked within a positivist but qualitative approach, including 
researchers working on female terrorism (Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, 
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Berko and Erez, 2007a, Berko and Erez, 2007b, Schweitzer, 2007, 
Cunningham, 2008, Gonzalez-Perez, 2008, Speckhard, 2008, Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, Cunningham, 2010, Dearing, 2010, Bloom, 
2011, Bloom et al., 2012, Eggert, 2015). Most conflict studies scholars on the 
other hand, take an interpretivist and qualitative approach (Vázquez, 1997, 
Shayne, 1999, Bernal, 2000, West, 2000, Alison, 2003, Sajjad, 2004, Bernal, 
2006, Hamilton, 2007, Alison, 2009, Gayer, 2009, Parashar, 2009, Ortega, 
2012, Shekhawat, 2012, Katto, 2014, Parashar, 2014, Gentry and Sjoberg, 
2015, Magadla, 2015, Veneracion-Rallonza, 2015). In recent years, there 
have been repeated calls for more quantitative studies (Dalton and Asal, 
2011), and the trend – especially in the US – leans towards using mixed 
methods within a positivist framework (Viterna, 2006, Dalton and Asal, 
2011, Bloom et al., 2012, Davis, 2013, Shapiro, 2013, Henshaw, 2016, Davis, 
2017). At the same time, some researchers have criticised this tendency of 
overstating the importance of quantitative work, whilst neglecting 
qualitative approaches (Kenney, 2013: 28). Ultimately, there is no right or 
wrong approach. Each comes with its own set of merits and trade-offs. 
Indeed, sharp distinctions between positivist and quantitative approaches 
on the one hand, and interpretivist and qualitative approaches on the other 
hand, are misleading and unhelpful. In the words of Holliday: 
 
91 
 
[I]t is often argued that a major binding feature of qualitative 
research is its opposition to positivism [...] There needs 
however to be note of caution with regard to these 
distinctions [...] Social research is a complex area, and 
attempts to divide it into hard categories will always suffer 
from oversimplification. Qualitative research will always 
involve quantitative elements and vice versa (Holliday, 2007: 
2, see also Silverman, 1993: 20-22).  
 
In the case of my research, my decision to work within a positivist framework 
was guided by the research question and aim; namely, to identify the causal 
factors of female involvement within non-state armed groups during the war 
in Lebanon. My decision to opt for qualitative methods was based on three 
reasons: qualitative methods allow me to gain a deeper understanding of 
complex social phenomenon, generate new original data and verify 
information. 
 
Gaining a deeper understanding of complex social processes 
 
Whilst quantitative approaches are not without merit, in the case of this 
study, they would not have been particularly useful in helping to generate 
answers to the research question. This is because the qualitative approach I 
have chosen provides us with a “deeper understanding of social 
phenomena” (Silverman, 2010: 123) and allows us to delve “in depth into 
complexities and processes” (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 90-91), instead 
92 
 
of simply identifying themes in a set of data. Cerwyn Moore, for example, 
criticises that: 
 
[N]umerous studies have focused on definitions and concepts 
while academic work on terrorism more generally has been 
quantitative in style and form. Despite being interesting, 
when examined in a little more detail it becomes clear that 
some branches of this work are not really about the study of 
terrorism, but are rather, about extrapolating general themes 
from databases (Moore, 2013: 125).  
 
The aim of my study is to explain the involvement of female fighters. In order 
to achieve this, qualitative fieldwork allowing for an in-depth understanding 
of both the social processes studied, as well as the context in which they 
occurred, are essential (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 91, Dolnik, 2013b: 5, 
Moore, 2013: 131, Singh, 2013: 142, 150). This intimacy with the subject of 
one’s research also helps to avoid making false analytical assumptions with 
regards to correlation and causation (Silverman, 1993: 149-150). Adopting 
qualitative methods with a positivist framework can help to overcome some 
of the limitations of positivist approaches, which are often criticised for 
“imposing [a] limited worldview on the subjects” by “coding the social world 
according to preordained operational variables” (Marshall and Rossman, 
2011: 91). By combining qualitative methods with a positivist framework, 
one can test pre-defined operational variables, while leaving space for new 
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themes and categories to emerge from the data. The ability to deeply 
understand a handful of cases might come at the expense of limitedness in 
scope (Silverman, 2010: 104), but this is a trade-off that seems acceptable in 
the context of my research, especially given the current scarcity of data on 
female fighters during the civil war in Lebanon. 
 
Overcoming lack of data  
 
One of the weaknesses of studies in political violence is the relative lack of 
empirical data. There is a tendency amongst scholars working in the field to 
quote each other’s findings, with little new data being generated. In the 
words of Dolnik: “the same limited set of anecdotes and examples tend to 
be used and reused by researchers over and over again” (Dolnik, 2013b: 4, 
Ranstorp, 2013: 51). In terrorism studies specifically, many publications 
focus on the same small group of cases without exploring other, under-
studied conflicts or organisations. This lack of empirical work and new data 
is one of the main problems pointed out by critical terrorism studies 
scholars, although “the relative lack of field research has long been 
recognized from within the terrorism studies discipline as well” (Dolnik, 
2013b: 2, see also Horgan, 2013: 187-188, Kenney, 2013: 27, 42). There are 
very few publications on the militias that operated during the Lebanese civil 
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war or the role of female fighters in the war. Thus, in order to explain the 
phenomenon, data must first be collected. This approach is not contested 
by quantitative scholars who agree that qualitative methods are important 
for studies on topics where data is lacking and/or that are still at the 
exploratory stage of research (Silverman, 2010: 110, Marshall and Rossman, 
2011: 90-91). Horgan, for example, contends: 
 
Given that so relatively few interviews are available for 
interpretation, inferential statistical analysis here is either 
inappropriate or misleading. Greater engagement with 
interview methods would produce substantively new data 
and knowledge, and help accumulate the body of empirical 
data to promote conceptual development in the study of 
terrorism more broadly and eventually give rise to the kind of 
modelling of relationships to which interdisciplinary 
collaboration aspires” (Horgan, 2013: 190-191). 
 
Verifying information  
 
Qualitative fieldwork is essential when it comes to verifying pre-existing 
information and correcting false or biased data (Dolnik, 2013b: 2-4, Singh, 
2013: 142), especially in cases of conflict where bias and misrepresentation 
are often deliberately produced by the parties involved. Relying on official 
figures, numbers or accounts published by actors in the field or abroad 
without the ability to contextualise them, can cause significant issues with 
the validity of any data used. This is of particular importance in situations in 
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which the authors of such accounts are directly involved in the conflict 
themselves or have considerable interests at stake. This is why detailed 
knowledge about local particularities and realities on the ground is key. As 
Ranstorp has argued, “[f]ield research is essential in verifying ‘circular’ truth, 
debunking myths and information, and unlocking new perspectives into the 
specific research issue” (2013: 48). This is particularly important when 
sensitive topics are being studied (Jipson and Litton, 2000: 149). In the case 
of the Lebanese civil war, this is critical as many competing and often 
conflicting narratives on the war exist in contemporary Lebanese society 
(Traboulsi, 2012), which renders cross-group comparison particularly 
important. 
 
Case selection 
 
This study compares a set of non-state armed groups involved in the 
Lebanese civil war. The conflict context of the Lebanese civil war was chosen 
as it provides a universe of different non-state armed organisations, most of 
which remain relatively under-studied – especially when it comes to the 
question of female fighters. I had originally planned to compare two Sri 
Lankan militias; however, this plan had to be abandoned for a number of 
reasons, as will be discussed below. The cases included in this thesis were 
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selected with the help of theoretical sampling, including deviant cases 
(Mason 1996, Becker 1998, cit. in Silverman, 2010: 144-146). Case selection 
was informed by a most similar, different outcome/most different, similar 
outcome (MSDO/MDSO) approach (Mill, 1893). Cases were selected with 
regards to their expected relevance to the chosen research question and 
theory (Mason, 1996: 93-94, cit. in Silverman, 2010: 144), but without 
excluding cases expected to contradict the expected outcome. The novelty 
of the cases studied also played a role – which is of particular importance in 
the field of conflict (and terrorism) studies, where a small group of cases 
have been considerably over-studied in the past decades, whilst others have 
gained much less attention. Additional considerations included accessibility 
as well as safety of researchers and research participants during the 
fieldwork. The first choice of cases – two former Sri Lankan militias, had to 
be abandoned since these two requirements would not have been fulfilled. 
The thesis compares seven different cases; five with similar outcome but 
variation in degree (LCP and PFLP vs. Kataeb/FT and Fatah), one with 
different outcome (the PSP) and one with similar outcome which occurred 
at a later time (Amal), while also taking into account variation over time and 
location. Trade-offs between complexity and generalisability are inherent to 
every social sciences study. In this case, the decision to focus on militias 
operating during the Lebanese civil war without including a cross-country 
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comparison was based on two considerations. First, the novelty of the cases 
studied and the relative lack of data and pre-existing studies required that 
complexity be valued over generalisability. Second, the diversity of different 
militias involved in the Lebanese civil war provided ample opportunity for 
comparison – even within only one national conflict context. Including 
additional, cross-national cases would have been difficult in the limited 
space and time available. 
 
3.2 | Data collection 
 
General research context  
 
An overlap in the phases of data collection, management and analysis 
formed an essential part of my research strategy. Data was collected during 
four separate fieldwork trips in July/August 2015 (six weeks), December 
2015/January 2016 (four weeks), the summer of 2016 (six weeks) and 
autumn 2016 (one week). The fieldwork was conducted  over four separate 
visits  for practical reasons, as it needed to coincide with my daughter’s 
school holidays. What at first felt like a disadvantage, soon proved to be 
advantageous. I worked very efficiently during my field trips, throughout 
which I conducted up to nine interviews a week – sometimes carrying out 
98 
 
four interviews per day. The memories of what other interviewees had said 
were still fresh and if something had not worked very well during an 
interview, I could adapt quickly. It was also very motivating to see how many 
interviews I could do and how much data I could collect in a relatively short 
period of time. Another advantage was that I felt under less pressure in 
situations when it was difficult to reach potential interviewees, as I knew I 
would be back in a few months’ time. Spreading out my field trips also 
allowed me to go back to the literature during the ‘home’ phases in between 
the different trips, read up on issues that had come up during the last field 
visit and review my sampling and interviewing strategy accordingly. It also 
helped with gaining gatekeepers’ and interviewees’ trust, as it showed that 
I was interested enough in the topic to come back to Lebanon several times 
– an effect which other scholars working on political violence have also 
highlighted (Dolnik, 2013c: 242). 
Most importantly, after six weeks of field work in a rather challenging 
environment, I was glad to be able to go back home and take a break from 
the very intense few weeks. The environment in which I undertook my 
research was not always easy to cope with. I had chosen Lebanon for my 
field work upon realising after a first scoping visit to Sri Lanka, that in the 
current political climate, carrying out field research on political violence 
would prove very difficult. The Lebanese civil war offered a number of very 
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interesting cases, and I was more familiar with the region, culture and 
language. I had never been to Lebanon before, but had studied the region, 
its history, politics, culture and language for around 15 years prior to starting 
my field work in the summer of 2015. The fact that I had worked in Palestine 
for 3.5 months in 2006, and that I had family from Syria, also helped me to 
understand the research environment. Also, it was not the first time I was 
living in a (post)conflict country. In addition to my stay in Palestine, I have 
worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Yemen and Pakistan, and have undertaken 
study visits to Macedonia and Serbia. However, having to cope with the 
climate, poor infrastructure, and high levels of inequality and corruption still 
proved to be a considerable challenge.  
 
Research methods  
 
The main source of data this study is based on is semi-structured interviews 
with former combatants, party members, civil society representatives, 
researchers and journalists. In addition to this, I also analysed 
(auto)biographies of four former female fighters (Bechara, 2003, Sneifer, 
2006, El Murr, 2014, Duplan and Raulin, 2015). I chose to conduct semi-
structured face-to-face interviews, as they offer flexibility, have a relatively 
high response rate, allowed me to probe further during the interview and 
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gave me more control over the data collection process than other 
approaches (Silke, 2004). Meeting interviewees in person also helped to 
build trust and rapport. In the case of my research, these strengths 
outweighed the weaknesses; namely, time and resource intensity, the risk 
of interviewer bias, and problems relating to sampling (Silke, 2004).   
On the spectrum of academic interviews, ranging from the “informal, 
conversational interview” to “the standardized, close-ended interview”, my 
interviews, during which I followed the “interview guide or topical 
approach”, lie in the middle (Patton, 2002, cit. in Marshall and Rossman, 
2011). Like many other qualitative researchers, I felt that using semi-
structured interviews following an interview guide offered the advantage of 
reconciling the best of the two other approaches (Fife, 2005: 94).   
While “[t]he reliability of interview schedules is a central question in 
quantitative methods textbooks [according to which] it is very important 
that each respondent understands the questions in the same way” 
(Silverman, 1993: 148), attaining formal objectivity was neither an explicit 
aim of this study nor do I believe it is possible (or necessary), to design 
questions which each respondent will understand in the same way. Instead, 
I focus on transparency, researcher reflexivity and triangulation (Rekawek, 
2013: 179).  
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It has been claimed that “[a]n interview should entail a non-reciprocal 
relationship: most interviews consist of the interviewer’s questions, and the 
interviewee’s answers” (Horgan, 2013: 191). While I conducted some 
interviews in this way, others took the shape of a conversation between two 
relatively equal participants – with both asking and answering questions. 
This kind of interview has been described by Kvale and Brinkman as “literally 
an inter view, an inter change of views between two persons” (Kvale and 
Brinkman, 2009: 2, cit. in Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 145; see also Fife, 
2005: 95). Despite this degree of flexibility in how interviews were 
conducted, my interviews remained semi-structured. I did not conduct 
completely open-ended interviews where “the person being interviewed 
has the ‘right’ to interpret the question and take it any place he or she 
pleases” (Fife, 2005: 93).  
The epistemological framework I worked with, in combination with my 
methodology, also informed the approach I took to the questions included 
in my interview guide, which contained both fact-finding (descriptive) 
questions as well as those aiming at generating contextual information.  
At the beginning of each interview, I briefly introduced myself and the 
research project. In some cases, my interview partners started responding 
immediately, while at other times, more probing was needed. In order to 
avoid questions that could be perceived as leading or biased (Clutterbuck 
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and Warnes, 2013: 18), I started with more open questions which, towards 
the end, became more specific. 
My interview guide consisted of four sections.13 The first contained 
questions on facts of women’s involvements, such as numbers, times and 
locations of involvement. As the interview guide in the appendix shows, the 
following sections contained questions pertaining to the four strands of 
explanation I was testing as part of my research; namely, individual 
motivations, organisational characteristics, the security context, and societal 
aspects. 
Either at the very beginning or the end of each interview, I also asked 
questions about the interviewee’s personal background – unless I was 
already aware of it (as was the case with some more high-profile 
interviewees). Methodological flexibility and improvisation were an integral 
part of the research process (Moore, 2013: 129-130, Taarnby, 2013: 213), 
and with time my interview guide developed as I included questions on 
topics that had emerged in earlier interviews. This helped to decrease the 
risk of bias and selective memory and to increase the reliability of my 
findings through cross-checking (Clutterbuck and Warnes, 2013: 19; 
Rekawek, 2013: 179).  
                                                          
13  A copy of the interview guide is included in the appendix. 
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In total, I carried out 64 interviews with 69 interviewees.14 21 persons were 
interviewed during the first field trip in the summer of 2015, 21 during the 
second trip in winter 2015/2016, 29 in the summer of 2016 and 3 in autumn 
2016. 34 of the interviewees were former combatants (28 men, 6 women); 
26 (former) party members (11 men, 15 women); 4 civil society 
representatives (2 men, 2 women), 3 journalists (2 men, 1 woman) and 2 
researchers (both men). 11 interviewees were formerly associated with the 
LCP, 11 with Kataeb/the LF, 11 with Amal, 5 with Fatah, 5 with the PSP, 4 
with the CAO, 4 with the PFLP, 3 with different Palestinian and LNM-
affiliated militias, 2 with the NLP, 2 with the SSNP and 1 with Tanzim.  
The vast majority of interviewees were Lebanese, with 5 being Palestinians 
(from Lebanon), 1 half Lebanese, half Palestinian and 2 being Europeans 
working in Lebanon. Most interviews were conducted in a public space such 
as a café or at the interviewee’s work place or house. 48 individuals were 
interviewed in Beirut, 15 in the South, 5 in Jounieh and the region, and 1 in 
the mountains to the south east of Beirut. I interviewed both members of 
the (current) elite and individuals who would not be classified as belonging 
to the elite as well as former leaders and regular members of the different 
organisations, which helped me avoid elite bias (Marshall and Rossman: 
2011, 155-156). Since my study focused on organisational decision-making, 
                                                          
14  A table with an overview of all interviews is included in the appendix. 
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it was important to interview both male and female former militia members, 
unlike some other studies on female political violence, which focus on the 
women’s perspectives only (see, for example, Alison, 2009, Bloom, 2011). 
The aim of my data collection was to reach theoretical saturation, or, as it 
has been suggested by some, “theoretical sufficiency, whereby we have 
categories well described by and fitting with our data” (Dey, 1999: 257, cit. 
in Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 220). Moreover, I tried to interview a similar 
number of people associated with each of the different organisations. 
Speaking with members of as wide a range of different organisations as 
possible, as well as with individuals who were not associated with any of the 
parties or militias during the war, allowed me to cross-check information 
gathered and to minimise the risk of bias and selective memory, which is of 
particular importance when researching controversial topics – especially if 
these refer to past events (Rekawek 2013: 179; see also Clutterbuck and 
Warnes, 2013: 19).  
The extent to which interpretation (from one language to another) will have 
an impact on the interview is contested. On the one hand, it has been 
claimed that “[…] in many cases the interpretation process constitutes the 
single greatest obstacle to a successful interview” (Dolnik, 2013c: 243-244). 
Difficulties are mostly said to be related to establishing rapport and building 
trust. On the other hand, some have also suggested that a lack of language 
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skills can be an advantage, for example, because the researcher and the 
foreign language they speak are perceived as more neutral and less laden 
with conflict and emotions (Moore, 2013: 131). In fact, speaking the 
language of one’s interview partner can create a barrier, if it is, for example, 
the “wrong” language (e.g. the language of a perceived oppressor or political 
opponent) or accent (Dolnik, 2013c: 241-242, Rasmussen, 2013: 73). Lastly, 
one cannot deny that “all social research involves translation, if only from 
the ‘language of the streets’ into formal academic prose” (Singal and Jeffery, 
2008, sec. 2, cit. in Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 164). Thus, what matters 
most in this context is awareness of potential issues and transparency with 
regards to the chosen procedure (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 165-167). In 
the case of my research, I did not feel that conducting the interviews in 
English, French or with the help of an interpreter (in the case of those 
interview partners who could not or did not feel confident enough to speak 
English or French) created any major barrier. In retrospect, my ability to 
speak French helped me to gain access to many French-educated 
interviewees, which is something I did not expect to be of such great 
importance. 
For the interviews that were carried out in Arabic, my research assistant who 
interpreted for me from Arabic to English was present. 57 interviews were 
also attended by my daughter. In some cases, the interviewer’s children 
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and/or colleagues were also in the same room. I left the decision to the 
interviewee, trusting that they knew better than me about the degree of 
privacy they required. Most of the time, I felt the fact that my daughter was 
reading, writing or doing homework in the same room as us did not make 
any difference to interviewees. Indeed, in some situations, I got the 
impression that it contributed positively to the interview, in that it helped 
gain interviewees’ trust and establish rapport (Eggert, 2017).   
It is common practice for many social scientists to audio-record their 
interviews (Silverman, 2010: 199-200). At the same time, some scholars 
working on sensitive issues such as political violence describe the potentially 
intimidating effect a recording device can have on interviewees who might 
fear repercussions (Schweitzer, 2013: 81). Moreover, the often problematic 
nature of transcribing indicates that perhaps the belief that recorded 
interviews are inevitably more reliable than non-recorded ones might be an 
illusion (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 164-165). Several potential interview 
partners I spoke with on the phone prior to conducting the interview were 
reassured by the fact that I was not planning to record the interview. 
Moreover, many of my interviews were conducted in busy cafés, sometimes 
near main roads, where because of high levels of background noise, it would 
have been difficult to record. Instead, I took detailed notes during the 
interview – clearly marking direct quotes, in order to be able to distinguish 
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them from summaries of what had been said. It is not unusual for 
researchers working on political violence in the Middle East to not record 
their interviews (Parkinson, 2013).  
 
Sampling and access issues 
 
In principle, social researchers can choose between probability and non-
probability sampling strategies, with the latter including purposive, 
convenience and snowball sampling (Kenney, 2013: 31-36). Probability 
sampling requires a list of the entire population studied, which is not 
possible to acquire if many members of a group are not known to the 
researcher, as is often the case when studying sensitive or controversial 
topics (Kenney, 2013: 31). Thus, for the purpose of my research, I used a 
combination of purposive and snowballing sampling. One main issue of non-
probability sampling methods, including purposive and snowballing 
approaches, is the limited representativeness of the data collected. This 
limitation is inherent to many qualitative approaches. One suggested 
strategy to overcome this problem is to be “more transparent with respect 
to research methods and openly acknowledging their limitations as 
qualifiers for one’s findings” (Dolnik, 2013c: 245). In this context, Horgan 
(2013: 200) warns about “misunderstandings of what case studies and 
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exploratory research are all about” and “unrealistic expectations about 
generalizability.” He stresses that: 
 
Understanding the value of data driven by rigorous data 
collection and making the effort to sample systematically may 
lessen the efficacy of arguments about sample size. […] 
Researchers’ resistance to generalizability, however, should 
not be frowned upon when we consider the preponderance 
of political science models that are rarely empirically derived 
at all (Horgan, 2013: 200). 
 
In other words, the trade-off of generating non-representative data is that 
findings cannot be generalised. However, collecting non-generalisable data 
is preferable to not generating any empirical data at all.  
Gaining access to research participants can prove to be difficult. It is often 
particularly challenging in (post)conflict countries, especially when the 
issues that the researcher focuses on are considered to be of a sensitive or 
controversial nature (Hermann, 2001: 84-85, Smyth, 2001: 9, Kenney, 2013: 
29). Having said that, gaining access to violent political groups can be easier 
than expected (Bokhari, 2013: 95, 97, Dolnik, 2013c: 238, Horgan, 2013: 195-
196). Reasons for this surprisingly easy access can be due to a cultural nature 
(Radsch, 2009: 94-95) or be related to the wish of an individual or an 
organisation to have their story told (Abuza, 2013: 158). In any case, trust-
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building is essential in gaining access and collecting meaningful data in such 
contexts (Norman, 2009: 71, 73, Ranstorp, 2013: 55).  
Before my first trip to Lebanon, I relied on several methods of gaining access 
to potential interview partners. Firstly, I made use of personal contacts and 
secondly, I contacted a number of non-government organisations and 
cultural institutions working in Lebanon. A third way of gaining access was 
through personal, unplanned encounters during my stay in Lebanon, for 
example, through networking at conferences or through family members of 
friends. I also asked every person I interviewed at the end of our 
conversation, if they could think of anyone else who might be willing to 
speak to me as well. This strategy worked extremely well. In fact, one of the 
biggest advantages of snowballing sampling is that a trusted gatekeeper 
vouches for the researcher, which tends to increase the willingness of 
potential interviewees to participate (Kenney, 2013: 34). During my 
research, I was surprised how willing people were to speak to me about their 
views and experiences and to refer me to others who they thought could be 
of help.  
While snowballing can be very useful, it also entails a number of potential 
issues. Firstly, “the snowballing method can create problems within the 
network if sensitive links between individuals are acknowledged […], or if the 
researcher, usually in attempts to enhance validity, shares information or 
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opinions from one respondent with another” (Norman, 2009: 79). This 
problem can be overcome relatively easily by respecting principles of 
confidentiality. A second issue is related to over-sampling of interviewees 
with homogenous views (Kenney, 2013: 35). In order to tackle this 
methodological issue, I attempted to diversify the ways in which I secured 
my interviews and ensured that access was gained through multiple entry 
points.  
In the case of my research, I realised how important these multiple entry 
points were during my first field trip, when I reflected on how comfortable 
many of the interviewees were with sharing their experiences and views 
with a complete stranger, on such a sensitive topic. I realised that this was 
partly due to the fact that many of them had either been members or 
sympathisers of the political groups and movements I was studying for 
decades. They were thus accustomed to engaging in discussions about social 
and political topics. However, having thought about it for longer, I realised 
that many of my interviewees were members of a local NGO founded by 
former fighters during the Lebanese civil war, who were now campaigning 
for non-violent conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence. Speaking 
publicly to strangers about their experiences during the war was one of the 
backbones of their activities, with some of them giving up to three 
interviews per week. Realising this, I appreciated having gained access 
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(through said multiple entry points) to other former fighters who had been 
much less in the spotlight (or not at all). Speaking to people who were now 
public figures, as well as to more low-profile individuals, also helped me to 
minimise the risk of practice effect (Heiman, 2002), even though I felt all the 
former combatants I spoke with shared their genuine views and experiences. 
In this context, triangulation and cross-checking – especially through 
interviewing individuals who have never been involved with any political or 
armed organisation, proved to be very helpful. 
In addition to my sampling method, the use of multiple entry points and a 
general openness to new contacts, I also found that my status as a European 
female researcher helped me to gain access. The fact that I spoke French 
was also particularly helpful, especially when contacting French-educated 
potential interviewees. That being said, even the most auspicious research 
design and sampling methods cannot overcome all issues related to trust. In 
the context of my research, I had initially planned to also interview (former) 
Hezbollah members; however, it proved to be impossible to gain access 
through the official party channels, and individuals who were willing to share 
their experience without the party’s approval could not be identified. 
In line with my research aims, my criteria for inclusion in the pool of possible 
interviewees was knowledge of and/or experience with: (1) non-state 
violent political organisations operating during the Lebanese civil war, (2) 
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the role and status of women in Lebanon during the 1970s, 1980s and early 
1990s, and (3) the general context of the war. These criteria are rather 
inclusive, which is due to reasons pertaining to my methodological approach 
and to the fact that I sought to collect data that both described facts and 
provided an understanding of the groups, as well as the general context. 
Interestingly, some scholars working on political violence found interviewing 
former combatants “not […] rewarding” as they “provided little or no 
additional information” (Moore, 2013: 129; see also Speckhard, 2009, cit. in 
Horgan 2013: 194-195). My experience was that interviewing former 
combatants can be incredibly useful, especially if they are disengaged and 
feel safe enough at the time of the interview to share their experience and 
impressions without fear of repercussions.  
 
3.3 | Data management and analysis 
 
Data analysis, the “process of making sense of the data and discovering what 
it has to say” (Holliday, 2007: 89), is an essential part of every social research 
study. It has been claimed that there are “nearly as many analysis strategies 
[…] as qualitative researchers” (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 17, cit. in Marshall 
and Rossman, 2011: 208). In the continuum of analysis strategies ranging 
from very standardised to non-standardised forms of analysis (Crabtree and 
113 
 
Miller, 1992, cit. in Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 208), my strategy was 
closer to more standardised approaches. This is linked to the main aim of my 
research, which was to test explanations drawn from existing literature. As I 
was attempting to analyse the role individual motivations, organisational 
characteristics, the security context and societal factors played in the 
organisational decision-making with regards to the inclusion of female 
fighters, both my data management and data analysis strategies were 
guided by these four pre-existing categories. At the same time however, 
data collection and analysis were inspired by grounded theory (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1997), in that I remained open to new explanations emerging from 
the data collected (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 206). The rationale behind 
this was to “minimise the risk of prematurely closing the door to new 
explanations that might come up during data collection” (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2011: 208). Also, this approach was an additional way to help 
reconcile my epistemological perspective with the qualitative approach I 
was taking. Positivist approaches are often criticised for “imposing limited 
worldview on the subjects” by “coding the social world according to 
preordained operational variables” (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 91). 
Combining the testing of hypotheses with an openness to new categories 
emerging from the data, allowed me to test pre-defined operational 
variables, while leaving space for new emerging themes. It has been claimed 
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that data analysis is “by no means a strictly linear process as each stage 
influences all the others” (Holliday, 2007: 90). This did apply to my research 
project whereby data analysis was an interactive process of collecting and 
analysing data, coding, identifying themes, going back to the field, and 
applying constant comparison (Silverman, 2010: 279-280). Data analysis at 
each stage fed into successive data collection, and informed triangulation 
over the research period. This allowed me to “check and compare [research 
participants’] responses with all the available participants in the research 
project, in order to confirm their stories or find any discrepancies between 
various versions” (Schweitzer, 2013: 89). It also allowed for the content of 
publications looking back on the time of the Lebanese civil war to be 
compared with the oral narrations of my interview partners. In this way, 
interviews became “part of a larger body of work” (Moore, 2013: 131). 
Data analysis consisted of three stages (which were then repeated for the 
newly collected data during and after subsequent field trips). First, I applied 
codes to the collected data, then I identified themes/categories and then I 
looked for linkages across categories (Fife, 2005: 125). In practice, this meant 
that during and after every field trip, notes taken during interviews were 
typed up and then coded. I coded the biographies of former fighters in the 
same way as my interview scripts. It was at this stage that the interviews 
were anonymised (except for a few, which had already been anonymised 
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during the interviews whilst note-taking). The codes were linked to the four 
explanatory approaches I was testing, i.e. CUL = societal norms, SEC = 
security context, ORG = organisational characteristics and IND = individual 
backgrounds and motivations. In addition to that, I applied the code FACT 
for facts regarding the involvement of female combatants in the respective 
groups (such as their numbers, times and locations of involvement), and OTH 
for aspects to be mentioned in the introduction or conclusion of the final 
thesis (which were not central to the research question but still related to 
the topic). After that, themes and thematic headings were created whilst 
going through the coded scripts (Holliday, 2007: 91). While coming up with 
themes, I looked for continuity and change over time and in different 
locations. I also compared groups with organisations from the opposing 
camp as well as with other groups from within the same alliance, reports 
on/by female combatants with their male equivalents, statements on/by 
leaders with those on/by regular fighters, claims by non-party/military 
members with those by individuals who used to be part of the movement, 
and so on. Lastly, active searching for deviant cases was also part of the data 
analysis process (Silverman, 2014: 97-100). Looking for negative instances of 
identified patterns helped to support the validity of identified themes 
(Marshall and Rossmann, 2011: 220). As called for in the literature, 
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inconsistent or contradictory evidence was not simply ignored, but included 
in the analysis (Fife, 2005: 133-134). 
 
3.4 | Research ethics and researcher reflexivity 
 
Research ethics 
 
Research does not take place in a socio-economic, cultural or political 
vacuum. It has the potential to affect those involved – both in a negative and 
positive way. In recent years, there has been an increased awareness of the 
negative impact research can potentially have, with the importance of 
ethical standards whilst conducting research increasingly highlighted (Fife, 
2005: 11). Harm can be caused to the researcher, research participants or to 
the wider community (Jipson and Litton, 2000: 160-162). Potential threats 
can be of physical, emotional, ethical and professional nature (Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle, 2000d: 23).  
There is relatively little literature on ethical issues in research on 
(post)conflict countries or political violence (Feenan, 2002). Apart from 
more general publications on conducting research on “sensitive” (Lee, 1993, 
Renzetti and Lee, 1993) or “dangerous” issues (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 
2000a), only a handful of books have been published on research in or on 
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violent contexts (Nordstrom and Robben, 1995, Smyth and Robinson, 2001, 
Sriram, 2009, Dolnik, 2013a). This gap in the literature is significant as 
research in or on violent contexts often requires special precautions to be 
taken.  
In the case of my research, the initial plan to conduct research in Sri Lanka 
was abandoned as the political and security climate at the time would have 
rendered research on political violence in the country extremely difficult and 
even dangerous – both for research participants as well as the local 
institutions on whose support I would have depended. Even though Lebanon 
has also lived through a lengthy and brutal civil war, most of the practical 
ethical and legal dilemmas created by researching armed groups identified 
in existing literature (Smyth, 2001: 6) could be avoided by the time factor, a 
post-war political amnesty and a relatively open society. Nevertheless, a 
detailed risk assessment was conducted before I left for the first field trip 
and it was updated before every subsequent research trip to Lebanon.15  
In most cases, perceptions of threat depend on who is undertaking the 
research (Jamieson, 2000: 63, see also Bokhari, 2013: 93, Singh, 2013: 143).  
Thus, experience and training can help to mitigate potential harm (Dolnik, 
2013c: 234). Prior to starting my fieldwork, I had both. In addition to several 
                                                          
15  For detailed instructions on how to write a risk and vulnerability assessment see, 
for example, Mertus 2009: 169-173. 
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years of experience working in a number of countries afflicted by violent 
conflict, I had been formally trained to cope with dangerous situations in 
(post)conflict countries by attending three workshops conducted by a 
French-Middle Eastern NGO, an international organisation and the doctoral 
training centre of a British university. Researchers in the field, especially 
when their fieldwork is conducted abroad or in (sub)cultures they are not 
very familiar with, tend to be more likely to cause harm to themselves or 
others if they lack the cultural background knowledge necessary to identify 
and defuse potentially dangerous situations (Linkogle, 2002: 132). I had not 
lived in Lebanon before, but had worked in another country of the region –  
Palestine, which in terms of mentality, lifestyle and culture, shares many 
commonalities with Lebanon. I had also studied the region for about 15 
years before leaving for the field, was fluent in both English and French and 
spoke basic Arabic. While I was aware that “it is not always possible to 
eliminate threat from either everyday life or social research” (Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle, 2000c: 200), I was confident about my skills and abilities to 
handle difficult situations. In the following two sub-sections I will look more 
closely at how research participants’ and my own safety were ensured 
during fieldwork.  
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Research participants’ safety 
 
Debates on ethical issues in the social sciences have traditionally focused on 
potential harm to research participants (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000b: 
1). The principle of “do no harm”, which originally was a medical injunction 
and has gone on to become a guideline for development workers and peace 
activists, is also invoked by many conflict researchers. Symth, for example, 
states that researchers should at least aim not to do harm to anyone 
involved in their research activities and that ideally the research should have 
a “beneficial effect for those participating” (2001: 5). Some have even gone 
as far as claiming that research on sensitive issues is only justified if it 
explicitly benefits the research participants (Turton, 1996: 96). As a 
researcher coming from abroad with the ability to easily leave again (unlike 
most of the research participants), I was very aware of my responsibility 
towards the participants of my research.  
Contrary to earlier expectations, the risk to research participants was 
relatively low, which was mostly due to the time factor and the political 
amnesty mentioned above. Moreover, several of my interviewees were 
actively involved in peace activism in Lebanon and spoke regularly at public 
events about their involvement during the war. Similar experiences have 
been reported by researchers working on other conflicts where a post-
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conflict agreement entailed rehabilitation of former militants (Rekawek, 
2013: 172). In the case of my research, it was mostly former members of 
those groups that fought Israel during the civil war who were more reluctant 
to have their identity exposed, as the conflict with Israel has not yet ended 
and revealing involvement in the fight against Israel can still have drastic 
consequences. In order to protect research participants’ safety, all names 
were anonymised, even those of participants who consented to being 
named.  
In most ethical research guidelines, informed consent of research 
participants constitutes one of the key principles of an ethical research 
strategy. It is essential that “[e]ach individual involved in the project […] 
should be aware of the basic reason for the study and how it is being carried 
out” (Fife, 2005: 12). However, the way in which informed consent is gained 
tends to be culturally specific and may need to be adapted depending on the 
specific context of the research project (Kovats‐Bernat, 2002: 214-215, Fife, 
2005: 12, Hemming, 2009: 34, Norman, 2009: 73, Dolnik, 2013c: 226-230, 
Ranstorp, 2013: 54). In the context of this research study, informed consent 
was gained by providing information about the research project, researcher 
and their background at the beginning of each interview. All research 
participants were also handed a card with the researcher’s contact details. 
Before my first trip to Lebanon, I updated my university website with details 
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about both the project and me. Moreover, the fact that access to most 
interviewees was gained through a third person (often a former interviewee 
themselves) also ensured that participants could obtain more information 
about the project through a trusted source.  
Whilst I was prepared to pause or terminate an interview if the participant’s 
behaviour gave any indication of them feeling uncomfortable or at risk of 
being affected by reliving a traumatic incident (Norman, 2009: 83-84, Ross, 
2009: 181-183, see also Dolnik, 2013c: 227), such a situation did not occur. 
 
Researcher’s safety 
 
Historically, research participants’ safety has often been prioritised over the 
safety and wellbeing of researchers (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000b: 1). 
This was not the case at my university where equal importance was placed 
on the researcher’s safety. The initial risk assessment conducted before the 
first field trip included precautions with the safety of both researcher and 
participants in mind.  
On the high risk ethnography scale quoted by Taarnby, the environment I 
undertook my fieldwork in would have been categorised as a level I or II 
context, which allows for qualitative research to be undertaken safely 
(Taarnby, 2013: 210-211). Overall, the situational risk of violence was very 
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low, with the risk of targeted violence being even lower.16 Threats were 
highly localised and limited in space. In practice, this meant, for example, 
that when violent clashes between protesters and the police broke out 
during my first fieldtrip in the summer of 2015 (Ensor, 2015), I did not feel 
threatened because the violence was targeted, localised and easily avoided.  
Apart from the political situation, another major concern prior to arriving in 
Beirut was how to ensure my safety while meeting strangers for interviews. 
The original plan had been to always keep a trusted friend or family member 
informed about whom I was meeting when and where. I followed this rule 
for the first few interviews but eventually reached a point where I did not 
feel it was necessary anymore as we were meeting in public spaces. Similar 
to the experience Rekawek made while researching political violence in 
Northern Ireland, none of the individuals I spoke to remained involved in 
political violence (Rekawek, 2013: 172). Instead, they were working in civil 
society, research or other roles. They were an “integral part of […] society, 
and the danger which emanate[d] from them [was] negligible” (Rekawek, 
2013: 172). In addition, my sampling strategy helped make both researcher 
and research participants feel safe, as I had been referred to nearly every 
person I met through a trusted contact or previous interviewee.  
                                                          
16  For an overview of the different types of violence, see Knights 2013: 105-106. 
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Interviewing former combatants and individuals who have lived through a 
brutal civil war has the potential to emotionally impact those involved in the 
research (Smyth, 2001: 10). During my research, my experience in this 
context was not as extreme as the experience reported by other researchers 
(Rasmussen, 2013: 65). Nevertheless, I could feel that at points, my 
wellbeing was affected while in the field. Triggers included some of the 
topics I discussed with my research participants in the interviews, things I 
had read about in the literature on the civil war or simply time spent walking 
through neighbourhoods which I knew had been the sites of large-scale 
massacres and violence decades ago. This had not been my first stay in a 
(post)conflict country so I was prepared for these emotions and aware of 
coping strategies. Emotional stress in the field can be exacerbated by the 
fact that “doing research can be a very isolating experience” (Brown, 2009: 
219). In this context, the fact that I was staying in Beirut with my daughter 
proved to be of advantage, as it forced me to also plan recreational activities 
(Eggert, 2017). Support by peers and through informal networks also proved 
to be very helpful (see also Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000c: 202). 
Lastly, one should not forget that limited risk-taking is often “part of the job” 
for any researcher working on political violence. The aim cannot be to 
completely avoid all risk at all times, as that would practically prevent any 
research on sensitive issues to take place. Instead, the aim should be to 
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decide “what risks are necessary and how worthwhile it is to take them” 
(Linkogle, 2002: 132), whilst keeping in mind that often there is a 
considerable difference between actual and perceived risk – especially when 
assessing the situation from abroad.  
 
Researcher reflexivity 
 
Probably more so than in quantitative research, the researcher herself 
constitutes a research instrument in qualitative research. Her presence is a 
vital part of the research process (Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 112). My 
main method of data collection were interviews, in which I interacted with 
one (or more) interview partners. It would be naïve to believe that my 
(perceived) identity did not have any impact on the interview situation. 
Indeed, “[r]esearch participants use researchers’ physical appearance, 
accent, mannerisms and multilingual abilities to identify them with certain 
ethnic, regional and even political groups” (Paluck, 2009: 45). Other identity 
markers such as gender, race, origin, religion or age can also play a role 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2011: 158-159). In extreme cases, the researcher’s 
(perceived) identity “can […] make them more or less likely to be perceived 
by participants as biased, foreign, or unfriendly, which would harper their 
125 
 
ability to work […] and in some cases put the researchers in danger” (Paluck, 
2009: 46).   
The fact that a qualitative researcher is an essential part of her research 
project does not have to be a disadvantage. If seen favourably, it can 
facilitate access and trust-building (Smyth, 2001: 9), as well as frankness and 
candour during the interview (Paluck, 2009: 46). In some cases, one might 
be able to strategically use some identifiers (Radsch, 2009: 97). Thus “rather 
than engaging in futile attempts to elimination of the effects of the 
researcher, we should set about understanding them” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983: 6, cit. in Holliday, 2007: 138). Transparency is essential in 
this context.  
In turn, a false “inferiority complex” vis-à-vis quantitative methods, which 
are often claimed to be more objective than qualitative approaches, is 
uncalled for. Quantitative analyses can also be affected by bias, particularly 
in the areas of sampling, case selection, data collection and interpretation 
of findings. Ultimately, “[b]eyond the chimera of objective and value-free 
research, each researcher carries personal ideas, feelings and stereotypes 
into the field” (Armakolas, 2001: 174).  
It has been claimed that especially “with regard to the study of violent 
conflicts, both the positivistic demand for objectivity and the hermeneutic 
requirement for honest reflexivity are extremely difficult to meet” 
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(Hermann, 2001: 79, see also Smyth and Darby, 2001: 20). During my 
fieldwork, I did not feel my objectivity or capacity for reflection, self-
reflexivity or impartiality was affected. Similar to Armakolas’s experience in 
the Balkans (2001: 167), I realised quite early on that the conflict in Lebanon 
had been far too complex for an outsider to simply side with one of the 
conflict parties. The fact that almost all the organisations involved in the 
fighting committed war crimes and were responsible for human rights 
violations stressed that point.  
Many publications on researcher reflexivity stress the need to critically 
reflect the power relation between researcher and research participants 
(Lee, 1993: 110-111). While some contend that the researcher’s power is 
limited, for example, by the etiquette of the interview (Lee, 1993: 111), 
others question the researcher’s presumed power over her research 
participants altogether. Hemming, for example, criticises the “assumption of 
‘power over’” as being “intellectually bereft” in a situation where the 
researcher enters her research participants’ social space (Hemming, 2009: 
30). Her point is indeed quite compelling, especially when it is members of 
non-state armed organisations who are being researched (Dolnik, 2013c: 
228). That being said, “[a]lthough power dynamics between researcher and 
researched are often balanced in research involving repellent [sic] 
populations, researchers still maintain the upper hand in one important area 
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– the power of representation” (Gallaher, 2009: 140). Different researchers 
have suggested different strategies to overcome the associated risk and to 
protect their research participants from harm. Giving them a say in the 
research process (identified as good practice by some), is not always an 
option, especially not in the case of research on armed groups. To give an 
admittedly rather extreme example, which nonetheless illustrates an 
important point in this context, “[m]ost people, for example, would balk at 
giving a neo-Nazi group the right to veto a researcher’s conclusions” 
(Gallaher, 2009: 136). Instead, Gallagher contends the importance of being 
“fair to a group’s self-presentation” (2009: 136). I did not feel more powerful 
than most of my research participants. They had the advantage of being 
insiders, while I was a foreigner who was new to the country and the topic 
of the Lebanese civil war. The fact that I only speak basic Arabic and was 
considerably younger than most of my interviewees also played a role in this 
context. This effect was amplified by the fact that several of my interviewees 
were elites, and successful, well-known and accomplished members of 
Lebanese society. 
During my research in Lebanon, for the most part, I felt and was considered 
to be an outsider or rather, an “involved outsider” – someone who, despite 
her status as someone coming from outside of the community, is still 
involved in events which are of relevance to the in-group (Hermann, 2001: 
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79). It has often been claimed that it is easier for insiders to gain access and 
to gather data (if only for the lack of a language barrier) (Hermann, 2001: 82-
90). However, “[s]ometimes being a foreign researcher […] makes an 
opening possible” (Abuza, 2013: 168). Experience also shows that what kind 
of outsider one is can make a difference. For instance, perceptions of the 
researcher’s country of origin or citizenship can differ in different context. 
For example, while Norman experienced issues of access and trust in 
Palestine due to her being an American and the fact that she had links with 
Israel (Norman, 2009: 76), during his fieldwork in Serbia, Amakolas (2001) 
benefitted from the fact that he was Greek and from a nation considered to 
be a friend and ally by many Serbs. At the same time, it has been claimed 
that outsiders are more likely to remain more objective, and that because of 
the presumed distance to their research subject, it was easier for them to 
analyse and disseminate data (Hermann, 2001: 82-90). This claim, however, 
is contradicted by the phenomenon of some qualitative researchers “going 
native” or over-identifying with their research participants. Whilst many 
researchers describe the “dilemmas” and “constant fights” they experienced 
in their attempt to situate themselves as a researcher in the insider/outsider 
nexus (Bokhari, 2013: 97), others have fewer difficulties to report and 
instead use the ambiguity strategically (Radsch, 2009: 97).  
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I felt that during my fieldwork in Lebanon, gaining access and building trust 
was facilitated by the fact that I was a European researcher. Some of my 
local friends even expressed the opinion that this made me “more 
interesting” for someone to share their experiences with. I also felt that my 
identity as a researcher (as opposed to a journalist), facilitated my research. 
This was affirmed by my being asked several times to confirm that I was an 
academic and not someone working for the media. The fact that I spoke 
French fluently also proved to be of advantage, especially when speaking to 
French-educated research participants.  
The relativity of insider/outsider identities and their constructed nature was 
evident to me through my experience as a Muslim researcher. Before my 
first field trip to Lebanon, I was anxious about the extent to which my visible 
identity as a Muslim researcher would impact the relation with some of my 
interviewees – especially in a country with a relatively high conflict potential, 
where inter-community rifts are sometimes presented as existing along 
sectarian or ‘secular vs. religious’ lines. However, while in the field, I found 
that on the whole my Muslim identity was not detrimental to gaining access 
or building trust. I believe this is in part, due to my being a Western 
foreigner, an academic and a French-speaker (which are all identifiers that 
tend to be considered as positive and desirable by many Lebanese –  
especially amongst the political and educated elite). The fact that I was a 
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guest and for most of my interviewees, someone who had been introduced 
to them by a personal contact, also helped. It was also certainly linked to the 
fact that many of my interview partners were educated and eloquent 
individuals who, in principle, were in favour of tolerance and co-existence. 
Nevertheless, there were a few incidents in which I sensed anti-Muslim 
sentiments from some of the interviewees. In these cases however, I may 
have positively benefitted from some of the research participants’ 
distinguishing between “good because educated, secular and tolerant” 
Muslims on the one hand, and “bad because overly religious, uneducated 
and intolerant” Muslims on the other hand.17 My social class, education, 
linguistic abilities and European origin seemed to have held more 
importance to the interviewees than my religion. Also, interestingly, my 
Muslim identity led many locals to assume that either my father or husband 
were Lebanese. I am not sure how many interviewees assumed this as very 
few asked me personal questions directly and therefore, I was unable to 
correct this presumption. Nevertheless, this exemplifies how one’s status as 
an insider or outsider is indeed often constructed and highly dependent on 
perception. 
                                                          
17  The construction of very similar categories of “good and bad Catholics” in Northern 
Ireland has been described by Brewer and Magee 1991: 25, cit. in Finlay 2001: 60. 
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Lastly, several other identifiers also worked in my favour during the research 
process. These included: my relatively young age (I could have been the 
daughter of many of the interviewees, and I did get the sense that some of 
the interviewees felt a sense of responsibility to help me with my research); 
my gender (it has been claimed that men in particular, find it more 
“interesting” to talk to a woman and that female researchers are perceived 
to be less threatening and more in need of help) (Bokhari, 2013: 97 – 98); 
and the fact that I was a mother (which often forms a connection, 
particularly with other parents, and especially so in a relatively child-friendly 
country such as Lebanon) (Eggert, 2017). 
  
3.5 | Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed epistemological and methodological issues 
pertaining to my research on armed political groups’ decision-making on the 
inclusion of female fighters. A discussion of the epistemology as well as the 
methodological approach was followed by sections on data collection, 
management and analysis. I discussed advantages and limitations of 
combining a positivist framework with qualitative methods and emphasised 
the importance of including interviewees from a variety of different 
backgrounds. The final sections of the chapter were dedicated to issues 
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around research ethics and researcher reflexivity. I illustrated how, due to 
the specific post-war environment in Lebanon, gaining access to former 
members of most of the militias involved in the civil war was much easier 
than suggested in some of the literature on other armed groups and civil 
wars. In each sub-section of the chapter, expected and actual problems were 
discussed and ways to overcome these were discussed. As with any research 
study, this project contains a number of limitations which were highlighted 
throughout the chapter. Overall, none of the identified issues were 
impossible to mitigate. However, it is essential to bear these methodological 
limitations in mind during the analysis of the findings of this study, which will 
be discussed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4 | Individual motivations 
 
The majority of existing publications on female involvement in non-state 
political violence focus on individual aspects. In the case of women’s 
participation during the Lebanese civil war, individual motivations were 
indeed crucial. Without the women’s insistence for their inclusion, it is highly 
unlikely that there would have been any female fighters in any of the militias 
operating during the Lebanese civil war. In this chapter, I illustrate the 
importance of women’s individual motivations to join the non-state armed 
groups. In Section One, I firstly look at debates surrounding the question of 
whether or not women’s participation is as a result of a self-determined and 
voluntary decision. I show that in the case of female fighters in the Lebanese 
civil war, coercion did not play a role. On the contrary, the women were 
highly motivated, and were it not for their insistence to be included in 
combat roles, the organisations would probably not have made the decision 
to let them participate. Secondly, I look at the backgrounds of the women 
(and men) who got involved in the various militias. Who are the women who 
decided to join the war? What are their backgrounds and what is it that 
made them want to actively participate in the civil war? Are there any 
differences between the different militia members’ motivations and were 
any of the motivations gender-specific? I examine these questions in Part 
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Two and Three of this chapter. In previous literature on individual 
motivations in other violent conflicts, most authors stress the highly 
complex nature of the individual decision-making process and that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to single out singular causes (Bloom, 2005: 162, 
234-235, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 503, McKay, 2007: 171, Schweitzer, 2007: 
143, Eager, 2008: 23, Alison, 2009: 128, Jacques and Taylor, 2009: 507, 
Shekhawat, 2012: 132). This is further complicated by the fact that 
motivations can of course, change over time (Bloom, 2005: 234-235). In the 
context of my research, most women (and men) identified political reasons 
as motivational factors for their involvement. However, as this chapter 
shows, other factors such as previous non-violent activism, age, marital 
status and personal links to militias, also played a role. Another factor worth 
mentioning in this context is that, whilst many individuals share the same 
experiences or attitudes, all of them do not get involved in political violence 
(Eager, 2008: 31). This is why “[e]xactly how individuals become terrorists 
[or involved in political violence more generally] can only usefully be 
appreciated on a case-by-case basis” (Galvin, 1983: 23, cit. in Eager, 2008: 
4). It is also the reason why in this chapter, I not only discuss the motivations 
of women who decided to join as fighters, but also the reasons why other 
women in the same militias decided to contribute in non-combat roles 
instead. The focus on the individual level in the majority of existing conflict 
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and terrorism studies literature does sometimes come at the price of more 
comprehensive approaches being shunned (Haen Marshall et al., 1986: 22, 
cit. in Hamilton, 2007: 133, see also O'Rourke, 2009: 683). Particularly in the 
field of terrorism studies, there is a history of analysing individual features 
with attempts to identify common “terrorist profiles” – as though other, 
non-individual, factors do not play a role in processes of involvement in 
political violence. In order to avoid this pitfall, I integrate the role of the 
security context, organisational aspects and societal factors into this 
chapter, by examining in Sections Four, Five and Six how each of these 
factors influenced women’s motivations.  
 
4.1 | Choice or coercion? 
 
Is female involvement with non-state armed groups a choice women make 
or is it more accurate to speak of coercion? Claims of coercion can often be 
found in conflict studies literature focusing on Africa, and to a lesser degree, 
Asia and South America (Eager, 2008: 128, Alison, 2009: 139-141, Parashar, 
2009: 137, Katto, 2014: 544). According to some scholars, in some conflict 
contexts, the majority of female fighters were either abducted or born to an 
abducted mother (McKay, 2007: 171, see also Coulter, 2008: 55). On the 
other hand, it has been contended that the majority of women joining armed 
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groups worldwide volunteer (Speckhard, 2008: 1018, Henshaw, 2015: 3). 
Henshaw in particular, criticises the focus on the use of force as a tool for 
recruitment and retention for women. She notes the “difficulty that many 
observers have reconciling women as willing participants in violent activity”, 
and criticises what she calls the “dichotomous notion of agency that 
oversimplifies the realities of conflict”, by pointing to the cases of women 
who are coerced to join and then decide to stay (Henshaw, 2015: 14, see 
also Coulter, 2008: 55). Others have questioned the degree to which a 
decision made by a forced member of a violent group can be considered 
voluntary and self-determined, which is why Coulter, for example, speaks of 
“choiceless decisions” in this context (Coulter, 2008: 61). She contends that 
this is a situation both men and women find themselves in, but adds that 
women’s struggle is often harder as they tend to face more barriers (Coulter, 
2008: 68). The situation is further complicated by the fact that the distinction 
between coercion and choice “is not always clear-cut and shades of grey 
proliferate. The spectrum of coercion includes everything from subtle 
community pressure to brute force” (Bloom, 2005: 234). However, in the 
case of militias operating during the Lebanese civil war, direct coercion did 
not play a role. Whenever the role of the militias in the recruitment process 
came up, it was stressed that “the choice is with the woman” (interviewee 
57; see also interviewees 22, 27, 52).  
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A lesser form of the coercion argument is the belief that organisations lure 
women in by making false promises, or by hiding the true nature of the 
group’s or its members’ motives and activities. The women, in this 
explanation, are naïve, vulnerable, indoctrinated, mentally disturbed or do 
not fully grasp what they are doing. Their agency is reduced to a minimum. 
This explanation can mostly be found in terrorism studies (Bloom, 2005: 234-
235, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 505-506, Speckhard, 2008: 1018, Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2008: 106, 115). In these publications, it is often assumed that 
women are lured in by men (Berko and Erez, 2007b: 503), which reproduces 
problematic gender stereotypes of men as active perpetrators and women 
as passive victims. Moreover, the focus on women being the subject of 
manipulation is striking. It stands in contrast to the findings of a number of 
scholars working on the topic, who have pointed out that it is both men and 
women who are being used and exploited by military groups (Schweitzer, 
2007: 143).  
Attempts to explain female participation in combat through either coercion 
or by being lured in by men have been strongly contested by a number of 
researchers, who instead point to the women’s high motivation to join as 
fighters (Hamilton, 2007: 145). Some have questioned the conceptualisation 
of “recruitment as a top-down process in which recruiters identify 
susceptible potentials and coerce them into joining their organization” 
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(Jacques and Taylor, 2008: 308). Instead, they stress the crucial role women 
pushing for their inclusion plays, and describe recruitment as a reactive 
process (Jacques and Taylor, 2008: 308). This mirrors the findings of this 
research study. Several interviewees stressed that recruitment of female 
fighters was a bottom-up process. This was emphasised by a former fighter 
with leftist and Palestinian groups who stated: “No, it wasn’t that they [the 
Christian militias] hired women, the women came to them. It was the same 
for us [members of the Lebanese National Movement]. This is a very 
important point” (interviewee 14). A former female fighter with the LCP, 
described a similar process looking back on her experience: “When the war 
started I was ready. The war started, I was a friend of the Communist Party, 
so I went there and said I wanted to enrol” (interviewee 31). Almost all 
interviewees stressed the high motivation of female combatants to join the 
fight (interviewees 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 
32, 44, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66; see also Bechara, 2003, Sneifer, 
2006, Duplan and Raulin, 2012, El-Murr, 2014). Women joining the fight 
were described as having a “clear vision” of what they wanted (interviewee 
27), as being “very committed” (interviewee 56) and “serious about joining” 
(interviewee 54). One former military commander commented that “when 
the young women came to us, it was not to sit on the phone” but to fight 
(interviewee 60). Another described how in the war, you could see women 
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fighting who “couldn’t even handle a gun” properly, but who were so 
determined to contribute to the fight that they wanted to participate 
anyway (interviewee 32).  
In existing literature, it has been claimed that even in cases where the 
leadership of an organisation was initially reluctant to include female 
fighters in combat, women were “eventually accepted through their own 
persistence” (Bloom, 2005: 130, 244, Bernal, 2006: 133, Alison, 2009: 124-
125). Examples of violent political groups, in which women’s insistence on 
being fully included was at least partially decisive in women’s later 
involvement, include organisations as diverse as the Sri Lankan LTTE (Alison, 
2009: 124-125), Eritrean EPLF (Bernal, 2000: 63), different armed Palestinian 
groups (Bloom, 2005: 130, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 504), Irish Republican 
groups (Bloom, 2005: 244), the Mozambican FRELIMO (Katto, 2014: 542-
543), Namibian PLAN (Shikola, 1998: 139) and the Western Somali Liberation 
Front (Van Hauwermeiren, 2012: 22). This was also the case during the 
Lebanese civil war where the door for female fighters was opened after 
women’s insistence to be included. Several interviewees described this as 
the women “pushing” for their inclusion (interviewee 11), and “imposing” 
themselves (interviewees 7, 11, 65). Moreover, many interviewees stressed 
that it was the women demanding to be given a more active role in the fight 
(interviewees 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 44, 45, 
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47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69; see also Duplan and Raulin, 
2015: 54-55). In some cases, this determination went so far that the women 
participated against the explicit wish of their families (interviewees 57, 64, 
Duplan and Raulin 2015: 62). However, some of the interviewees also 
recalled accepting the non-combat roles they were allocated – which they 
considered to be of equal importance, rather than insisting to be included as 
actual fighters (interviewees 30, 52). Amongst the women wanting to fight, 
some were so motivated that they found ways to become combatants even 
if the organisation denied them entry as fighters (as was the case with the 
PSP) (interviewees 9, 10, 51). Their strategy was not getting married to a 
male fighter (as in the Khalistani armed groups Laurent Gayer analysed) 
(Gayer, 2009: 7), but instead, they formed their own independent combat 
unit in the Matn – a district in the mountains near Beirut (interviewees 9, 10, 
51). 
Rather than coercion, it was the women’s high motivations and their 
insistence on being included that constituted the first step towards their 
participation in combat during the Lebanese civil war. But who were these 
women and how can their extremely high motivations be explained? Did 
their personal backgrounds have an impact on their motivations? This will 
be explored in the following sections.  
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4.2 | Individual backgrounds 
 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, there is a multitude of reasons for 
why women (and men) become involved in political violence. Women’s 
individual backgrounds are equally as diverse – as a number of conflict and 
terrorism scholars have pointed out (Vázquez, 1997: 140, Bernal, 2000: 66, 
Von Knop, 2007: 399, Eager, 2008: 84, Zedalis, 2008: 50). Despite this 
diversity, which makes it difficult to come up with one profile of the “typical” 
female militia member, it is often possible to identify some commonalities 
the majority of female fighters in a given context share. Interestingly, the 
demographic variables and personal backgrounds of men and women 
joining armed groups often seem to be very similar (Hamilton, 2007: 135, 
Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 106, Zedalis, 2008: 50). This claim, which 
can be found in existing literature, is supported by the interviews I 
conducted with men and women involved with the different militias during 
the Lebanese civil war. Men and women largely shared the same personal 
characteristics. Major gender-specific differences in men’s and women’s 
personal backgrounds could not be found. When analysing existing literature 
on the topic, there are three characteristics that most fighters (and militia 
members in general) within non-state armed groups are said to share: (1) 
their young age; (2) family ties and other existing networks that link them to 
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armed groups, and (3) previous involvement in civic society or political 
movements for the cause. The role of (4) educational background and (5) 
socio-economic situation are more contested. Below, I will discuss these 
with regards to the militias operating during the Lebanese civil war. 
The majority of the fighters (and militia members in general) during the 
Lebanese civil war were young. While some of interview partners claimed 
that women (and men) of all ages were involved (interviewees 26, 30, 44), 
the majority agreed that many, if not most, fighters and militants were 
between their mid-teens and mid-twenties (interviewees 11, 18, 25, 29, 30, 
32, 37, 44, 45, 48, 52, 53, 55, 62, 66, 68; Sneifer, 2006: 23, 59, 81, Duplan 
and Raulin, 2015: 9, 14, 53, 79). This confirms findings by most conflict and 
terrorism scholars who state that young age is a characteristic shared by 
most women involved in non-state political violence (Weinberg and Eubank, 
1987: 254, Berko and Erez, 2007a: 152, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 498, Eager, 
2008: 108-109, 176, Speckhard, 2008: 106, Zedalis, 2008: 50, Alison, 2009: 
123, 143-144, Bloom et al., 2012: 66). The claim that this is true for both men 
and women in general (Hamilton, 2007: 143), with only minimal differences 
(Weinberg and Eubank, 1987: 256, Bloom et al., 2012: 66), is supported by 
my research on the militias operating during the Lebanese civil war. Most of 
the interviewees and their comrades were of the same age as their female 
peers in the militias (interviewees 8, 9, 10, 23, 27, 28, 29, 41, 46, 48, 49, 51, 
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55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 68, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 134). Existing 
literature highlights that in some cases, the young age of militants means 
that even children (under the age of 18) are involved (Shayne, 1999: 94, 
West, 2000: 183, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 498, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 
2008: 106, Alison, 2009: 123, Magadla, 2015: 394). Indeed, many of the 
interviewees (or their comrades) in my study were under the age of 18 when 
they were fighting during the war – both men (interviewees 1, 8, 23, 27, 28, 
29, 48, 49, 55, 59, 64, 68, see also Sneifer, 2006: 87) and women 
(interviewees 1, 22, 23, 29, 30, 55, 62, 66, see also Duplan and Raulin 2015: 
14, 53, 79). A male interviewee started to fight when he was 12 (interviewee 
14), and one woman I spoke with received training, but did not fight, at the 
age of 13 (interviewee 47). Previous studies have shown that many militants, 
especially those from an urban background, are students (Weinberg and 
Eubank, 1987: 254, Vázquez, 1997: 140). This finding, too, is supported by 
the analysis of the accounts of both female (interviewees 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 32, 44, 45, 53, 55, 56, 61, 63) and male (interviewees 23, 28, 45, 48, 55, 
see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 126) militia members during the Lebanese 
civil war – many of whom were either pupils or students at the time of their 
involvement with the militias. Specifically, but by no means exclusively, 
women who were with the Christian militias seemed to have been students. 
Many militia members (including frontline fighters), maintained a double-
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life in that they continued their studies whilst fighting in the war 
(interviewees 19, 23 25, 45, Sneifer, 2006, Duplan and Raulin, 2012). This 
was possible because of the nature of the war whereby, in many parts of the 
country, several rounds of fighting followed with relatively calm periods in-
between. As described in existing literature on female fighters in other 
conflicts (Viterna, 2006: 8, 18-19, 35-36, Eager, 2008: 109, 162, Speckhard 
and Akhmedova, 2008: 106-107, Bloom et al., 2012: 67), the majority of 
female combatants in Lebanon were not married – even though a minority 
had husbands and some also had children (interviewees 44, 45, 53, 68). 
Another characteristic that is mentioned frequently in other conflict 
contexts is family ties or other personal networks that link women to 
individuals who are already involved in political violence (Della Porta, 1992: 
273, cit. in Eager, 2008: 32, West, 2000: 186, Bloom, 2005: 235, Eager, 2008: 
109, 111, 122, 148, 163-164, 184, 204, Gayer, 2009: 4). Eager reaches the 
conclusion that “most of the women involved in […] various types of political 
violence and terrorism […] were recruited or became active through 
personal relational networks” (Eager, 2008: 213). This was also the case for 
many women and men involved in the different militias operating during the 
Lebanese civil war. Many mentioned a sibling – or siblings – (male in most 
cases) (interviewees 13, 22, 27, 29, 47, 55, 66, see also Duplan and Raulin, 
2015: 30-31, 37), a parent (interviewees 18, 25, 41, see also Bechara 2003: 
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11, El-Murr, 2014: 10-11), spouse (interviewees 2, 14, 15), cousins 
(interviewees 11, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015) or uncle (Bechara 2003: 
14), who were involved in militancy before they joined themselves. Several 
interviewees recounted growing up in political families where political 
debate and the preparation of political action used to take place regularly 
(interviewees 2, 14, 23, 30, 46, 49, 57, 64, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 
28-31, 35, 58). This supports earlier findings by Peteet (1991) and Parkinson 
(2013), who worked on female participation in Palestinian militias during the 
Lebanese civil war. Family and neighbourhood networks played a 
particularly important role for women involved with the Christian militias at 
the beginning of the war, when many families and friends came together to 
defend their neighbourhoods (interviewees 2, 11, 19, 25, 41, 44, 45, 55, 56, 
57, 59, 60, 66). Previous non-violent participation in political student groups, 
trade unions or neighbourhood initiatives also played an essential role, as 
will be discussed in more detail below. The importance of personal networks 
has been linked with the secretive nature of many non-state armed 
organisations, who rely on their members loyalty and confidentiality (Eager, 
2008: 32). Moreover, personal networks offer points of contact with a group 
and its organisational culture and political positioning, as described by 
Ortega (2012: 92-93) in the context of Latin American organisations.  
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Some researchers studying personal networks go as far as denying female 
militants their agency and question their commitment to the cause 
(Weinberg and Eubank, 1987: 255, Morgan 2001, cit. in Hamilton, 2007: 137-
138; Reinares, 2001, cit. in Hamilton, 2007: 138). This is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, mobilisation via personal networks does not 
necessarily equate to a lack of commitment on the part of the woman 
(Eager, 2008: 148, Alison, 2009: 160, Gayer, 2009: 7, Roy, 2012: 126). This 
was definitely not the case for the individuals I interviewed – all of whom 
stressed their high individual motivations to join the fight. The second 
problem linked to this is the fact that the role of personal networks in an 
individual’s mobilisation are often emphasised for women but not men – 
even though they play an important role in the process of involvement of 
members of both genders (Hamilton, 2007: 143-144, Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2008: 112, Ortega, 2012: 92-93). In the context of my research, 
both men and women claimed to have been influenced by family members. 
Often these role models were indeed male; however, a few of the 
interviewees also stressed how their mother’s (interviewee 18; see also El-
Murr, 2014: 10) or sister’s (interviewee 27) militancy was a key motivating 
and facilitating factor in their own involvement in political action (see also 
Bechara, 2003: 14). And lastly, we must not overlook the fact that, whilst 
some women (and men) may be drawn into a violent group through personal 
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contacts, personal ties to militia members are not always a pathway into 
participation – neither in the Lebanese context (Sneifer, 2006), nor in other 
conflicts worldwide (Blee, 2002: 9-10, cit. in Eager, 2008: 88, Viterna, 2006: 
18-19, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 507, Hamilton, 2007: 144, Alison, 2009: 145).   
Previous participation in political organisations or civil society initiatives 
such as trade unions, political parties, student organisations or 
neighbourhood initiatives, is another factor which has often been cited as a 
pathway to military roles for women in non-state armed groups worldwide 
(Weinberg and Eubank, 1987: 254-255, Vázquez, 1997: 140, Shayne, 1999: 
93, Bloom, 2005: 147, Hamilton, 2007: 142-143, Eager, 2008: 27-32, Alison, 
2009: 142, Gayer, 2009: 17, Magadla, 2015: 394. For example, comparing 
loyalist and republican groups in Northern Ireland, Alison comes to the 
conclusion that one of the reasons for the low numbers of female fighters in 
loyalist groups is their comparatively lower involvement in community 
resistance and political activity (Alison, 2009: 142). Indeed, many of the 
women (and men) I spoke with in Lebanon had been involved in non-violent 
political action with political groups, before they joined the armed fight, and 
described this as a common pathway for many other fighters (interviewees 
2, 14, 19, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, 44, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 
64, 65, 66; see also Bechara 2003, Sneifer 2006, El Murr 2014, Duplan and 
Raulin, 2015). Some students and pupils spent their weekends and holidays 
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getting trained in military camps (interviewee 48; Duplan and Raulin 2015: 
39, 52). It has been pointed out by some that previous non-violent political 
participation is not a necessary stepping stone for all women (Viterna, 2006: 
18-19). However, most of the women I interviewed had started their 
engagement in non-violent political roles. In many conflicts, involvement in 
non-violent activism tends to be a pathway into political violence for both 
men and women (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987: 255-256, Hamilton, 2007: 
143), and indeed as referenced above, this was the case for many men 
involved in the militias I examined during this study.   
In terms of educational background, most scholars agree that female 
fighters are either better than or as educated as their peers outside the 
group (Bloom, 2005: 165, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 498, Von Knop, 2007: 399, 
Eager, 2008: 32, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 108). In general, this 
seems to be a characteristic shared by men and women (Bloom, 2005: 237). 
Notable exceptions include women who got involved with the LTTE and PKK 
– who often seemed to be less educated (Bloom, 2005: 165, Alison, 2009). 
Other researchers depict a more complex picture, describing groups with 
both highly educated and poorly educated female members (Vázquez, 1997: 
140), whereby, educated and urban women get involved first and then 
recruit other women – including those from rural areas (Bernal, 2000: 63). 
In their study of female suicide attackers in Chechnya, Speckhard and 
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Akhmedova came to the conclusion that many of the women are highly 
educated but without opportunities in the job market – often due to the 
conflict context (Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008). Overall, it seems that 
the educational background of militia members is context-specific. In the 
case of the Lebanese civil war, as mentioned above, many of the militia 
members – especially at the beginning of the war, were students or even 
pupils. According to some interviewees (in Beirut in particular), many 
militants were educated, especially in the communist (interviewees 22, 32, 
54) and Christian parties (interviewees 2, 19, 25, 41), whereas the number 
of educated fighters in other parts of the country were lower (interviewee 
54). Some interviewees contended that many fighters were from poor or 
working class backgrounds but had got the opportunity to go to university 
(interviewees 7, 18, 48). There do not seem to have been any significant 
differences between women’s and men’s educational backgrounds. The very 
long duration of the war meant that some militia members, especially those 
who got involved as children and went on to hold positions of responsibility, 
did not get any formal education beyond the level they had reached at the 
beginning of their involvement with the militia. On the other hand, many of 
the militants I spoke to continued their education even whilst being involved 
with the militia, which was rendered possible by the nature of the war which, 
in many parts of the country, was characterised by times of intense fighting 
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followed by calmer periods (interviewee 25, Sneifer, 2006: 93). The fact that 
several interviewees left the militia at later stages of the war, either to 
complete their studies or upon completion (interviewees 19, 22, 23, 61), 
could be an indicator that at the beginning of the war, more educated people 
were with the militias than during the war’s later stages. In fact, some 
interviewees mentioned this in the course of the research project 
(interviewees 2, 22). This fact could be linked to the changed composition 
and aims of the militias, as well as the development of the security context, 
which I will look at in more detail in the chapters on organisational 
characteristics and the security context. 
As to the role of women’s socio-economic status, both in the terrorism and 
conflict studies literature, claims can be found that women (and men) are 
from poor or working class backgrounds (Shayne, 1999: 93, Eager, 2008: 162, 
176, Ortega, 2012: 94). Many interviewees stated that while there was a 
certain degree of diversity (interviewees 1, 2, 48, 55), most of the fighters in 
Lebanon, men and women, had a working-class background (interviewees 
18, 31, 44) and/or came from disadvantaged regions (interviewees 1, 2, 11, 
22, 24, 31, 32, 54, 62). Some had recently migrated to Beirut and were poor 
but educated (interviewees 7, 18, 48, 65, see also Bechara, 2003, Traboulsi 
2012). This is not to say, however, that the leftist militias (just like the 
Christian organisations, (interviewees 2, 11, 56, see also Duplan and Raulin 
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2015: 18-19, Sneifer, 2006: 25-27), did not also have strong support from 
petit bourgeois members of society (interviewees 7, 18, 48). These findings 
are similar to claims made in the existing literature, according to which 
female militants usually come from working class or middle-class 
backgrounds (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987: 254, Sajjad, 2004: 6, Eager, 2008: 
34, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 108-109). As to the question of 
whether more female than male fighters come from a middle-class 
background as discussed in existing literature on other political conflicts 
(Reif, 1986: 151-153, Lobao, 1990: 188-189, cit. in Shayne, 1999: 86, Sajjad, 
2004: 6), based on the data available to me, I cannot come to a definitive 
conclusion. It is not clear what was more salient – the fact that many 
working-class women were less affected by social constraints and gendered 
barriers as they had already been working alongside men on, for example, 
the tobacco fields in the South or the factories of Beirut, or the fact that 
many middle-class women tended to be more educated about and aware of 
political processes.  
 
4.3 | Gender-specific motivations? 
 
A central question in the debate on individual motivations is the question of 
whether men and women share the same motivations, or if gender-specific 
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motivations can be identified. In general, the claim that women’s 
motivations differ substantially from men’s motivations is more widespread 
in the terrorism literature than it is amongst conflict studies researchers, and 
can often be found in psychological research on terrorism (see, for example, 
Silke, 2008, cit. in Bloom et al., 2012: 63). However, most researchers agree 
that men and women widely share the same motivations (Schweitzer, 2007: 
143, Ness, 2008b: 6-7, Speckhard, 2008: 1002, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 
2008: 106, Zedalis, 2008: 50, O'Rourke, 2009: 684, Cohen, 2013: 368, Eggert, 
2015, Davis, 2017). My research on non-state armed groups during the 
Lebanese civil war supports the findings of those scholars who stress that in 
general, men and women share the same motivations. The fact that women 
and men largely got involved for the same reasons was stressed in interviews 
with former members and supporters from all the different militias I looked 
at as part of this study (interviewees 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 52, 55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66). At the 
same time, as also pointed out in existing conflict studies literature (Alison, 
2003, Alison, 2009: 128, Ortega, 2012: 92), in the case of the militias 
operating during the war in Lebanon, gender-specific motivations existed, 
too, as we will see below.  
One persistent stereotype of female political violence is that men are 
motivated by political, and women by personal, reasons. This claim can 
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mostly be found in the terrorism studies literature (Victor, 2003, Bloom, 
2005: 145-146, 163, 235-237, Pedahzur, 2005, Berko and Erez, 2007b, 
Jacques and Taylor, 2008: 321, O'Rourke, 2009: 707-710), even though some 
terrorism scholars have criticised it strongly (Schweitzer, 2007: 133-135, 
143, Eager, 2008: 187). The fact that “the so-called ‘personal reasons’ 
consume so much of the public’s and media’s fascination” (Eager, 2008: 4), 
probably says more about biases and stereotypes of those observing the 
phenomenon of female fighters than it does about the women themselves. 
Despite this problematic view on female participation, the majority of 
scholars in conflict studies, as well as some terrorism researchers, contend 
that women’s mobilisation is as much motivated by political factors as men’s 
(Eager, 2008: 163, Shekhawat, 2012: 132, Veneracion-Rallonza, 2015: 48). 
The findings of this research supports this. The vast majority of interviewees 
stressed that both men and women joined the war for political reasons. In 
the case of militias aligned with the LNM, it was the fight for Palestinians’ 
rights and a new political and societal order that motivated both men and 
women to participate (interviewees 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 59, 
61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69). Most members of the Christian militias got 
involved in order to fight for the survival of the Christian community and the 
political status-quo (interviewees 2, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 25, 26, 41, 44, 
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45, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66; see also Sneifer, 2006, 34-38, 41, 44, 49, 52-56, 
81-83; El-Murr, 2014, 16-17, 23, 25). The main motivation of female fighters 
with Amal was to defend their community against the Israeli invasion 
(interviewees 12, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 50, 58, 63). Similar to claims 
in existing literature according to which women are supposedly more 
idealistic and have stronger belief than men in the political ideals and values 
which the armed group they join (claims to) stand(s) for (Galvin, 1983, cit. in 
Eager, 2008: 4, Jaber, 2003, cit. in Sixta, 2008: 268, Alison, 2009: 145), some 
interviewees also contended that women were even more motivated than 
men (interviewees 57, 66). Only two interviewees mentioned personal 
factors such as the wish to take revenge for a relative who was killed or to 
make up for a tarnished reputation after being sexually assaulted by a family 
member (interviewees 49, 69).  
That being said, it is imperative to stress in this context that dividing an 
individual’s motivations into personal and political factors is not 
unproblematic from an analytical point of view. For example, defending 
one’s community (which was one of the main motivations mentioned by 
most interviewees formerly associated with one of the Christian militias), 
has both a personal (fighting to defend oneself, one’s family, neighbours and 
friends) and a political dimension (the fight for the Christian community as a 
whole and for the preservation of the Christian-dominated pre-war political 
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order). Indeed in existing literature, some have criticised the attempt to 
divide personal from political motivations, as if the two were not intimately 
intertwined (Eager, 2008: 194). Overall, the majority of scholars working on 
female political violence believe that both men and women are motivated 
by a mix of personal and political motivations (Sajjad, 2004: 6-7, Parvati, 
2005: 5235, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 511, Von Knop, 2007: 399, Ness, 2008b: 
5-6, Alison, 2009: 145, Gayer, 2009: 16, O'Rourke, 2009: 684, Roy, 2012: 126, 
Shekhawat, 2012: 133, Parashar, 2014: 128). This view is supported by the 
data I collected (interviewees 1, 8, 11, 14 41, 44, 48, 64). In this context, 
especially when studying women’s motivations, it is important not to fall 
into the trap of seeing the existence of personal grievances as delegitimising 
women’s participation – as both men and women tend to be motivated by 
personal and political factors (Eager, 2008: 4).   
Apart from personal and political factors, a few interviewees also mentioned 
more pragmatic reasons for joining the war, such as seeking protection 
(interviewees 23, 48, 64) or opportunities (interviewees 28 32, 48). 
However, this aspect was only mentioned by 6 out of 69 interviewees. In 
existing literature on female involvement in armed groups, pragmatic 
reasons for joining are rarely discussed; exceptions include Shikola (1998: 
139), Shayne (1999: 93), Viterna (2006: 8), McKay (2007: 171), Eager (2008: 
208), Ortega (2012: 93), Van Hauwermeiren (2012: 23) and Parashar (2014: 
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127). This stands in contrast to the general literature on rebel mobilisation 
and its focus on the question of whether insurgents are motivated by greed 
(seeking opportunities) or grievances (addressing socio-political issues) 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Gurr, 2012). In the case of the Lebanese civil war, 
the fact that seeking protection does not seem to have been one of the main 
motivational factors for women to join one of the militias is most likely linked 
to the nature of the war. In most of the country, the war consisted of several 
rounds with longer relatively calm periods in between, so individual safety 
could, in many cases, be relatively easily achieved and was not necessarily 
improved by joining a militia. More research on the topic would be needed 
to determine whether this was also the case in other conflicts or if we are 
instead dealing with a bias in existing literature based on the assumption 
that women are less affected by greed than men. 
While most interviewees agreed that men and women widely shared the 
same motivations for joining the war, a number of gender-specific reasons 
were also mentioned. This reflects findings of existing literature, which 
stresses that while men and women join for the same reasons overall, some 
gender-specific motivations also exist. In existing literature, the two most 
frequently cited gender-specific reasons are: (1) personal experience or fear 
of sexual violence (Bloom, 2005: 163-164, Von Knop, 2007: 400, Alison, 
2009: 136-137) and (2) participation as a strategy to escape a predestined 
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life with few prospects for equality and self-determination. As to the role of 
sexual violence in motivating individuals to join armed groups, it has been 
claimed that it depends on the context and that it does not seem to be of 
equal importance in all conflicts (O'Rourke, 2009: 712-714). My research 
supports this insofar as only one interviewee who participated in this 
research project saw sexual violence as a motivating factor for women to 
join the war (interviewee 69). On the contrary, the fear of sexual violence 
led to the exclusion of women from combat roles, as will be discussed in 
more detail in the chapter on the role of societal factors.  
A more widespread motivational factor seems to have been women’s 
aspirations to free themselves from societal constraints and restricting 
gender norms and expectations in a relatively conservative society. Several 
interviewees mentioned women’s liberation as an important motivational 
factor (interviewees 3, 15, 27, 31, 32, 53, 69). It has been pointed out that 
liberation can be a motivational factor for men, too (Speckhard, 2008: 1013), 
even if, in many societies, women’s options to find meaning and carve out 
space for themselves tends to be more limited than men’s. However, none 
of the men I interviewed seemed to have joined the war in order to escape 
a traditional society and its restricting gender norms and expectations. With 
regards to women’s motivations, the notion of ‘proving oneself’ in 
particular, came up repeatedly in the interviews and several interviewees 
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stressed that women joined in order to prove to other militia members or 
the wider community that, as women, they were able to join the war, even 
as fighters (interviewees 23, 31, 53). However, women’s emancipation was 
not mentioned as often as political reasons, which the vast majority of 
interviewees agreed was the most important reason for both men and 
women to join. This finding is particularly interesting considering the 
relatively strong focus on female participation as an act of liberation or 
feminism in the existing literature (Sajjad, 2004: 6, Bloom, 2005: 145-146, 
234, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 504-505, McKay, 2007: 171, Von Knop, 2007: 
399, Eager, 2008: 109, Alison, 2009: 137, O'Rourke, 2009: 707, Ortega, 2012: 
95). It supports the claims of those scholars who deny the centrality of 
feminism and liberation as a motivational factor and rather see it trumped 
by political motivations, such as nationalism (Bloom, 2005: 245, Speckhard, 
2008: 1003, Alison, 2009, Bloom et al., 2012: 72). Thus, my findings could be 
an indicator that this focus of much of the literature on female participation 
as an act of feminism is less guided by the motivations of the women joining 
the war and more by biases amongst the scholars studying the topic. In fact, 
Gayer came to a similar conclusion in his research on Sikh Khalistani 
insurgents (Gayer, 2009: 2).  
Sometimes, a sense of adventure can also be a motivational factor for joining 
(Berko and Erez, 2007a: 160, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 507, McKay, 2007: 171). 
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This factor was mentioned by several interviewees (interviewees 30, 41, 48, 
58, see also Sneifer, 2006: 89, 92, Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 53, 46). One 
former militia member recalled the happiness, excitement and pride she felt 
when she saw a real weapon for the first time (interviewee 30). Others 
believed that for some women, carrying a weapon was a form of showing 
off and making oneself look important (interviewee 52). In this context, the 
time of involvement is also interesting, as many young women and men 
joined training camps or the actual fight during the summer holidays when 
they were off from school or university. Military activities it seemed to some 
was a way of dealing with the boredom during the school holidays 
(interviewee 48; Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 53). 
If emancipation was a motivational factor for some, it is noteworthy that, as 
I will show in more detail in the chapter on organisational characteristics, 
men and women were not treated as full equals in any of the groups fighting 
during the Lebanese civil war. Moreover, once the fighting stopped, women 
were largely pushed back into the domestic sphere. This contradiction has 
been pointed out by several scholars working on other conflicts (Bloom, 
2005: 164-165, Ness, 2008b: 4), and the Lebanese civil war was no exception 
in this regard.   
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4.4 | The influence of the security context and perceived 
injustice on individual motivations 
 
One main argument of this study is that the different factors which played a 
role in the decision-making of non-state armed groups during the Lebanese 
civil war were not significant in themselves only, but also in how they 
influenced each other. In order to highlight this interplay of different factors, 
in the second part of this chapter, I look at how women’s individual 
motivations to join were influenced by the remaining three factors: the 
security context, societal aspects and organisational characteristics. 
The main push factor for women to join was the changing security context 
and perceived injustice. I will demonstrate in the chapter on the security 
context, how extreme external pressures caused by the changing security 
situation, left the organisations with the impression that everyone (including 
the women), needed to be involved in combat. This perception facilitated 
women’s inclusion in combat, even in groups that had hitherto been 
reluctant to allow women within their ranks, such as the Amal Movement. A 
similar dynamic can be observed on the level of individual motivations. The 
main motivational factor for women to join non-state armed groups during 
the Lebanese civil war was their wish to help defend the interests of their 
community or to support the fight against perceived injustice. This supports 
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findings of previous literature on other violent conflicts (Bloom, 2005: 154, 
Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 110, Alison, 2009: 145, 147, 155).   
As foregrounded earlier in this chapter, in the case of the Christian militias 
in Lebanon, women were fighting for the survival of their community which 
they saw at stake in the conflict, for the preservation of the pre-war political 
status-quo18, and against the growing influence of the Palestinian militias 
and their Lebanese and international allies. The vast majority19 of 
interviewees who used to be involved with one of the Christian militias saw 
their involvement in the war as a last resort and legitimate self-defence: 
“Our parents hadn’t raised us to go to war. It was the war that made us that 
way. It was the environment. We were obliged [to go to war]” (interviewee 
56; see also interviewees 11, 25, 55). This supports claims found in previous 
literature on female fighters in other conflicts (Bloom, 2005: 147, Eager, 
2008: 132, Alison, 2009: 133, Cunningham, 2009: 567-568, Cunningham, 
2010: 205, Magadla, 2015: 394-395). 
As discussed above, for women involved with the leftist and Palestinian 
groups, it was less the survival of their community that they were fighting 
for (even though that did play a role for some – see interviewee 47), but 
                                                          
18  This was the situation at the beginning of the war. Later, many Christian militia 
members also fought for an independent Christian homeland (Sneifer, 2006: 129). 
19  Only one described the mobilisation at the time as influenced by propaganda 
(interviewee 59). 
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more the fight against perceived injustice for a new socio-political order, and 
for the rights of Palestinians in Lebanon and the region. To them, and 
according to the ideology they believed in, the fight in Lebanon at the 
beginning of the war was “the Revolution” against the order in place – or as 
a former male PSP fighter put it: “All we thought about was that we wanted 
to damage the regime and make the leadership social and progressive” 
(interviewee 51). In a revolution, the support of all members of society is 
needed, hence the high motivation of many women to also do their part. 
This finding regarding the role of perceived injustice supports previous 
claims in existing literature on other conflicts (Bloom, 2005: 159-160, Berko 
and Erez, 2007b: 504, 506, Eager, 2008: 132, 204, Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2008: 112-113, Alison, 2009: 131, 157, Cunningham, 2009: 568, 
Magadla, 2015: 395). Personal or collective, direct or indirect experiences of 
injustice affected men and women during the war in Lebanon in very similar 
ways, as they do in other conflicts (Ortega, 2012: 93, see also Burgess, 1989: 
128-129, Alison, 2009: 128).  
In this context, including times and locations of involvement into the analysis 
is particularly illuminating, as it clearly shows that women’s involvement did 
not remain constant throughout the different phases and locations of the 
war. Whilst this was not entirely due to women’s motivations, individual 
motivations and women’s wish to be included (or not) did play a role in the 
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change in numbers, and the former were at least in part influenced by 
external pressures due to the security context and perceived injustice. For 
example, this explains why the number of female fighters in the leftist and 
Palestinian groups (excluding the PSP) went up both at the beginning of the 
war (when individuals felt that they were contributing to “the Revolution”, 
until the security context defused considerably after the first round of the 
war ended with the arrival of the Syrian army in Lebanon), and in 1982, when 
the security context intensified again with the invasion of large parts of the 
country by the Israeli army. Another example would be the relatively higher 
numbers of women fighters in (and from) south Lebanon and the southern 
suburbs of Beirut (interviewees 1, 2, 24, 28). Both areas were particularly 
deprived at the time of the war and in the case of the South, also 
disproportionately subject to attacks by the Israeli army and its local allies 
(interviewees 1, 8, 18, 29, 30, 24, 28, 31). In the case of the Christian militias, 
a similar observation can be made; most women were fighting in those parts 
of East Beirut where the conflict started and was most intense (interviewees 
7, 45, 66). Amal women, did not start fighting in military roles until the 
conflict escalated due to the Israeli invasion of the south (interviewees 50, 
63). The female members of Amal I spoke to (both fighters and non-fighters), 
all cited the Israeli occupation as the reason for their involvement 
(interviewees 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 63). Again, this supports findings of 
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existing literature on other conflicts (Eager, 2008: 126, Alison, 2009: 124-
125).   
However, it is important to consider that the security context and 
experiences of injustice can only partially explain a person’s decision to join 
an armed group. Many individuals live in a similar context, or share similar 
experiences, but do not become involved in political violence (Bloom, 2005: 
237, Eager, 2008: 31, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 114). We have 
already looked at the role individual factors such as someone’s personal 
background and relational networks, play in the first part of this chapter. The 
next two sub-sections will examine how organisational characteristics and 
societal factors influenced women’s individual motivations. 
 
4.5 | The influence of organisational characteristics on 
individual motivations 
 
As far as the influence of organisational characteristics on individual 
motivations is concerned, claims that a group’s ideology can function as an 
important pull factor in the mobilisation of women looking to join an armed 
organisation can be found in both conflict and terrorism studies. In conflict 
studies in particular, it has been claimed that women are “attracted by those 
organisations that have programmes for childcare, health care, literacy, 
165 
 
social welfare and/or feminist agenda” (Reif, 1986: 162-163), as they see 
their interests and the interests of their families and communities best 
represented by these groups. Related to this argument is Margaret 
Gonzalez-Perez’s claim that whether or not an armed group has 
international (as opposed to domestic) aims has an impact on the inclusion 
of female fighters: 
 
[H]igh levels of female terrorist activity appear predominantly 
in domestic terrorist organizations because the 
characteristics of these groups are more conducive to the 
rejection of traditional gender roles and the acceptance of 
active female participation, thereby encouraging the 
mobilization and participation of women. Conversely, 
international terrorist organizations that focus on external 
opponents do not attempt to transform the conventional 
behaviour patterns of the sexes within, or outside, the 
terrorist group or state. Accordingly, women choose to be far 
less active in international terrorist groups (Gonzalez-Perez, 
2008: 2). 
 
Gonzalez-Perez specifies that her argument is not that organisations with a 
domestic agenda are indeed more receptive to issues concerning women, 
but that women perceive these groups to be more open to their own aims 
and aspirations (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008: 1). She contends that “[t]he more 
opportunity for improvement that they perceive, the more likely women are 
to mobilize and seek higher positions within the hierarchy of the domestic 
terrorist group” (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008: 122).  
166 
 
In the case of the Lebanese civil war, the relatively high numbers of female 
fighters in the leftist groups, and the LCP in particular, who explicitly invoked 
women’s rights and gender equality, seem to confirm this theory. However, 
women insisted to be included even in Kataeb and other Christian groups, in 
which the position of the party and its members on women and their role in 
the organisation as well as society as a whole was much more ambiguous. 
Another counter-example would be Amal. The female members of Amal I 
spoke to were highly motivated to fight for the organisation’s aims and 
seemed to stand firmly behind its ideal of gender segregation and division 
of labour between the sexes – even if that meant that their opportunities in 
the group and wider community were restricted. Furthermore, the claim 
that women are more likely to join organisations that (claim to) fight for 
women’s rights is intrinsically linked to the assumption that women 
prioritise women’s rights and gender equality over the political cause that is 
at the heart of their organisation’s discourse. However, we have already 
seen in the first part of this chapter that most of the participants in this 
research study believed that the majority of women (and men) joined the 
fight for political reasons, namely the defence of their communities and the 
fight against injustice.  
In fact, organisational aims seem to have played a role in women’s decision-
making, albeit in a different way than Gonzalez-Perez claims. This could be 
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seen very clearly in the later stages of the civil war in Lebanon when the aims 
of many of the organisations involved in it changed and opportunistic goals 
started to supersede more idealistic aims. Existing literature has pointed out 
that in other conflicts, the change from a (relatively) idealistic struggle to a 
movement dominated by individuals looking for financial benefit or an 
opportunity to settle personal scores tends to discourage women from 
starting (or continuing) their involvement (Alison, 2009, Shekhawat, 2012: 
138-139). This seems to have been the case in the Lebanese civil war as well. 
Several interviewees mentioned that they or their fellow combatants quit 
their military roles when the intra-sectarian fighting started and in many 
militias, the struggle over assets became a priority (interviewees 15, 19, 22, 
66). The fact that the Mourabitoun, a relatively small predominantly Beirut-
based organisation with many members whose participation – according to 
several of interviewees – was mostly motivated by economic gains (it was 
described as “a gang” by some) did not have any female members could be 
another factor supporting this argument (interviewees 15, 31).  
Organisational structure also seems to have influenced women’s individual 
decision-making. In the case of Christian militias in particular, in the first two 
years of the war, female participation in combat activities took place mostly 
in the women’s neighbourhoods where groups of peers or whole families 
took up arms to defend their local area and community (interviewees 11, 16, 
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19, 25, 41, 44, 45, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 66). This facilitated women’s inclusion 
as they were fighting alongside their friends or family members. Previous 
involvement of women in the respective political parties before the war 
seems to also have had an impact on women’s individual motivations and 
might have played a role in attracting more women to the militia. In this 
context, it is telling that both the LCP and Kataeb – two parties who had had 
women’s units or unions for a long time before the war started, were joined 
by female fighters whereas Amal and PSP, whose women’s units were not 
founded until much later (interviewees 50, 53, 63), were not. Not all the 
women I interviewed who were fighters during the war had been involved 
in the women’s units of their parties before joining the war. However, the 
very existence of these groups signalled that women had a place in the party 
and were part of the struggle. The same can be said about role-models; 
women who joined the militia and inspired others to join the fight. It is 
interesting in this context that role-models seem to have played a much 
bigger role in the leftist and Palestinian groups. Many of the interviewees 
from these groups mentioned the names of women such as Leila Khalid, 
Soha Bechara, Lola Aboud and Dalal Moughrabi, who fought with Lebanese 
or Palestinian groups and inspired both men and women to take up arms, as 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.   
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4.6 | The influence of societal aspects on individual 
motivations 
 
The norms and expectations prevailing in the society that an armed group is 
based, or operating in, can have a considerable impact on the group’s 
decision-making, as we will see in the chapter on societal aspects. The same 
is true for individual motivations, which can also be heavily influenced by the 
positions of the society or community an individual comes from (Bloom, 
2005: 244, Ness, 2008b: 4, Alison, 2009: 153). In the case of the prevailing 
societal norms and expectations that a society is shaped by, these can either 
produce a general atmosphere that is supportive of women joining the fight, 
or which disapproves of women’s inclusion. I will discuss these different 
factors in detail in the chapter on societal aspects (as the impact societal 
norms and expectations had on individual motivations was largely the same 
they had on organisational decision-making), but will provide a brief 
overview here. 
Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s was a society undergoing considerable 
social change (Abisaab, 2010, Traboulsi, 2012). New spaces and 
opportunities were slowly opening up for women in public life, especially in 
Beirut, and to a certain degree also in other bigger cities and even some 
more rural areas. Female participation in public life, as part of the working 
force but also in political organisations and initiatives, became more 
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widespread and accepted (Abisaab, 2010, Traboulsi, 2012). This had an 
encouraging and empowering effect on many women and opened up the 
possibility of their later military involvement to be seen as an “extension of 
their involvement with public organizations such as neighborhood 
committees” and similar initiatives (Cunningham, 2008: 88). This effect has 
been described by existing research focusing on other conflict contexts 
where “women have participated fully in the early stages of the political 
resistance at all levels”, which facilitated their inclusion in the armed 
struggle (Bloom, 2005: 147, see also Eager, 2008: 186, Alison, 2009: 142).  
Several interviewees mentioned that this recent change in Lebanese society 
made people more receptive to the idea of women being involved in military 
roles and that this, in turn, encouraged women personally to join the fight 
(interviewees 1, 7, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 54, 64, 65).  
If women who have joined the fight are praised as heroes within the 
community, this can encourage other women to follow suit (Bloom, 2005: 
159). As shown above in the section on organisational characteristics 
influencing individual motivations, this might be one of the reasons why the 
numbers of female fighters with the leftist and Palestinian militias (who had 
many well-known iconic female members), were considerably higher than 
those with the Christian organisations. A similar observation can be made 
with regards to the conflict in Northern Ireland where “[r]epublicanism has 
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promoted active images of women as ‘freedom fighters’ and female 
paramilitary members have been celebrated in a number of republican 
street murals in nationalist areas” (Alison, 2009: 142), whereas the 
Protestant community, which has produced very few female fighters, has 
not actively promoted images of women in military roles (Alison, 2009: 153).  
It is important in this context to bear in mind that societal attitudes to 
women’s involvement are neither static nor monolithic. They do change 
over time, and often there is considerable variation in different parts of a 
country and different sections of society. This is why variation in time and 
location needs to be borne in mind. In this context, it is telling that the 
number of female fighters during the Lebanese civil war was higher in the 
relatively open and cosmopolitan city of Beirut than it was in more 
conservative cities such as Saida or in the Mountains, as will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. The fact that, as foregrounded above, most 
fighters were based in Beirut, but originally came from the south and other 
relatively deprived parts of the country, is also noteworthy. On the one 
hand, due to their precarious socio-economic position, these women had 
more to fight for, less to lose and more to gain (interviewee 32). On the 
other, living away from their extended families, who had stayed in their 
home regions, meant that they were subject to less societal control 
(interviewee 2). Evidence from other conflict contexts worldwide indicates 
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that class also plays a role in this context insofar as a woman’s socio-
economic background can have an impact on how receptive society is to her 
inclusion as a fighter (Reif, 1986: 151-153, Lobao, 1990: 188-189, cit. in 
Shayne, 1999: 86, Sajjad, 2004: 6). In the context of this research project, I 
could not come to a categorical conclusion in this regard. Some interviewees 
mentioned that women from middle class families enjoyed more freedoms 
because they and their families were more politically aware and believed 
that personal sacrifices had to be made for the sake of society’s 
advancement (interviewee 3). Others believed that the participation of 
working class women was less frowned upon as they had already been 
working in traditionally male positions, alongside the men, on the fields or 
in the factories for decades (interviewees 1, 2, 7, 12, 18, 29, 30). Lastly, there 
is often a tendency amongst communities that have experienced prolonged 
and protracted conflict and who see their very existence as under threat, to 
allow female participation as part of a general mobilisation, in all sectors of 
society (Cunningham, 2003, Dearing, 2010). I will show how this played out 
during the Lebanese civil war in Chapter Seven. 
Lebanese society was influenced by slowly changing gender norms and 
expectations in the 1960s and 1970s. This process was amplified by the war 
when security considerations trumped some socio-cultural norms. However, 
Lebanon remained a relatively gender-conservative country. In most areas 
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of life, gender expectations remained clearly defined. This was the main 
reason why the overall numbers of female fighters during the war in 
Lebanon remained relatively low. The majority of society disapproved of 
female inclusion in military operations. Most women, as members of this 
society, either agreed with this view or were discouraged to join by society’s 
disapproval (interviewees 28, 31, 32, 45). There were, of course, exceptions. 
Some women were so motivated they placed less value on the wider 
community’s approval and joined the armed struggle regardless. One 
interviewee, for example, claimed that “whether they [the family] accept it 
or not, when a young woman decides to go [to war], she will not ask her 
parents” (interviewee 59). Another former fighter contended that “the main 
issue [in deciding whether or not a woman will join] is not the community 
but it’s her” (interviewee 23). However, society’s disapproval did discourage 
other women who might have otherwise been interested in joining a non-
state armed organisation (interviewees 23, 28, 32, 59). 
 
4.7 | Conclusion 
 
The women who joined non-state armed organisations during the Lebanese 
civil war did so out of their own will. Unlike in some other conflicts, forced 
conscription or abductions with a view to force women to join the war did 
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not take place. On the contrary, the women who joined were highly 
motivated to participate in the armed fight and participated out of their own 
choice. In fact, their motivation extended so far that they convinced the 
organisations to include them or, in the words of several of the interviewees, 
they “imposed themselves”. While the women came from a wide range of 
different backgrounds, some common characteristics can be identified. 
Most of the women were relatively young (in their mid-teens to mid-
twenties). Many of them were previously involved in political organisations, 
initiatives or linked to such groups through a family member or friend who 
had already joined. These findings support claims made in the existing 
literature on female fighters in non-state armed groups. The theory that 
women join for personal reasons whereas men are motivated by political 
factors (which can be found in some terrorism studies publications), is not 
supported by this study. According to the findings of my research, for both 
men and women, political considerations were the most important 
motivational factor. Both men and women claimed to have made the 
decision to fight in order to defend their country or community and/or in 
order to counter perceived injustices. For some women, their rights and 
gender equality also played a role. However, only some of the women I 
spoke to mentioned this as being a motivational factor. Women decided to 
join both organisations that officially upheld progressive gender norms as 
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well as those where traditional gender expectations remained part of the 
party’s practice and discourse. This contradicts claims in existing literature 
that women are more likely to join armed organisations that (claim to) fight 
for women’s rights and gender equality. The findings of my research suggest 
that in this case, the fight for the militia’s cause trumped feminist 
motivations. As to the societal context and its impact on individual 
motivations, overall, the women living in Lebanon at the time of the civil war 
were facing a relatively conservative society with clearly defined gender 
norms influenced by traditional ideas of men’s and women’s roles. This 
remained the case despite a slow opening (especially in Beirut and other 
bigger cities) in the years leading to the war – a process which was amplified 
by the violent conflict. However, societal barriers to women’s involvement 
in the armed struggle remained high. Some individuals did not let this stop 
them from pursuing their aim to join a militia as a fighter. However, the 
majority of women in Lebanon refrained from joining for this reason, which 
explains the overall low numbers of female participation in military roles 
during the civil war in Lebanon. 
Individual motivations explain why those women (and men) who joined the 
militias during the civil war did so. However, it does not help us understand 
why there were women fighters in some of the militias and not in others. In 
this chapter, I showed that women were so motivated, they insisted to be 
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included in the war. Their demand for inclusion was successful in some 
militias – such as the LCP and Kataeb, but not in others – namely the PSP and 
Amal (until 1978). In the next chapter, I will show that once the women 
insisted on their inclusion, it was organisational characteristics that caused 
the women to gain immediate access to fighting positions in some militias 
but not in others.
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Chapter 5 | Organisational 
characteristics 
 
Women’s insistence to be included as fighters was a crucial factor leading to 
female participation in combat activities during the civil war. However, 
whilst women were fighting in most leftist, Christian and Palestinian 
organisations (such as the LCP, CAO, PFLP, Fatah and Kataeb) from the 
beginning of the war, there were not any female fighters in the PSP, and 
female members of Amal only started fighting from 1978 onwards. The 
percentage of female fighters in the LCP, CAO and PFLP were considerably 
higher than in Kataeb (and later, the LF) and Amal. This variation can be 
explained by organisational characteristics and varying evaluations the 
different groups made of the security context. The role of the security 
context will be examined in the following chapter. In this chapter, I will 
analyse the extent to which a group’s ideology (Section One), internal 
structure and dynamics (Section Two), external relations (Section Three), 
aims (Section Four), and age and size (Section Five) were decisive in the 
decision-making on whether or not to include female fighters. I will show 
that organisational gender ideology and group structure and internal 
dynamics played a major role in the militias’ decision-making. Other 
organisational characteristics, such as a group’s aims, age, size and external 
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relations, only have limited explanatory power.  
The role of organisational characteristics in the decision-making on female 
participation in combat features in most analyses of female inclusion in non-
state armed groups. The role of ideology in particular is often discussed 
(Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, Cunningham, 2010). Some publications on 
female participation briefly address other organisational factors. A number 
of scholars take a more analytical approach to the issue and systematically 
discuss the explanatory capacity of different organisational factors 
(including Crenshaw, 1985, Crenshaw, 1987, Shapiro, 2007, Asal and 
Rethemeyer, 2008, Jackson, 2009, Dearing, 2010, Dalton and Asal, 2011, 
Asal, Ackermann and Rethemeyer, 2012, Davis, 2013, 2017).  
Traditionally, two competing approaches in studies of non-state political 
violence co-exist, with both trying to explain non-state armed organisations' 
decision-making and behaviour. According to the first, non-state armed 
groups are strategic actors whose actions are guided by informed, directed 
and purposeful actions, whereas the second sees insurgents and terrorists 
as constrained by organisational characteristics, which impede the group's 
strategic room to manoeuvre (Crenshaw, 1987). Thus, while according to the 
first explanation, the groups in question are active, in control, and able, in 
the view of the second approach, they are constrained and restricted by the 
organisation's own characteristics. I will show in this chapter that during the 
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civil war in Lebanon, organisational characteristics did indeed play a 
considerable role in the decision-making of individual groups. A pertinent 
example of this is the internal struggles over gender ideology as stipulated 
in gender norms and expectations. These internal struggles over the 
inclusion of female fighters took place in many of the militias involved in 
Lebanon during the civil war. In the case of the LCP and, to a lesser extent, 
the PFLP, those in favour of female participation were in the majority and 
managed to override the (very) few voices expressing disagreement. In 
Kataeb and Fatah, on the other hand, women’s participation was rendered 
possible due to the divided stand of their leadership which created a window 
of opportunity for women to participate. Thus, referring to Crenshaw’s 
model again, to argue that the militias involved in the civil war did not have 
any strategic room to manoeuvre would be too far-fetched. However, 
organisational constraints did play a significant role during the Lebanese civil 
war. The most important factors in this context were organisational gender 
ideology and internal dynamics and discord.  
In this context, it worth reiterating that, when studying non-state armed 
organisations, it is crucial not to view these groups as static entities. An 
organisation's ideology, aims, size, external relations and internal structure 
and functioning can change over time – either as a result of an informed 
decision by the group's members or of external pressure beyond the control 
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of the organisation (Jackson, 2009: 215). Moreover, different organisational 
factors can impact and influence each other (Crenshaw, 1985: 483, 
Crenshaw, 1987: 21, Oots, 1989: 149, Jackson, 2009: 215, Dalton and Asal, 
2011: 808). Moreover, non-state armed groups are not monolithic 
organisations either. In most cases, various and sometimes conflicting views 
exist in these groups. I will look at this in more detail in Section Two of this 
chapter, after discussing the role of ideology. 
 
5.1 | Ideology 
 
The majority of publications that try to explain female involvement in 
combat activities stress the salience of ideology. According to this view, left-
wing and secular groups are generally more open to female combatants 
whereas right-wing, religious or conservative groups tend to be more 
reluctant to allow female participation in combat (see, for example, 
Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2008 and Dalton and Asal, 2011). However, not 
everyone I spoke to throughout the course of my research thought ideology 
was decisive. Some specifically stated that ideology was either not very 
important or not the most important factor for many fighters (interviewees 
14, 15), while others thought that, due to the perceived threat to their 
respective groups and the communities they did (claim to) fight for, many 
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organisations “took anyone who came” (interviewee 53, see also 
interviewees 52, 54). These claims will be looked at in more detail in the 
chapters on the role of the security context and societal factors. While some 
contended that ideology was not a major factor, many interviewees claimed 
that the party’s official ideology was essential in deciding whether women 
were included as fighters in the militia (interviewees 3, 4, 12, 18, 20, 21, 22, 
31, 42, 51, 65, 67, 68, 69). Moreover, the fact that the highest numbers of 
female fighters could be found in the leftist LCP (and OAC as well as PFLP) 
seems to support this line of argument. However, it does not explain the fact 
that in the PSP, for example, (which, according to its name and strategic 
alliance, was a leftist group as well), had no official female fighters. 
Moreover, despite the prevalence of the claim that left-wing and secular 
groups tend to be more accepting of female combatants (whereas right-
wing, religious and conservative groups are not), a clear definition of what a 
left-wing, right-wing, religious or conservative organisation is lacks in most 
studies. In fact, this might explain why Gonzalez-Perez (2008), in her 
comparison of different non-state armed groups, comes to the conclusion 
that because many left-wing non-state armed groups recruited no or very 
few female members, organisational ideology (in the broader sense of the 
term) in itself is not sufficient to explain female involvement in combat 
(Gonzalez-Perez, 2008: 1-2). Apart from the fact that it is hardly ever just one 
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factor that leads to a certain outcome in social phenomena, the problem 
also lies in the conceptual vagueness of what is meant by terms such as 
‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. Whether or not a group can be considered to be 
right-wing, left-wing, secular or religious is often not entirely agreed upon 
by all20 and it does not always tell us what the group’s position on gender 
norms is, as a group’s general ideology is not always automatically linked to 
their position on gender norms.  
Instead of referring to the rather broad terms of right-wing, left-wing or 
conservative organisations, an alternative might thus be to focus on a 
group’s position on gender norms and relations. According to this approach, 
it is not just ideology in general, but more specifically the gender images and 
norms a group upholds (regardless of other parts of their ideology), which 
define the roles an organisation deems acceptable for their female 
members. 
In this vein, this chapter argues that, in the case of most of the militias 
operating during the Lebanese civil war, the groups’ gender ideology was 
one of the key factors (albeit not the only one) explaining whether or not 
                                                          
20  In the case of the militias involved in the Lebanese civil war, for example, leftist 
parties such as LCP, COA were described as ‚totalitarian parties‘ by some of their opponents 
(see interviewee 60), whereas for their followers, they were ‘fighting for freedom and 
justice’ (interviewee 1). Similarly, the Christian-dominated Kataeb party was described as 
an ‘extreme right’, even ‘fascist’ party by some of its opponents (interviewees 14, 18), 
whereas its members would describe it as ‘centre-right’, ‘traditional’, ‘progressive’ or 
‘social-democrat’ (interviewees 16, 19, 41). 
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the organisation decided to include female fighters.  
After women started insisting on their inclusion in combat roles, it was 
mostly leftist groups such as the LCP, the OAC and the PFLP which included 
them – unsurprisingly, because in their case, there were no ideological 
barriers; the left-wing parties’ gender ideology was characterised by a belief 
in gender equality (interviewees 8, 14, 18, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 67). Their aim 
was to “promote a new society” (interviewee 18), in which female 
participation was “an accepted idea” (“une idée admise”, interviewee 18). 
The left was the most radical in their demands for gender equality at the 
time (interviewees 15, 27, 29, 31). The LCP, in particular, had a “pioneering 
role in leading women’s rights even before the civil war” (interviewee 27, 
see also interviewee 29, 31). During the war, the LCP made a “point of 
including them [the women], to reflect a progressive image” (interviewee 7). 
One former female fighter and military commander with the LCP described 
her former party’s position on the inclusion of women as follows:  
 
They [the women] are half of society, so they should 
participate in everything. They [the party] tried in the 
Communist Party to encourage the women to study, to go and 
attend universities, to help the men more, to have political, 
economic and social knowledge. That helped them [the 
women] to have a role and to rise up in society. They [the 
party] believe in gender equality, to have an equal role; this is 
the base [of the party’s ideology] (interviewee 29). 
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This position is very similar to the one of the PFLP, as described by a former 
male PFLP fighter: 
 
Our [the PFLP’s] ideology was Marxist-Leninist, so the role of 
women was equal to that of men. She was a main constituent 
of the political movement. There was no discrimination 
between women and men… For us as Communists, as 
Marxists, a woman is not a woman, a man is not a man, but 
an individual, a productive part of society… Distinguishing 
between men and women is a neo-liberal idea that made 
women a commodity. They are the same and suffer from the 
same problems in society… The rise of the women’s 
movement in the West started to see women as different; this 
is not true, men and women are the same. Many societies 
differentiate between men and women but they suffer from 
the same problems… There was no split between genders. 
[The inclusion of women] was something we did not plan for, 
it was part of our ideology (interviewee 8). 
 
Many interviewees saw the leftist parties’ secular identity as an important 
factor in this context. Religion did not play a role in these parties – at least 
not officially,21 and this reduced some of the barriers women encountered 
in other parties which were influenced more by religious and/or right-wing 
thinking, such as the Kataeb, Hezbollah, Amal or Fatah (interviewees 12, 18, 
29, 31, 42, 51).   
While the fight for gender equality and women’s rights was, at least in 
                                                          
21  For example, one former male LCP fighter (and commander) I interviewed claimed 
that to this day he had friends he fought with during the war whose religion he did not 
know, as they never asked and it was “not part of [the] vocabulary” (interviewee 1). 
185 
 
theory, central for the ideology of leftist parties such as the LCP, OAC, PFLP 
or DFLP, the situation was more ambiguous in the case of those groups 
which were both influenced by secular and religious thinking, such as the 
Christian parties (notably Kataeb), some Palestinian groups (such as Fatah), 
and Amal. Comparing the PFLP and Fatah, most interviewees stated that 
Fatah had fewer female fighters and that this was due to Fatah being more 
influenced by religious thinking than the PFLP or DFLP (interviewees 3, 13, 
18, 21, 24 27, 52, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69). One interviewee, a former (male) fighter 
with the Fatah Student Brigades, described the Fatah ideology at the time as 
a “theoretical and intellectual syncretism” of Maoist, Marxist, social-
democrat, Arab Nationalist and Islamist influences (interviewee 18), which 
had an influence on how the role of women within the party was conceived. 
Despite the fact that Fatah and Kataeb were opposing each other during the 
war, Kataeb’s gender ideology was in fact quite similar to the one of Fatah. 
It was influenced by religious thinking (interviewees 2, 12, 16, 18), as well as 
a number of other ideological factors, which were often so closely 
intertwined it was difficult to separate.  This is illustrated by this statement 
of a former high-ranking (male) member of Kataeb (and later the LF): 
  
We were defending Lebanon. I mixed the Christian Lebanon 
with the occidental Lebanon with the French. Were we 
fighting for the church? At some point perhaps yes, but not 
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generally. ‘The cause’ was a slightly vague idea. I mixed 
everything, I think it was a bit the same for many others 
[within Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces] as well (interviewee 
2). 
 
Another former fighter I interviewed (who used to be a member of the Fatah 
Student Brigades) shared this viewpoint and described the Kataeb’s party 
discourse as extremely contradictory, presenting themselves as the “avant-
garde of modernity” on the one hand, whilst defending highly conservative 
(gender) values on the other (interviewee 18).  
To sum up, those parties in which a strong leftist influence dominated had 
the highest numbers of female fighters, because women’s inclusion was in 
line with the party’s gender ideology. On an ideological level, there was no 
reason for these organisations not to include the women once they had 
demanded to be included. Those groups where the organisation’s gender 
ideology was more ambiguous (as was the case with Kataeb and Fatah) 
deployed some female fighters (because of the women’s insistence to be 
included), albeit at a lower percentage (as discussed in Chapter Four).  
While Kataeb, the LF and Fatah were influenced by both gender-progressive 
and gender-conservative thinking, they were considerably less gender-
conservative than Amal (interviewee 1). Amal was influenced by both 
secular and Islamist thinking but regardless of the party’s ideology, the group 
also represented one of the most gender-conservative communities in the 
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country (interviewees 1, 4). I will look at this in more detail in the chapter on 
societal factors. The women of Amal did not actively participate in the inner-
Arab fighting during the Lebanese civil war. This ban was linked to the party’s 
gender ideology which was dominated by the party’s interpretation of 
Islamic rules on gender roles and relations. When I asked him why women 
did not participate in the fighting between different Lebanese and 
Palestinian groups during the civil war, one former (male) Amal fighter 
explained the ban referring to Islam: 
 
Because in Islam, for girls it is forbidden to fight. For women 
in Islam, there is no need to fight as long as men fight […] 
Because in the bylaws of Amal, women don’t fight […] In Amal 
as an Islamic organisation, they have to follow Islamic 
guidelines. So for the fighters, they cannot overcome Islamic 
things […] The fighter has to pray, must not torture or kill 
captures […] There are military instructions but they are 
respecting Islamic rules […] They were all committed to the 
rules, because if they break them, they will be punished by an 
Amal court […] They [the fighters] were not allowed to mix 
[with the opposite gender], it was not appropriate. Imagine a 
group of 20, 30 guy and a lady in front of them – it’s not 
possible. There is a rule in Islam, if men are there, the woman 
is not allowed to fight (interviewee 58). 
 
Women were eventually allowed to participate in the fight against Israel 
(after 1978), as Amal’s spiritual leader Musa Sadr advocated resistance 
against Israel by all possible means (interviewees 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 50, 63). As I will show in the chapter on the security context, when faced 
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with an external invader considered “the absolute Evil” (interviewees 33, 34, 
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 50, 58, 63), the perceived security threat trumped 
conventional gender norms. Amal’s fight against Israel was presented by the 
militia as “Islamic and patriotic” (interviewee 33). Women’s participation 
was framed as a religious right, “an honour” that cannot be taken away from 
them (interviewee 50).  
Similar to Amal, the PSP had a “traditional vision for women” (interviewee 
62). During the war, the PSP had no officially endorsed female fighters. This 
might seem surprising at first, as officially and by name the PSP – the 
“Progressive Socialist Party” – stood for progress and socialism. Looking 
more closely however, the PSP reveals itself as a pertinent example of how 
a party’s official party ideology is not necessarily linked to its de-facto gender 
policies. As one interviewee, a researcher, put it: “You can be socialist and 
progressive, but it depends on the mentality (whether or not you include 
female combatants)” (interviewee 7). In the case of the PSP, it was described 
by some as “more Druze than Socialist” (interviewee 1), and indeed, the 
sectarian character of the party trumped its officially adopted ideology. The 
Druze are often described as one of the most gender-conservative 
communities in Lebanon (interviewees 7, 9, 10), which is the main reason 
why women were not included as fighters in the PSP. Most interviewees 
believed that the party’s stance on female fighters was due to the reluctance 
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of wide parts of the community to allow women to fight in the war, despite 
their espoused commitment to a left-wing ideology (see, for example, 
interviewee 43). I will explore this further in Chapter Seven. 
If a party’s official ideology does not always match the gender policy the 
organisation implements, a similar discrepancy can, sometimes, be observed 
“between the professed ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of 
individual members” (Drake, 1998: 16). In other words, organisations tend 
to be more complex than they sometimes seem. They rarely constitute 
monolithic blocs and often change over time, which is why it is important to 
not just analyse the role of a group’s ideology but also its internal structure, 
dynamics and discord. I will now look at this in the next section. 
 
5.2 | Internal structure, dynamics and discord 
 
Alongside a group's gender ideology, internal group structure, dynamics and 
discord can also impact organisational decision-making. Gaining access to 
data about non-state armed groups in general can be difficult, and collecting 
data on their internal structure and functioning tends to be particularly 
challenging (Silke 2004, cit. in Jackson, 2009: 213). However, despite these 
difficulties, the retrieval of such data is crucial, as focusing on these enables 
us to view armed organisations as the complex, multi-layered, often-
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changing organisms they tend to be, rather than treating them as static, 
monolithic and homogeneous units.  
This importance of considering not just a group’s ideology, but also internal 
processes between different members of an organisation, has been stressed 
in the existing literature. Crenshaw, for example, contends that inner-
organisational processes need to be taken into account (1987). She 
maintains that “(o)rganizational activity will vary according to internal 
pressures and external competitiveness” (Crenshaw, 1987: 24).22 In this 
context, McCormick stresses the importance of looking beyond official 
political objectives or ideologies: 
 
In contrast to the rational choice model, which argues that 
terrorism [or political violence in general] represents a 
calculated and instrumental attempt to achieve an external 
set of political objectives, the organizational model suggests 
that much of what terrorists do on the outside can only be 
understood by looking inside the group itself. A terrorist 
organization is not a black box but a living system […] 
(McCormick, 2003: 486). 
 
Thus, whilst, in public, political (and partly also in academic) discourses on 
armed political actors, it is often assumed that the actions of non-state 
armed groups are driven by their ideology, values and aims, proponents of 
                                                          
22 I will focus on inner-organisational aspects in this section. The role external 
relations play will be discussed in the following section. 
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the organisational process approach maintain that it is also more mundane 
aspects that can explain the decision-making and behaviour of non-state 
armed groups: 
 
Although groups take action to advance their goals, it is also 
true that they take actions for reasons that might be viewed 
as 'entirely their own': to address internal organizational 
needs that may or may not directly relate to the ideological 
or other agenda the group supposedly exists to pursue” 
(Crenshaw 2001, cit. in Jackson, 2009: 227). 
 
In the case of the militias operating during the Lebanese civil war, group 
structure, internal dynamics and discord played a role in facilitating the 
inclusion of female fighters.  
Firstly, as far as group structure is concerned, the very nature of the militias 
operating during the war played a central role. While societal norms and 
expectations were never completely overcome, for many of its members, 
the militias became their new community. Looking back on her involvement 
with the LCP during the war, one of the former female fighters I spoke to 
described this as follows: 
 
In the war, communities change. Before the war, my 
community was my village, my region. In [the] war, my 
community became the party. If I think about who you could 
speak to [for the purpose of your research project], they are 
all from the Communist Party. This helps fundamentalism in a 
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way, because you don’t know others, you don’t see others 
[outside of your party] (interviewee 31, see also Sneifer, 
2006: 98, 123). 
 
This phenomenon was first described in the literature on foreign policy as 
‘groupthink’, before the concept was subsequently applied to non-state 
armed groups, too (Drake, 1998: 169). Often, as a response to growing 
external pressure, many groups gradually distance themselves from other 
societal subgroups to the point where, in extreme cases, most links to 
mainstream society are severed. In a lesser form, this distancing from 
mainstream society takes place at a beliefs and attitudinal level, with the 
group’s members “constructing images that are increasingly remote from 
both their ‘dominant’ culture and their own subculture” (Della Porta, 1992: 
19, cit. in McCormick, 2003: 487). As a result, interpersonal bonds within the 
group are strengthened (McCormick, 2003: 490), and the importance of 
group solidarity augments (McCormick, 2003: 489). Groupthink can lead to 
growing homogenisation, where internal dissent is suppressed and the 
group's decision-making is homogenised (McCormick, 2003: 489). A second 
possible effect of groupthink on a clandestine group's decision-making is a 
tendency towards action bias and risk-taking (Crenshaw, 1985, Drake, 1998, 
McCormick, 2003, Jackson, 2009). In practice, this means that group 
members are more likely to “push to act rather than wait or reflect on 
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individual decisions” (Jackson, 2009: 228). In the context of including female 
militia members, this can play an important role in overcoming societal 
barriers, such as the taboo to employ women in combat roles. Indeed, some 
interviewees described the militias as extremely self-dependent 
organisations, which were unfazed by external evaluations of their actions 
(interviewees 14, 23, 28, 48, 50). 
As far as the internal structure of the militias is concerned, previous research 
shows that “organizational structure affects a group’s violent output” (Heger 
et al., n.d.: 763). In the case of the militias operating during the war in 
Lebanon, it is telling that nearly all of the organisations which employed 
female combatants had had a long tradition of engaging women in separate 
women’s units. This gave women a platform to organise and develop 
political confidence, and it helped to normalise women’s presence and 
participation in political activities organised by the party.  
In 1920, members of the Lebanese left founded the Lebanese Women Union 
(Stephan, 2014). Women of the left were also involved in trade union 
activism and workers’ protests (interviewee 7, see also Abisaab 2010, 
Traboulsi, 2012), at times spearheading the strikes and demonstrations. 
Their activism reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s (Abisaab, 2010, 
Traboulsi, 2012). Several interviewees stressed the importance of women’s 
involvement in these pre-war groups with regards to their later involvement 
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in the militias of the LCP and other leftist groups, which included the highest 
percentage of female fighters during the war (interviewees 6, 27, 31, 32). 
The second-oldest Lebanese women’s group was founded in 1947 by 
Christian women (Stephan, 2014). On the party level, a women’s unit was 
founded within Kataeb in the 1940s, which facilitated women’s involvement 
during the war (interviewee 2, 11, 41, 44, 57). In the case of the Palestinian 
militias, the first women’s groups in Palestine were established in the 1920s 
(Sayigh, 1993). Thus, despite the fact that the PLO’s General Union of 
Palestinian Women was not founded until 1965, there was a long tradition 
of Palestinian women being involved in political activism, dating back to the 
1920s (Sayigh, 1993).  
The PSP and Amal on the other hand, both of whom did not include any 
female fighters at the beginning of the war did not have separate women’s 
units until the 1970s (interviewees 51, 52, 53, 58, 67). Despite this, both in 
Amal and the PSP, women had had a role in the party (interviewees 7, 9, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 58, 63). However, the relatively late 
foundation of a separate women’s unit provided the women of the PSP and 
Amal with a lot less time to organise, gain political experience and get their 
voices heard.  
I will discuss the role of women in the political parties in more detail in the 
chapter on societal factors (as women’s presence in the parties had a similar 
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effect both on the organisations as well as on the wider society). For now, it 
suffices to bear in mind the link between the existence of separate women’s 
groups or unions before the war and the inclusion of female fighters during 
the conflict. 
In the case of the Christian militias in general, and Kataeb in particular, 
another structural factor facilitated the inclusion of female fighters; namely, 
the lack of organised combat units at the beginning of the war. In this 
context, it is telling that it was during the first round of the war, when the 
groups fighting on behalf of Kataeb mostly consisted of loosely organised 
neighbourhood collectives, that the percentage of female fighters in the 
organisation was the highest. The lack of organisation and formalisation of 
the militias, which was due to the security context, opened a window of 
opportunity for women to participate in the war in non-traditional roles. I 
will discuss this in more detail in Chapter Six. 
With regards to internal group dynamics and discord, several scholars 
working on political violence point to the dynamics between leaders and 
ordinary members (Crenshaw, 1987, Oots, 1989, Drake, 1998, Shapiro, 
2013). Often, differences arise because many lower-ranking members “join 
an organization for reasons other than ideological commitment” (Crenshaw, 
1987: 15), whereas “it can be assumed that the original leadership of a group 
will be made up of ideologically committed actors” (Oots, 1989: 141; see also 
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Crenshaw, 1987: 21). Indeed, this factor was stressed by several 
interviewees (interviewees 12, 14, 15; see also Bechara, 2003: 84). At the 
same time, the leadership of many non-state armed organisations does not 
constitute one united front either (Oots, 1989: 142, Shapiro, 2007: 58). 
Differences between and amongst the leadership and regular members can 
lead to considerable “management challenges” and present the leadership 
with the difficulty of reconciling conflicting views and opinions (Shapiro and 
Siegel, 2012: 47). In this context, it is essential to bear in mind that the 
relations between leaders and lower-ranking members of a violent group are 
highly dynamic and subject to change. External pressure, for example, can 
lead to previous positions of the group being revisited and possibly adapted 
(Crenshaw, 1987: 22). 
In the case of the organisations fighting in the civil war in Lebanon, there 
was some disagreement within most of the militias on the question of 
whether female fighters should be included in combat roles. The least 
opposition could be found in the groups on the far left – such as the LCP, 
CAO and PFLP, where both the leadership and the majority of the regular 
fighters and other members of the groups agreed with the participation of 
women in combat roles and, overall, treated women as equals (interviewees 
1, 6, 13, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30, 54). However, this does not mean that 
there was no debate or that women did not face any difficulties 
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(interviewees 14, 31, 62). Some interviewees recounted how women tended 
to be given easier tasks than men and that men felt protective of them 
(interviewees 1, 8, 9, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 48, 49, 57, 59, 60, 69). One former 
female LCP fighter believed that it was the men’s socialisation in a relatively 
gender-conservative society, which made it harder at times for them to 
overcome traditional patterns of behaviour: 
 
In the party, it was ok. But the men are also from this society, 
so sometimes they forget [to fully include the women]. They 
were very nice to women but sometimes … they forget and 
are very sorry and apologise [she laughs]. If you believe in 
something, you cannot live directly like that, as you thought 
[about it in theory] (interviewee 31). 
 
However, even where full implementation of gender equality was not 
achieved, in principle, women’s participation was accepted in leftist 
organisations such as the LCP, CAO and PFLP. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the percentage of female fighters was the highest in these leftist groups.  
The cases of Kataeb and Fatah, on the other hand, illustrate that when the 
leadership was divided on the inclusion of female fighters, the lack of unity 
regarding female participation helped facilitate the involvement of women 
in combat, especially when the group was facing extreme external pressure. 
In Kataeb, for example, on the level of leaders, Pierre Gemayel, the founder 
of the Kataeb party, fundamentally opposed the inclusion of female fighters. 
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One former female Kataeb fighter recalls: 
 
As far as mentalities were concerned, it was a very traditional 
party. Pierre Gemayel saw me two or three times from afar in 
a training camp, and he asked, ‘is this a girl or a boy?!’ It 
disturbed him. He was very happy when we changed that [and 
women’s contribution started to mostly shift towards non-
combat roles] – he called me three times [to express his joy 
and approval]! The president of the women’s office of Kataeb 
was also very reluctant vis-à-vis our role as combatants. One 
time, during a meeting, she told me, ‘you are not the kind of 
female model that we want to promote to future generations’ 
(interviewee 19). 
 
While Gemayel’s reluctance was mirrored by other leaders and ordinary 
members of Kataeb (and later the Lebanese Forces) (interviewees 7, 16, 19, 
44, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 78), other party members such as 
William Hawi (the leader of the Kataeb militia at the beginning of the war) 
were in favour of the inclusion of women in military roles (interviewees 2, 
16, 41, 55, 56, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 9). The party and its militia 
were divided in their position on the issue of female fighters (interviewees 
16, 19, 57, 59). When the war broke out and women insisted to be included, 
this lack of unity prevented the party from stopping the inclusion of women 
fighters (interviewee 19).  
The situation was similar in those groups on the left that were not only 
influenced by communist and socialist ideas, but also by right-wing and 
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Islamist thinking (such as Fatah and later Amal). For example, one former 
fighter with the Student Brigades of Fatah told me of heated discussions he 
used to have with other members of the group on the inclusion of female 
fighters, because he feared that including women in combat roles would 
alienate more traditional members of their group and the wider community 
(interviewee 20). However, other Fatah members were in favour of including 
women (interviewee 14, 27, 52, 61, 64), and this lack of a united stand on 
the issue created a window of opportunity for those women wishing to join. 
Lastly, when most of the leadership is united in its opposition to the inclusion 
of female fighters – as it was the case with the PSP and Amal (before their 
change of position after the invasion of Israel), it is highly unlikely that 
female fighters will be employed. This is the case even if a proportion of the 
regular fighters would not object to the inclusion of women in combat roles 
– as it was the case in the PSP, for example (interviewees 9, 51). The case of 
the PSP shows that those women, who are so motivated to participate in 
combat that they are unwilling to accept their exclusion by the militia 
leadership, might instead resort to getting training outside of the group and 
form their own separate combat units, as was the case in Lebanon during 
the war (interviewees 10, 20).  
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5.3 | External influence and support 
 
Of all organisational factors, group gender ideology and internal structure, 
dynamics and discord played the most important role in decision-making on 
whether or not to include female fighters in the organisations examined in 
this study. External relations and influences were the second most important 
factor. They played a particularly important role in the Lebanese leftist 
groups, such as the LCP and CAO, but excluding the PSP where, as we have 
seen above, the group’s de facto gender ideology and internal structure and 
dynamics trumped other factors. Both LCP and CAO were heavily influenced, 
and indeed inspired, by the role of women in the Palestinian revolution. In 
the case of the Christian groups in general, and Kataeb in particular, external 
influence also played a role – though to a lesser degree than in the case of 
the Lebanese leftist groups. 
The presence of Palestinian armed militias on Lebanese soil was one of the 
triggering events of the Lebanese civil war (Traboulsi, 2012). As highlighted 
in Chapter Four, the fight for Palestinians’ rights continued to be a key 
motivational factor for LNM militias during the war. On the organisational 
level, all Lebanese leftist parties maintained close external relations with 
Palestinian organisations. Particularly after the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan 
in 1970, when Lebanon became the new base for the Palestinian leadership, 
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most Palestinian parties also had a Lebanese branch (interviewee 8). Most 
Arab Nationalist parties also had a presence both in the majority of all Arab 
countries and Lebanon. The individual branches of this network of political 
parties often cooperated closely across national borders (interviewees 1, 8, 
21). In the area of military training, cooperation between Lebanese and 
Palestinian organisations was prominent. Most leftist groups received 
training, money and weapons from Palestinian groups (interviewees 1, 18, 
22, 24, 32), and the Palestinian revolution was idealised and revered by 
many Lebanese leftist organisations (interviewees 18, 22).  
Alongside with this cooperation on the organisational level, many individual 
members of the Lebanese leftist groups operating during the civil war were 
also heavily influenced by the Palestinian struggle for an independent 
homeland (interviewees 18, 22, 27). This included militia members, like the 
former fighter with the LCP with whom I spoke, who recounted how as a 
teenager, he saw a Palestinian child in Beirut shooting at an Israeli 
aeroplane. He stressed how witnessing this scene had a strong impact on 
him and encouraged him to also join the war (interviewee 23). Three other 
former fighters I interviewed also stated a major source of inspiration for 
their fight was the Palestinian resistance (interviewees 18, 22, 31).   
When the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, the Palestinian revolution 
had been ongoing for decades. Palestinian women had been involved in the 
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fight for an independent Palestinian homeland since the 1960s, especially in 
the more leftist-oriented groups (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, Traboulsi, 
2012). Whilst women’s involvement in combat activities was not on a par 
with men’s participation, their role had become increasingly public (Peteet, 
1991, Sayigh, 1993, Traboulsi, 2012). The 1960s and 1970s in particular saw 
a number of highly mediatised attacks in which Palestinian women played a 
central role (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, Traboulsi, 2012). The importance of 
role-models in encouraging women to join the fight has been stressed in 
previous literature (Alison, 2009, Dearing, 2010). Indeed, many interviewees 
stressed how they or their female comrades were inspired by the role of 
women in the Palestinian revolution (interviewees 7, 8, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 
24, 27, 31, 32, 46, 48). Several interviewees mentioned the names of famous 
Palestinian female fighters, such as Leila Khaled, Dalal Mughrabi and Fatima 
Bernawi, as inspirations to join the fight. Leila Khalid, in particular, became 
extremely popular in the late 1960s and 1970s after her role in high-profile 
aeroplane hijackings (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, Traboulsi, 2012). The 
potential influence of these women on Lebanese militants was particularly 
high considering that both Leila Khaled and Dalal Mughrabi had grown up in 
Lebanon as Palestinian refugees (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, Traboulsi, 
2012). One former female fighter with the LCP, who was a military 
commander during the war, recounted how as children, they used to climb 
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pine trees in their village to watch Palestinian women being trained in the 
backyard of one of the houses. As a teenager of 13 or 14 years of age, this 
had a profound impact on her and she remembered how she imagined 
herself to be a Palestinian woman (interviewee 31). Palestinian women were 
considered by many former leftist militants to be particularly determined 
and to have a clear vision of what they were fighting for (interviewees 27, 
28).  
Not all interviewees thought the Palestinian influence was essential in 
inspiring and encouraging Lebanese leftist militias to also include female 
fighters (7, 14, 17, 21, 31, 52). Some saw the Palestinian revolution as one of 
many factors, such as, for example, the recent change in social values 
(interviewee 6). Others thought that the very visible presence of women in 
many Palestinian groups amplified a development within Lebanese political 
parties that had already started much earlier (interviewee 31, see also 
interviewee 8). Two interviewees were of the opinion that it was, in fact, 
Lebanese women who were more liberated and involved than their 
Palestinian counterparts (interviewees 14, 21). However, the vast majority 
of interview partners were convinced that the role Palestinian women 
played in the fight for a free Palestine played a considerable role in 
encouraging and facilitating the participation of Lebanese women in the 
Lebanese civil war. 
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The struggle for Palestine was, of course, not the only source of inspiration 
for many Lebanese leftists at that time. The Lebanese civil war took place in 
the 1970s and 80s, when anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements were 
still relatively strong. Several interviewees named the states of Russia, China 
and Cuba, resistance movements in Vietnam and Latin America, and 
communist groups in Europe as inspirations (interviewee 1, 18, 31, 32). 
Russia, China and Cuba all supported the Palestinian revolution and provided 
training to both male and female Palestinian (and later, also Lebanese) 
fighters (interviewees 1, 32). This led one interviewee to claim that as a 
Lebanese female militia member, she did not learn from the Palestinians but 
“from those who taught the Palestinians – the Soviets” (interviewee 32). 
As far as the Christian-dominated LFr is concerned, external relations and 
influence played a less prominent role in influencing the group’s decision-
making on the inclusion of female fighters. The Christian groups did not take 
the Palestinian revolution as an example to strive towards. As one former 
female fighter put it, “we didn’t support the Palestinians, we didn’t want to 
follow anything that came from them… We didn’t take into consideration 
what they did at all. We wanted to forget about them” (interviewee 11, see 
also interviewee 19). In fact, one former LFs member, who trained to be an 
officer, said she was not aware of what exactly Leila Khaled’s role had been 
until she read about it years after the end of the civil war in the early 2010s 
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(interviewee 16). When former members of the Christian militias said they 
were influenced or inspired by external groups (they claimed this to be the 
case a lot less often than their leftist counterparts did), they either spoke of 
examples from the French context – such as Jeanne d’Arc (interviewee 45) 
(which is not surprising given the traditional Francophilia of many Lebanese 
Christians), or the 1968 movement for social change and women’s rights 
(Eggert, forthcoming, 2018). “The Christians were very influenced by what 
was happening in the West, in terms of socio-cultural structures and 
thoughts. They thought it was part of modernity,” one former fighter and 
military commander with Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces explained 
(interviewee 19). However, these two influences (examples from French 
history or the 1968 women’s movement) were not exclusive to former 
Christian militia members, as they were put forward by both former 
members of the Christian and leftist militias – especially by those with an 
intellectual background and / or living in Beirut (interviewees 7, 12, 18, 19, 
22, 23, 65). As one former male CAO commander put it, in the first half of 
the 1970s, “the mood was an explosion of freedom and very liberal relations 
between men and women […] women were breaking many societal rules […] 
even in the PSP, that was the word” (interviewee 65). While Lebanese 
militias were trained and joined by Palestinian fighters, the Christian militias 
were also joined by right-wing militants from France and Italy who came to 
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fight with Kataeb, for example (interviewees 2, 18). However, these were 
much lower in numbers and, except for Jocelyne Khoueiry, the most 
prominent female Christian militia fighter during the war, there were no 
influential female figures that could have served as role-models for women 
with the Christian militias as was the case with the Palestinian organisations 
inspiring Lebanese women. Another external actor with strong relations to 
the Christian militias was the state of Israel which trained, equipped and 
funded the Christian organisations (Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012). Even 
though the Israeli army is now known for its obligatory military service for 
both men and women and the fact that women were involved in combat 
roles in 1948/49, women were barred from assuming combat roles after the 
1948 war (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy, 2017). The fact that the overall 
numbers of female fighters in Kataeb was much lower than the LCP figures 
is thus not surprising.  
 
5.4 | Age and size 
 
As discussed above, most publications on female political violence attempt 
to explain women's inclusion in non-state armed organisations by referring 
to ideology. A lot less attention is paid to group age and size. One notable 
exception is a study by Dalton and Asal (2011), in which the authors test 
207 
 
possible group- and country-related reasons for women's participation in 
non-state military activities. Dalton and Asal frame the inclusion of female 
combatants by a group which previously did not allow women to participate 
in the fighting as organisation change, thus drawing on a term used in 
organisational theory and behaviour studies and applying it to research on 
armed political groups. They argue that “[o]rganization change, defined as 
'shifts in an organization’s activity sets or strategic domain,' may be 
influenced by organizational factors such as organizational size” or age 
(Dalton and Asal, 2011: 807). Using a data set of 395 non-state armed 
organisations, Dalton and Asal run a logistic regression including 12 variables 
and come to the conclusion that “larger organizations are more likely to 
recruit and deploy women” (Dalton and Asal, 2011: 810). They hypothesise 
this may be due to the greater need for a higher number of new recruits or 
an indicator for larger organisation's increased capability for organisational 
change, as claimed in the organisational theory research drawn upon by the 
authors.  
The findings of this thesis do not support Dalton and Asal’s claim, as the 
organisations deploying female fighters in the Lebanese civil war included 
both big and small organisations.23 With 3000 to 6000 fighters, the LCP was 
                                                          
23  Most of the militias operating in Lebanon at the time of the war were, as one 
interviewee called it, “politico-military organisations” (interviewee 18), which consisted of 
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one of the biggest militias in terms of the numbers of fighters they 
commanded, including the highest percentage of female fighters 
(interviewees 1, 2, 7).24 It was also one of the biggest parties at the beginning 
of the war (interviewees 1, 2, 7, 22, 29, 30, 32, Badran, 2008). The CAO was 
one of the smallest organisations and had considerably fewer fighters (no 
more than a few hundred in fact), but employed a similar percentage of 
female fighters. This contradicts Dalton’s and Asal’s hypothesis, according to 
which one would expect the LCP to have proportionally more female fighters 
than the CAO. With several thousand fighters at the beginning of the war, 
Fatah was also one of the biggest organisations, with the PFLP as one of the 
smaller ones (it had only a few hundred professional fighters when the war 
started) (interviewees 67, 68 69, Badran, 2008). According to Dalton and 
Asal’s findings, one would expect Fatah to have a higher percentage of 
female fighters than the PFLP, yet the percentage was actually higher in the 
(relatively) small PFLP – this contradicts Dalton’s and Asal’s theory. The PSP 
contained very few fighters at the beginning of the war, and many more at 
a later stage, yet women were barred from combat roles regardless of the 
organisation’s respective size. Dalton and Asal’s theory also does not explain 
                                                          
both a military and a political wing. Numbers for both the general membership of the 
political party as well as their military wings are given further down in this chapter. 
24   For a detailed overview of how many male and female fighters each organisation 
included, see the section on numbers in Chapter One. 
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why the percentage of female fighters in the relatively big Kataeb (4000 to 
6000 fighters, and even more party members, at the beginning of the war) 
was considerably lower than in the LCP (interviewees 1, 2, 7, 55, 57, Badran, 
2008). The only organisation where one could suspect that size played a role 
is Amal, which was a relatively small organisation when it was first founded 
in 1976 and later continued to grow into one of the war’s biggest politico-
military organisations. Amal started to deploy female fighters as it grew 
older and bigger. However, in this case, it seems that the employment of 
female fighters was mostly linked to security-related concerns, as I will show 
in the next chapter on the role of the security context.  
Dalton and Asal also outline claims rooted in organisational theory and 
behavioural sciences, according to which an organisation's age is an 
indicator for its ability and willingness to change and adopt new strategies. 
The idea behind this is that “young organizations are burdened with the 
'liability of newness”, and that older organisations have a strategic 
advantage due to their “organizational reliability, accountability and 
capability in terms of the development of internal structure and personnel, 
resource obtention, and performance through processes of organizational 
learning” (Dalton and Asal, 2011: 808). Dalton and Asal thus come to the 
conclusion that “[t]he factor having by far the largest impact […] is the age 
of terrorist groups” (2011: 810).  
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As is the case with group size, organisational age, too, has only limited 
explanatory capacity with regards to the inclusion of female fighters during 
the civil war in Lebanon. The LCP was founded in 1924, Kataeb in 1936 and 
PSP in 1949 (Traboulsi, 2012). Those three organisations were thus some of 
the oldest parties in Lebanon, yet only the LCP and Kataeb included female 
fighters, whereas the PSP did not. Even though the LCP, which had the 
highest percentage of female fighters, was indeed the oldest party of the 
three, and PSP, which did not include any official female fighters, the 
youngest, at the time of the outbreak of the war, all three parties were 
established parties. Moreover, there were younger parties, such as the PFLP, 
Fatah and CAO, which included female fighters. If one was to consider the 
beginning of military activities, rather than the date of party establishment, 
of the LCP, PSP and Kataeb, all three parties started to provide military 
training to members of their organisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Traboulsi, 2012), and so the difference in age between the military wings of 
the respective parties was minimal. As far as middle-aged organisations are 
concerned, Fatah started as a political movement in the late 1950s and was 
founded as a party in 1965 – around the same time when the PFLP was 
founded in 1967 (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993). Both parties were involved in 
military activities from the outset, and both included female fighters during 
the war. Amongst the youngest organisations include the CAO, which was 
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founded in 1970, and Amal, which did not come into existence until after the 
beginning of the war in 1975 (Norton, 1987, Traboulsi, 2012). One of them, 
the CAO included female fighters, whereas Amal did not – until the security 
context changed considerably. It is thus mostly the PSP (one of the “old” 
parties which did not include female fighters) and the CAO (one of the 
younger organisations, female fighters) which contradict Dalton’s and Asal’s 
theory on the relevance of group age. Thus, given the relative 
inconclusiveness of the data in this case, it is more likely that it was 
ideological factors (which I have discussed in the beginning of this chapter) 
and security-related aspects (which we will look at in the next chapter), 
rather than age and size that decided whether female fighters were included 
in the militias operating during the Lebanese civil war or not. 
 
5.5 | Aims 
 
While most scholars working on female political violence mention a group's 
ideological orientation as one of the decisive factors in organisational 
decision-making on the inclusion of female combatants (as discussed in 
section one of this chapter), some also point to an organisation's strategic 
aims. For example, Gonzalez-Perez argued that organisational aims are 
central in determining the degree to which women are involved in non-state 
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armed groups (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). As highlighted earlier in this chapter, 
she rejects the claim that ideology is salient in female participation in non-
state violent political groups. Instead, she contends that group aims are 
decisive in this context – or more specifically, whether an organisation fights 
for change at the domestic or international level. She claims that “women 
are more active and participate at much higher levels in terrorist groups that 
espouse domestic objectives and act against a state government, than 
women in terrorist organizations with an international agenda that targets 
globalization, imperialism, or foreign influence” (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008: 1). 
The rationale behind this argument is that groups fighting for change on a 
national level are supposedly considered to be more likely to tackle issues 
relevant to women, which makes them more attractive to potential female 
recruits. Other scholars, such as Alison, have made similar claims:  
 
Organizations or movements aimed at upholding an 
oppressive status quo or containing those revolutionary 
movements that desire to disrupt this are, in most cases, 
likely to be more conservative than their opposition and to 
have correspondingly more conservative views on the 
appropriate roles of women (Alison, 2009: 229). 
 
Other researchers also uphold the idea that organisations working for 
revolutionary change are more prone to including women in a wide range of 
different roles including combat positions (Moghadam, 1993: 71-72, Yuval-
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Davis, 1997).  
The claim that it is not a group's political orientation, or ideology, but its 
strategic aims that are decisive in its decision-making on female 
participation in combat might seem convincing at first. However, Gonzalez-
Perez' analysis of the topic has not been exempt from criticisms. Narozhna, 
for example, pointed to the fact that “the overwhelming majority of 
domestic terrorist groups in her analysis are left-wing” (Narozhna, 2009: 
644), thus implying that political orientation might play a role after all. 
Narozhna also criticised Gonzalez-Perez’s categorisation of cases as either 
international or domestic. As Gonzalez-Perez' entire argument relies on the 
distinction between domestic and international groups, this criticism is to be 
taken seriously.  
Indeed, when comparing Gonzalez’s claim to the case of militias operating 
during the Lebanese civil war, her hypothesis does not hold up for too long. 
Kataeb’s aims, for example, were, for the most, domestic. The group did not 
have strong international aims and was mostly focused on the internal 
situation in Lebanon. According to Gonzalez’s theory, the number of female 
fighters in Kataeb should have been particularly high. This was not the case 
however. The organisational aims of the LCP, PSP and Amal all had an 
international element to them. The LCP and PSP were both linked to 
international networks including other leftist organisations. They were, at 
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least in theory, fighting for the unity of the pan-Arab nation as well as 
Palestinians’ rights – both in Lebanon and the region. As to Amal, one of the 
group’s main aims was the fight against Israel. However, all of these three 
groups also had domestic aims, as they were fighting for socio-political 
change in Lebanon. This supports the criticisms put forward by Narozhna 
that Gonzalez’s categorisation suffers from conceptual ambiguity. 
Regardless of this weakness of Gonzalez’s explanatory framework, if one 
was to categorise LCP, PSP and Amal as international groups, according to 
Gonzalez, one would expect them to have very few, if any, female fighters. 
If the three militias were considered to be domestic groups, according to 
Gonzalez, they would be more likely to have higher numbers of female 
combatants. Comparing the percentages of female fighters in the three 
groups (the LCP being the group with the highest percentage of female 
fighters during the Lebanese civil war, Amal with very few and the PSP with 
no women combatants), it becomes obvious that regardless of which 
categorisation of these three groups one decides to undertake, Gonzalez’s 
framework lacks explanatory power.  
In this regard, framing the argument as done by Alison is less problematic as 
conceptual ambiguity is more likely to be avoided when speaking of “anti-
state” or “revolutionary” movements, as Alison does, instead of “domestic” 
versus “international” groups (2009). In fact, Alison’s distinction between 
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different kinds of nationalist aims of non-state armed groups is particularly 
helpful in this context. According to Alison, in the case of nationalist projects, 
the kind of nation a movement seeks to construct is also of importance, as 
it can have a range of different implications on gender roles (Alison, 2009: 
223). Alison uses Yuval Davis's categorisation of Volknation (or “nation based 
on genealogical and biological notions of origin”) with “women as biological 
reproducers”; Kulturnation (or “nation based on notions of shared culture 
and symbolic heritage”) with “women as social and cultural reproducers”; 
and Staatnation (or nation based on relatively inclusive notions of 
citizenship) (Yuval-Davis, 1997). According to Alison:  
 
 [I]n nationalist movements with a strong Volknation element 
women are usually likely to be strongly dissuaded from 
participating as combatants. In movements emphasizing the 
Kulturnation dimension […] how acceptable female 
combatants are will depend on the specific cultural traditions 
that are celebrated by the movement. Finally, nationalist 
movements emphasizing the Staatnation element may be 
more accommodating of women as combatants but this is by 
no means assured (Alison, 2009: 223). 
 
This framework fits the militias operating during the Lebanese civil war 
particularly well. According to the framework, the PSP would, de facto, aim 
to establish a Volknation, whereas Amal would be fighting for a Kulturnation, 
Kataeb for a hybrid of Volk-/Kulturnation, Fatah for a hybrid of Volk-/Kultur- 
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and Staatnation, and the LCP, CAO and PFLP for a Staatnation. Comparing 
percentages of female fighters with the different categories of nationalist 
aims, the validity of this framework is supported by my findings on the 
militias operating during the Lebanese civil war: the PSP (Volknation) did not 
include any official female fighters, because, as one former PSP fighter I 
interviewed stated, the PSP in the Mountain was “not fighting for ideological 
reasons, the slogan of the war in the Mountain was more ‘defending the land 
and the family’, so you can’t go and let [the female members of] your family 
fight” (interviewee 9). In turn, the numbers of female fighters in Kataeb and 
Fatah – two organisations which both largely viewed the nation state they 
were fighting for as based on biological and cultural factors and are thus 
examples for Volk-/Kulturnations – were relatively low. In the LCP and the 
PFLP, who were fighting for a Staatnation, the percentage of female fighters 
was relatively high. In this case, the numbers thus support Alison’s claim. 
Lastly, when speaking about organisational aims, one must not omit that 
while a group may have an overall aim that provides it with a strategic 
direction, group aims are by no means monolithic or static, can often be 
multi-layered and subject to change. This was the case for most of the 
militias operating during the Lebanese civil war (interviewees 3, 5, 28, 63) 
and it did affect female involvement. The first round of the war (from the 
outbreak of the war in early 1975 until the Syrian invasion in 1976) in 
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particular was considered by many to be influenced more by legitimate 
political aims, whereas the later stages of the conflict were often described 
as a time during which criminal activities of the different militias and 
(inner)sectarian fighting dominated (interviewees 1, 7, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 
41). In the words of one interviewee who used to fight in the ranks of the 
LCP, after the first two years, the “situation changed, the fighting had no 
[political] meaning any more” (interviewee 1). Another interviewee, a 
Lebanese fighter with the PFLP, described the change as the civil war turning 
“from a war of ideas into a war of chaos”, without any rules or political 
rationale behind it (interviewee 8). Yet another former LCP fighter described 
the transition from the first round of war to the later stages vividly:  
 
In the beginning, it was very idealistic […] Later, Amal came, 
things changed, the Sharia followers arrived. At the early 
stage of the war, there was a case for the cause of the war. 
Intellectuals were attracted. Just before the war, the political 
situation was very strong, at universities, schools, clubs. 
That’s why all those students and intellectuals got involved. 
After two years into the war, they realized that war is ugly. 
There were robberies, vandalism. The Syrian army came to 
Lebanon and changed the balance. It started shifting the 
political organisation. As a consequence, some went out, 
some in and some came closer to them [the militias]. People 
realized they were going nowhere and that they achieved 
nothing [fighting in this war]. Some moved abroad or 
withdrew. After two years, a new generation came who 
started stealing and corrupting the country. They controlled 
the country and bad people ran the streets. Because of this, 
the image became that this is a dirty war and that political 
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parties are not good, it’s an insult [to be involved with a 
political party]. Students withdrew, and because of this, good 
elements were not attracted any more to join – the majority 
of them were students. The girls who used to come with their 
friends didn’t show up any more. It was not intellectual or 
sophisticated any more but a dirty war. In the early stages of 
the war, in 1975, they would call her “militant”, after two 
years, she was a “dirty, a bad girl”. After two years, women 
practically didn’t exist [in the militias]. There were no new 
women fighters, only previous ones. A new atmosphere was 
created, with new political ideas and a new arena with a 
different ideology. The leftwing parties took a step back and 
the new movement sectarianised. It was Christians in the 
Lebanese Forces vs. Muslims vs. Druze in the PSP vs. Amal 
(interviewee 22). 
 
This analysis was shared by many of interviewees who were of the opinion 
that this directional change in the aims of most militias operating during the 
war, their increasing sectarianisation and criminalisation in the years after 
the first round of the war put off many militia members – and especially the 
women. Interestingly, in the leftist groups, in 1982 when the Israeli army 
invaded, the numbers of female fighters increased again, while the 
Mountain war in 1982/83 had a similar effect (albeit to a lesser degree) for 
the Lebanese Forces. I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter on 
the role of the security context in the organisational decision-making on the 
inclusion of female fighters in the various militias.  
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5.6 | Conclusion 
 
Organisational characteristics played an important role in the decision-
making on women’s participation in combat during the Lebanese civil war. 
Ideological factors, internal structure, dynamics and discord played the 
biggest role in the inclusion of female fighters. External relations were also 
of importance, even though this was more the case for the leftist 
organisations, which were heavily influenced by Palestinian organisations – 
and less so for the Christian militias. Group aims can also help explain the 
inclusion of female fighters, if what we look at is the particular type of nation 
the different groups were fighting for. Group age and size were not decisive. 
In the case of the leftist groups, such as the LCP, CAO and PFLP, 
organisational characteristics facilitated the inclusion of female fighters. To 
a lesser degree, this was also the case for those organisations where 
conditions, in terms of group ideology, internal structure, dynamics and 
discord, were less clearly in favour of the inclusion of female fighters, such 
as Kataeb and Fatah.  
The reason women were fighting in both Kataeb and Fatah during the war 
(despite conditions from an organisational point of view not being 
completely in favour of female participation in combat) was that the security 
context created additional pressure on the organisations. In the case of 
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Amal, it even led a group that was categorically against the participation of 
female fighters to eventually include them – not in the inner-Lebanese 
fighting, but in the war against Israel. The PSP did not find itself under 
comparable levels of external pressure due to the security context, which is 
why women continued to be excluded throughout the entirety of the war. I 
will discuss exactly what role the security context played in this case in the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 6 | Security context 
 
The most important factor leading to women’s inclusion as fighters in the 
militias operating during the Lebanese civil war was women’s insistence on 
being included. After women started requesting to participate as fighters, 
they were included in those militias whose organisational characteristics 
were conducive to female involvement. In those militias that were initially 
reluctant to include women as fighters, the intensifying security context 
during the war made the militias change their mind. This was the case 
because non-state armed groups do not exist in a vacuum. They operate in 
a strategic environment that is shaped by the security context and the 
societal circumstances of the society and/or community that the group is 
part of and interacts with. I will look at the societal context and the extent 
to which it impacted upon the militias’ decision-making during the Lebanese 
civil war in Chapter Seven. In this chapter, the focus is on the ways in which 
the militias took into account security-related aspects of the strategic 
environment in their decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters. I 
will show how the militias examined in this study responded to the specific 
security situation they found themselves in. During the Lebanese civil war, 
the militias’ perception of security measures implemented by their 
opponents limited the group’s opportunities in their strategic security 
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context. This led to a reassessment of the exclusion of female fighters in 
those militias that were divided about women’s involvement in combat 
roles. In the militias of the far-left, who were open to female participation in 
combat from the outset, it further facilitated the participation of female 
combatants. Faced with more conventional strategies and options being 
curtailed, in those militias that perceived their groups to be under extreme 
external pressure, the barriers to women’s participation were softened – at 
least for as long as the exceptional situation lasted. Tactical considerations 
were prioritised over other factors. In order to ensure group survival and 
success, new tactical options (even if considered controversial in the group 
and/or wider community) were adopted.  
The changing security situation affected the militias operating in Lebanon 
during the civil war in a number of different ways. Threat perception played 
an essential role. Security pressures made the non-state armed groups 
involved in the fighting perceive themselves and their communities to be 
under extreme (even existential) pressure that in turn led them to consider 
the inclusion of female fighters. Exactly how this played out differed from 
group to group. Whereas the organisations of the left saw their fight as a 
leftist revolution against the status quo, the Christian groups perceived their 
involvement in the war largely as a struggle for survival and as a fight for 
their continued dominance in the socio-political system of the country. 
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While in the groups of the far-left the ideological barriers to women’s 
inclusion as fighters were relatively low to begin with, in the case of the 
Christian militias, these barriers were initially higher. However, the extreme 
situation made the inclusion of female fighters possible even in those 
groups. In the case of the Amal Movement, it was the fight against the 
external invader Israel, which helped to justify women’s participation in 
combat in the eyes of the militia leaders. The PSP, on the other hand, did not 
find itself under such extreme pressures, which is one of the reasons why 
female fighters were not included in the group. This may have changed 
during the Mountain war; however, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
inclusion of female fighters at that stage would have contradicted the official 
slogan of “family and the land” under which the PSP fought this phase of the 
war (interviewee 9). 
It is often assumed that because an extreme security situation inhibits non-
state armed groups' options, their employment of female fighters is a sign 
of weakness (Cunningham, 2008: 93; Bloom, 2011: 215). On the other hand, 
it has also been argued that, rather than a desperate action, the inclusion of 
women fighters is an informed choice – a “clever tactical adaption” (Bloom, 
2011: 214) by “highly adaptive” non-state armed actors who respond to 
“high levels of external pressure” by expanding their operational range 
(Cunningham, 2003: 172-173). The two are not mutually exclusive, as non-
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state armed actors can make informed choices even when under extreme 
stress. Thus, if the external pressure that comes with an extreme security 
situation curtails some options for non-state armed actors, it facilitates 
other possibilities for them, such as, for example, the inclusion of non-
traditional fighters. During the Lebanese civil war, this was the case in those 
militias in which organisational characteristics were not as clearly conducive 
to women’s involvement in combat as was the case for the groups of the far-
left.   
The security context is mentioned as one reason for the inclusion of women 
as combatants in most publications on female non-state political violence 
(Cunningham, 2003, Eager, 2008, Dearing, 2010, Henshaw, 2016). Some 
authors point to both the security context and societal factors as being 
decisive and stress their interdependence (Cunningham, 2003, Dearing, 
2010). Indeed, a critical security situation can not only motivate an individual 
to engage in political violence (and a group to include said individual), but it 
can also lead a relatively conservative and gender-restrictive society to 
embrace the prospect of female participation in combat activities 
(Cunningham, 2008: 88). This was certainly the case in Lebanon during the 
civil war, where an extreme security context led the militias, the women 
themselves, and the wider community, to reconsider traditional conventions 
regarding the role of the women in non-state armed groups. Existing 
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literature states that societal norms, such as the tendency not to involve 
women in combat roles, tend to be respected as long as the armed group 
believes it will provide them with a tactical advantage (Cunningham, 2003: 
185, Speckhard, 2008: 998). If societal norms and expectations are 
considered to counter the armed group's goals and aims, the group will be 
willing to transgress the limits imposed by society, either by shunning them 
completely or by reinterpreting and adapting them to the current security 
situation. The findings of this research support this line of argumentation. 
Exactly how the security context impacted societal factors and how the 
militias managed their relations with the communities will be discussed in 
more detail in the chapter on societal factors. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of four parts and the conclusion. Each 
section looks at one of the four security-related factors which played a role 
in the militias’ decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters during the 
Lebanese civil war; namely, threat perception, attention-seeking, asserting 
of the group’s position, and avoidance of detection.  
 
6.1 | Threat perception 
 
As discussed in the chapter on individual motivations, the most important 
motivational factor for both men and women to get involved with the 
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different militias was their motivation to counter a perceived threat. On the 
level of the group, this was also one of the main reasons that led to the 
inclusion of female fighters in the militias (or the lack thereof). What form 
this threat took varied from group to group and at times also from region to 
region. Moreover, the perception of threat was not static, but evolved over 
time, with the civil war taking different turns over the years. In this context, 
it is insightful to look at how the numbers of female fighters in some of the 
groups changed over time. This will be done below. The evolving security 
context also influenced a number of other factors. I have already shown in 
Chapter Five how it affected the organisational structure of some of the 
groups involved in the fighting. In addition to that, it also had an impact on 
the communities, loosening some of the socio-cultural barriers to female 
participation, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  
The vast majority of interviewees contended that, from a military point of 
view, the inclusion of female fighters was not a necessity (interviewees 2, 4, 
7, 9, 12, 22, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 39, 45, 50, 55), except possibly for the 
Christian groups at the beginning of the war (interviewees 4, 7, 18, 22, 44). 
Only two individuals believed that the inclusion of female fighters was a 
military necessity for other groups, namely in leftist and Palestinian militias 
at the beginning of the war (interviewee 14) and in the Palestinian militias 
after 1982 (interviewee 12). Only one of those two interviewees was actually 
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a militia member during the war and had thus had an insider’s perspective. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that female participation was not considered 
a military necessity by the vast majority of interviewees, during the war the 
threat was perceived as being so imminent that it still facilitated the 
inclusion of female fighters. It is important to bear in mind that these 
perceptions were subjective estimations by individuals who not only had 
limited knowledge of the overall context, but who also often had a political 
agenda. However, for the purpose of this study, whether or not the threat 
perceptions at the time were indeed an accurate reflection of reality is 
irrelevant, as the groups were nevertheless guided by them. 
In Chapter Four, I showed that the women (and men) involved with the 
militias of the pro-reform LNM saw their fight as a struggle for a new socio-
political system and for the rights of Palestinians and other marginalised 
groups in Lebanon. Later, the fight against Israel also became a priority. As 
will be discussed below, the situation in the South – a region that was 
occupied by Israel from 1978 – was different, as the Israeli army posed a 
continuous threat to those opposing Israel in the South. The fight against a 
socio-political system perceived as unjust and oppressive (and later against 
Israel) were also major organisational motivations. In line with their leftist 
ideology, the organisations associated with the LNM saw their fight from 
1975 as a revolution, which would allow them to implement a new societal 
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system in Lebanon (interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 
61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69). This fight warranted the inclusion of women, as all 
segments of society needed to be involved for a revolution. Similarly, the 
invasion by Israel in 1982 was perceived as an extreme security pressure, 
which called for the inclusion of all available fighters. In line with this 
argument, most interviewees agreed that the numbers of female fighters 
were highest during the first round of the war (from 1975 to 1977), after 
which they decreased, to rise again in 1982 until the Israeli occupation of 
(most of) the country ended in 1985 (interviewees 1, 7, 8, 14, 18, 48, 22, 23, 
28). Indeed, only three interviewees (one former male CAO fighter, one 
former female LCP fighter and one former male LCP/Fatah fighter) thought 
that the numbers of women were lower in the beginning of the war. 
However, they also agreed that their involvement rose sharply after the 
Israeli invasion in 1982 (interviewees 6, 21, 31). In fact, a woman was 
involved in the first two attacks against the Israeli army in Beirut in 
September 1982 in the Kantari and Zokak al-Blat neighbourhoods, which 
were carried out by a four-member cell (interviewee 22). One interviewee 
recounted how: “[a]gainst Israel, it was a different thing. When Israel came 
to Beirut, it became a national combat – like in 1975, but even more” 
(interviewee 22).  
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When looking at threat perception, it is important to take into account 
regional differences. One illustrative example in this context is the constant 
increase of female fighters in militias of the Lebanese and Palestinian left in 
the South. I have shown above that most interviewees stated that the 
number of female fighters was relatively high during the first round of the 
war, how it declined after the invasion by Syria, and rose again when Israel 
invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982. According to several interviewees, 
this was not the case in the South however, where threat perception was 
shaped by different dynamics (interviewees 1, 30, 31, 32). Israel invaded 
large parts of the South in 1978 and moved as far as Beirut in 1982 (Hirst, 
2011, Traboulsi, 2012). As a consequence, women’s participation in the 
South did not increase in 1975 and decrease after 1976/77, but continued 
to rise throughout the entire war. In the words of one interviewee (a former 
fighter and military commander with the LCP), “in the South they have a 
different case; there was always the danger of Israelis” (interviewee 1). 
Moreover, unlike the rest of the country, the Syrian army in 1976 did not 
reach the area south of Saida, as they were asked by the Israeli army to stop 
their advancement (interviewee 1). Thus, in addition to still facing the threat 
posed by Lebanon’s southern neighbour Israel, the most-southern part of 
Lebanon was not occupied by the Syrian army in 1976 – an occupation that 
had curtailed militia operations in other parts of the country (interviewee 1). 
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As a consequence, the numbers of female (and male) militants in the South 
did not decrease until the mid-1980s when a new actor emerged in the 
conflict arena in Lebanon – the Shia-Islamist Hezbollah, which attracted 
many former (Shia) LCP members (interviewee 32). 
While for most members of the LNM, their involvement in the civil war was 
seen as a fight for a new socio-political order and for the rights of 
Palestinians and other marginalised groups, the Christian militias perceived 
their fight as a response to an existential threat (interviewees 2, 7, 11, 14, 
15, 16, 18, 19, 25, 41, 44, 45, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66, see also Duplan and 
Raulin, 2015: 53-54). A family member of one of the senior leaders of Kataeb 
at the beginning of the war stressed that the organisation and its 
constituency felt threatened by both internal and external actors: “We felt 
threatened, that’s why we founded the militias. There was no country in the 
direct neighbourhood of Lebanon that was not problematic to us” 
(interviewee 41). The fact that several interviewees criticised this perception 
and instead stressed that the Christian community was never at risk of 
extinction, and that this narrative was used by political leaders in order to 
mobilise the community (interviewees 1, 28, 56, 59), does not make a 
difference in this context, as it is the subjective threat perception which 
affected the militias’ decision-making. Unlike in the case of the militias 
associated with the LNM, the Christian militias were not experiencing any 
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major junctures that would have had a similar effect on the involvement of 
female fighters in the way the Israeli invasion did for the LNM militias; except 
for perhaps the Mountain War, when (according to some interviewees) the 
number of female fighters rose again (interviewees 7, 19). As a result, the 
involvement of women in the Christian militias did not follow a cycle similar 
to the one described above with regards to the LNM militias, but rather the 
number of female members continued to increase (interviewees 11, 44, 55). 
That being said, women’s involvement as fighters reached a peak during the 
first round of the war from 1975 to 1977 (interviewees 14, 18, 25, 44, 57, 60, 
see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 110, 112, 115). In addition to the 
organisational reasons discussed in Chapter Five, this decrease in female 
fighters in the Christina militias after 1976/77 can be explained by an effect 
that the security context had on the organisational structure. When 
outbreak of the war caused a sudden imminent threat, it triggered the 
formation of loosely organised armed cells – often comprising of family 
members, neighbours and classmates who had participated in protests and 
other political activities together before the war (interviewees 2, 22, 25, 41, 
44, 45, 56, 59, 66; see also Sneifer, 2006, El Murr, 2014, Duplan and Raulin, 
2015). This situation in the often chaotic and unpredictable first days and 
months of the war opened a window of opportunity for women to get 
involved as fighters (interviewees 2, 18, 19, 26, 31, 41, 44, 54). Later, an 
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increased organisation and formalisation of the militias caused the numbers 
of female fighters to decrease (interviewees 2, 15, 44, 55, 56, 57, 65). When 
I asked a member of Kataeb why Kataeb leaders – not all of whom were in 
favour of including female fighters (as discussed in Chapter Five) – agreed 
with the involvement of female fighters during these first months of the war, 
she stated: 
 
Because they were women of Kataeb. It was not a decision of 
the leaders, but coming from the grassroots. They joined their 
families, in the neighbourhoods. […] The militia was not an 
organised troop (interviewee 44). 
 
In the case of Amal, it was the invasion of southern Lebanon by the Israeli 
army which paved the way for the inclusion of female fighters. Women had 
not been involved in combat roles during previous stages of the war. They 
had not been included as fighters against any of the Lebanese and 
Palestinian militias fighting in Lebanon, but were first employed against 
Israel after its army invaded Lebanon in 1978 (interviewees 50, 63). Those 
interviewees who were associated with Amal made a clear distinction 
between the civil war (which for them included all inner-Lebanese and -
Palestinian fighting) and the fight against Israel, which they saw as a separate 
struggle – one which, in principle, is still ongoing today (interviewees 50, 63). 
While large parts of the civil war were perceived as a struggle over interests 
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between different communities, the fight against Israel was seen as a fight 
against an “outside attacker who wanted to kill us, take our territory” 
(interviewee 50). One Amal member described the difference as follows: 
 
[In the fight against other Lebanese and Palestinian militias, 
t]here was no need for that (the inclusion of female fighters), 
we had our military, we had our guys. Most fights, we were 
winning, so we don’t need more people […] It was not like 
against Israel where we made [let] all people, child, woman, 
old people fight […] Until now, all people know that if they 
have to fight, they will fight. The population of Amal has 
mentioned that they have to resist. So if they are attacked, 
they will resist. Musa Sadr was against the Lebanese civil war, 
but he said resist against Israel by all means, even if only with 
boiling oil (interviewee 50). 
 
In other words, fighting an external occupier warranted special measures, 
especially since this occupier was seen as “the absolute Evil” and the 
resistance was framed in religious terms and advocated for by Musa Sadr, 
the organisation’s spiritual leader (interviewees 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 50, 58, 63). The inclusion of female fighters was perceived as providing 
the organisation with a tactical advantage since, at least at the beginning of 
the hostilities, Israel did not expect women to be involved in combat 
(interviewee 50). 
Lastly, the case of the PSP illustrates how without the perceived need to 
counter an imminent threat to the organisation and its constituency, the 
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inclusion of women was not considered necessary by the militia. I have 
shown in Chapter Four that, at the beginning of the war, similarly to other 
members of the LNM, members of the PSP fought for a new socio-political 
order and the interests of marginalised communities in Lebanon 
(interviewee 42, 51, 53). Later, especially in the Mountain War, the fight 
turned very much into a struggle for “country, family and also religion” 
(interviewee 42, see also interviewee 7, 8). In such a fight, there was no place 
for female fighters, as it is hard to argue that you are fighting for your family 
when you are not actually protecting them, as one interviewee put it 
(interviewee 8). As far as threat perception is concerned, the PSP’s militias 
were not under extreme pressure for much of the war, as the bulk of the 
frontline fighting to protect the community was carried out by the PSP’s 
Palestinian allies (interviewee 65, see also Traboulsi, 2012). Several 
interviewees stressed the difference between different regions in this 
context. For example, in the Shouf (an area that was only afflicted by open 
fighting for a few years from the summer of 1982), women’s participation in 
the PSP’s militias was more limited than in the Matn region (where constant 
fighting took place for most of the war) (interviewees 7, 9, 10). It is telling 
that it was in the Matn that several women close to the PSP formed their 
own fighting unit (interviewees 7, 9, 10), as this was where the perceived 
threat was the highest. Similarly, in many villages surrounded by the 
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Lebanese Forces / Kataeb and the Israeli army during the Mountain War, 
women contributed to the fight, as recounted by this interviewee, a former 
male fighter with the PSP:  
 
An incident happened in August 1983. The Israelis got into the 
village to look for some guys to arrest them. The women 
clashed with the Israelis and didn’t let the men out. This was 
much more powerful as the Israelis can’t attack them [the 
women]. The Israelis injured some of the women, but they 
[the women] prevented them from taking the men. One of 
the women took her AK47 and shot the Israelis. The Israelis 
were embarrassed and withdrew. Those women were not 
fighters or trained, but their sons were fighters with PSP or 
other militias (interviewee 9). 
 
These examples illustrate that even in the PSP where women were not 
formally allowed to join the militia as fighters, individual involvement in 
combat activities occurred when the perceived threat demanded it. 
 
6.2 | Seeking attention  
 
In an extreme security environment with high external pressure, garnering 
attention can be crucial to non-state armed groups’ survival and success 
(Bloom, 2005). Indeed, political violence (especially when directed against 
civilians or highly symbolic targets) is often as much about making a 
statement as it is about inflicting physical damage (Drake, 1998). The 
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intended targets of such a statement (or message) can include current or 
potential sympathisers and supporters, opponents and (potential) victims as 
well as rival groups. They can either be targeted on a local level (in the area 
where the conflict takes place) or on a national, regional or international 
level, which is when the media and other transnational networks takes 
significance. To many non-state armed groups, public attention to their 
cause is important at all times. However, this need for attention often 
increases during times of extreme security circumstances, when a non-state 
armed group's tactical options are curtailed (Bloom, 2005). For example, if a 
bigger campaign of violence cannot be conducted due to limited mobility of 
male operatives or lack of other resources, it might be an option to spread 
fear via different media outlets instead. A rise in public sympathies can help 
to raise funding or garner other forms of external support (Bloom, 2005). 
The use of unconventional or symbolically loaded targets or perpetrators is 
then often a logical step in the attempt to attract the attention of the media, 
public and other groups (Drake, 1998, Bloom, 2005). 
The claim that one of the reasons why non-state armed actors decide to 
employ women in combat is the increased attention that female fighters 
garner is made in many publications on female political violence (Ali, 2005, 
Bloom, 2005: 144, Knop, 2007: 400-401, Speckhard, 2008, Zedalis 2008: 50, 
57). For example, Bloom (2007: 7) claims that female non-state combatants 
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“receive eight times the media coverage” than their male counterparts – a 
phenomenon described elsewhere as the “CNN factor” (Ali 2005).  
The extent to which attempts to gain attention played a role in the militias’ 
decision-making on the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese civil 
war was discussed controversially by the participants in this study. Notably, 
there was a clear contrast between how (former) members of the Christian 
militias perceived the inclusion of women in their groups and how their 
(former) opponents viewed this issue. Many members of the Christian 
groups denied that their organisations had strategically used female fighters 
for the advancement of their groups’ aims (interviewees 11, 16, 19, 22, 23, 
44). However, many former militia members associated with the LNM 
disagreed and reproached the Christian militias for the disproportional 
media attention their female members garnered (interviewees 6, 7, 18, 46, 
48, 54). Describing the media attention the female fighters in the Christian 
militias had amassed (and particularly those in Kataeb), several interviewees 
formerly affiliated with LNM groups even spoke of “a spectacle”, “a show”, 
a “mise-en-scène” (interviewees 6, 18, 46). Jocelyne Khoueiry (a particularly 
popular female fighter and commander with Kataeb, and later the LF) was 
at the centre of much of this attention, and pictures of her holding a weapon 
were reprinted in magazines and newspapers worldwide (interviewees 6, 7, 
11, 18). This was criticised by several formerly LNM-affiliated interviewees, 
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who claimed that the depiction of Christian female fighters in the press was 
disproportional to their actual involvement in the fight, especially when 
compared with the militias of the far-left (interviewees 6, 7, 18, 46, 48). 
Several interviewees formerly associated with Christian militias stressed that 
– contrary to claims made by their former opponents – they did not have the 
time to develop media strategies to garner the public’s attention as they 
were fighting for their survival (interviewees 11, 16, 19). Two former 
members of Kataeb and the LF pointed to the role of the media, claiming it 
was them rather than the party or militia who put the spotlight on female 
fighters (interviewees 11, 19). It is likely that this was indeed the case and 
that the media attention garnered by female fighters in the Christian groups 
was not necessarily planned by the militias as a whole. Nevertheless, the 
militias benefitted from the attention garnered by their female fighters, as 
they supported the image of Kataeb which some leaders, such as Bashir 
Gemayel, tried to convey. There is some evidence supporting the claim that 
Bashir Gemayel in particular deliberately used the image of female Kataeb 
members in order to promote a progressive and determined image of the 
party, as will be discussed below. 
While female fighters in some of the Palestinian groups operating in 
Lebanon also garnered some media attention (Leila Khaled is a notorious 
example), the focus on women in Kataeb (and later the LF) was unparalleled. 
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Female fighters in Amal were not featured in the media as, their 
participation was kept secret by the militia for security reasons (interviewee 
63). Therefore, the following analysis will mostly focus on how Kataeb and 
the LF benefitted from the media’s and public’s attention on the role of 
female fighters in the militia.  
Regardless of whether or not the images and stories of female fighters were 
deliberately spread by Kataeb in order to garner media attention, de facto 
an increased interest in the women fighting in the war (and especially in the 
Christian militias) was the outcome. Intended or not, this helped make and 
promote three statements about Kataeb (and later, the Lebanese Forces): 
(1) “we are modern”, (2) “we are determined”, and (3) “we are vulnerable”. 
Moreover, the participation of female fighters was used to (4) encourage 
men to join the fight. This last factor played a role in all militias, and not just 
the Christian organisations. I will discuss these four messages below. 
The most important message sent by the inclusion of female fighters in 
Kataeb (and later the LF) was the Christian community’s alleged modernity 
and progressiveness, which was evidenced by the inclusion of women. As 
discussed in the previous chapter on organisational characteristics, the 
ideology of Kataeb was influenced by both traditional and more progressive 
ideals, which were reflected in how the role of women in the party and the 
community was perceived. As one interviewee stressed, Kataeb upheld an 
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“extremely contradictory discourse”. On the one hand, they presented 
themselves as the “avant-garde of modernity”, whilst on the other, they 
promoted a “very conservative society” and were “very hierarchical” 
(interviewee 18). Including female fighters was a way to demonstrate 
unequivocally how modern and progressive Christians in Lebanon were, and 
how liberated their women supposedly were (interviewees 6, 7, 18, 46). 
These images were directed at the Christian militias, their supporters and 
opponents, but also at the wider public, including international audiences. 
According to one interviewee, highlighting the role of women in the militia 
was a way to show potential supporters in the West that “we are similar to 
you, our women are equal” (interviewee 18). It was also a way to stress the 
supposed difference between them and other groups: “Christians wanted to 
use women to show that they were more progressive than the Muslims” 
(interviewee 7). Attempts to change the image of Kataeb in order to “convey 
a progressive image to the West” (and possibly also local audiences) seem 
to have been ordered from above when Bashir Gemayel started steering the 
party in that direction after the end of the first round of fighting in 1978 
(interviewee 7). 
The second most important message sent by the inclusion of female fighters 
was the group’s determination. This is an aspect that has been widely 
described in the existing literature (Ali 2005, Knop, 2007: 401, Speckhard, 
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2008, Zedalis, 2008: 62). By using women, the group stresses its 
determination and its lack of fear to break societal taboos. It shows that it is 
willing to sacrifice all that it has, and to do all that it takes to defeat the 
enemy. By including women – members of society who are traditionally 
considered peaceful and non-violent, nurturing and life-giving (Gentry and 
Sjoberg, 2015), the group demonstrates that a new level of determination, 
and with it a new level of danger, has been reached. The message is that 
danger comes from everywhere – even those parts of society you would 
least expect it from. The aim (and outcome) of this strategy is to 
demonstrate to the group’s opponents that violence “has moved beyond a 
fringe phenomenon and insurgents are all around you” (Bloom, 2005: 144). 
Including female fighters in their militias was a way for the Christian 
community to show their strength (interviewee 46). It was a way of saying 
“yes, we can” and a way to stress that the militia “can mobilise another fifty 
percent of the population” (interviewee 7). In this context, how Lebanese 
Christians were perceived by some of their Lebanese and Palestinian 
opponents played a major role. One interviewee explained how, in Lebanon 
at the time, “Muslims looked down on Christians as mushy-gushy. Bashir 
Gemayel wanted them to be ferocious, he wanted to show that even the 
women kill” (interviewee 7, see also interviewee 15 and Sneifer, 2006, 45-
46). 
242 
 
The third most important message when including female fighters is 
targeted at male sympathisers, supporters and members of the armed 
group. Several existing publications describe how female fighters’ 
participation is used by armed groups in order to motivate men to join 
(Cunningham, 2003: 183, Bloom, 2005: 144-145; Bloom, 2011: 210). The 
message to the men is that a woman had to take up arms because the men 
who were supposed to fight in her stead did not deliver. During the civil war 
in Lebanon, this aspect played a role in most of the militias involved in the 
fighting. Women’s participation in combat motivated both existing male 
fighters as well as potential members of the groups. As a former male 
member of Kataeb (and later the Lebanese Forces) explained: 
 
The presence of women helped to alleviate the bad 
atmosphere when only boys are around. They gave a good 
example. They were good fighters and motivated the men to 
be as good as them or even better. They were a push for the 
morale (interviewee 2, see also interviewees 11, 45, 55). 
 
The same was reported by members of other groups, including the LCP, 
Fatah, PFLP and the SSNP, and by interviewees not associated with any of 
the militias. Women’s participation as fighters encouraged men to join, 
either out of guilt or because they enjoyed the women’s company 
(interviewees 12, 17, 22, 24, 54, 64).  
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A fourth message sent by the inclusion of female fighters focuses on the 
severity of the situation and the high threat the group is faced with. While 
this message is linked to the previous one, its emphasis lies on the 
vulnerability of the non-state armed group. By including women, the group 
stresses how much pressure it is under, in order to convince (potential) 
sympathisers and supporters to stand with the group and its cause. Similar 
to the previous message, it is the stark contrast between traditional gender 
norms and expectations on the one hand and the role women assume as 
members of the non-state armed group on the other that is intended to 
garner increased attention. Bloom describes this in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, where she claims Palestinian armed groups benefit from 
the attractiveness of many of their female suicide bombers. The idea behind 
this is that pictures of these attractive women will prompt outsiders to ask, 
“What could make such a pretty girl do that? There must be something 
seriously wrong” (Bloom, 2011: 218). Thus, by confronting the observer with 
the unexpected and by demonstrating that in this conflict even the women 
are taking up arms, the group highlights the severity of the conflict, the 
pressure the society these individuals stem from are subjected to, and the 
cruelty of the opponent, which lead even the (supposedly) most innocent 
and peace-loving members of society to commit violence. This factor was 
not evoked by most interviewees; however, one former male fighter 
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contended that the fact that women (and children) were present was used 
when they were bombed by opponent groups (interviewee 48).  
Lastly, it is important to note that as vital as media attention can be to non-
state armed groups and their causes, reporting on a group's attitudes and 
activities does not always have the intended effects of garnering support and 
spreading fear. Particularly when implementing unconventional measures, 
the reaction from outside the core group can also be sceptical or even 
hostile. For example, when a non-state armed group includes female fighters 
due to an extreme security environment, this is does sometimes receive 
severe criticism and clear disapproval by the host community. This aspect 
will be looked at in more detail in Chapter Seven.  
 
6.3 | Asserting a position 
 
In many conflicts involving non-state armed actors, more than one non-state 
organisation conducts violent activities targeting the same opponent. It has 
been argued that this constellation of competing or rival players in a given 
security context also affects the decision-making of non-state violent actors: 
 
One important feature of this approach is the assumption 
that the various players in the game coexist in a reciprocal 
operational relationship (Schelling, 1978). A competitor’s best 
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move, in this case, is a function of the prior and anticipated 
moves of his opponents and allies, and it varies accordingly. 
What this implies, for our purposes, is that a terrorist [sic] 
group’s decision to act (or not act) – a decision that includes 
its choice of targets, tactics, and timing—is influenced by the 
decisions of its opponents, of its political constituency, and of 
any other actors that influence its strategic environment” 
(McCormick, 2003: 481-482). 
 
There is a substantial body of literature on intergroup competition and 
cooperation, which specifically looks at non-state armed organisations. 
Horowitz and Potter (2014) for example, claim that intergroup cooperation 
can increase group capacity and notably a group's ability to carry out more 
lethal attacks. Others, such as Drake (1998: 76) and Cunningham (2003: 172) 
stress that non-state violent groups learn from each other – either indirectly 
by observing and imitating, or directly through training. In the previous 
chapters, I discussed the extent to which the militias involved in the 
Lebanese civil war learned from one another regarding the involvement of 
female fighters. I showed that external influence and support by other 
armed actors played a considerable role – mostly for the Lebanese militias 
of the left who were inspired by the role of the woman in the Palestinian 
revolution.  
Where intergroup competition is concerned, non-state armed groups are 
said to strive to distinguish themselves from competing organisations, in 
order to assert their position in a field of competing players (Crenshaw, 
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1987: 24, Oots 1989: 148). This is important for group survival and success, 
as groups strive to prevent defection of their members to rival groups and 
attempt to gain, and maintain, the support of (potential) sympathisers, allies 
and supporters (Crenshaw, 1987: 24, Oots, 1989: 148). Non-state armed 
groups always depend on (some level of) outside support, but this need 
tends to increase in situations of group competition (Oots, 1989: 148). In this 
context, several scholars point to the dynamics between different groups 
trying to outbid each other, by “build[ing] support and advertis[ing] against 
domestic rivals” (Findley and Young, 2012: 706). According to outbidding 
theory, non-state armed groups may be incited to opt for higher levels and 
more drastic forms of violence in situations of group competition or rivalry 
(Bloom, 2005: 94; see also McCormick, 2003: 488). The outbidding theory is 
particularly prevalent in the literature on suicide terrorism (see, for example, 
Bloom, 2004: 94-97, Hafez, 2007). Others suggest that outbidding is a 
general strategy of all non-state armed groups (Young and Dugan, 2014). 
When applied to the inclusion of female fighters in the context of a conflict 
involving multiple competing non-state armed actors, according to 
outbidding theory, the competing groups would mutually incite one another 
to employ women in combat. 
However, this was not the case during the civil war in Lebanon with regards 
to recruitment of female fighters. Outbidding between rival groups did not 
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lead to an increased inclusion of female members in general nor to the 
inclusion of female fighters in particular. Instead, women were included in 
the groups of the far-left because it was part of their gender ideology, and 
in the Christian and some Palestinian groups (such as Fatah) because there 
was a window of opportunity due to the security pressures discussed in the 
first section of this chapter, which motivated women to assume combat 
roles. This finding supports criticisms of outbidding theory in existing 
literature on non-state political violence. For example, in an extensive 
analysis of global terrorism between 1970 and 2004, Findley and Young 
conclude that the outbidding theory is not supported by their empirical 
findings: 
 
The logic [of the outbidding theory] suggests that in multi-
party conflicts, each group needs to differentiate itself from 
others in order to attract supporters. Accordingly, where 
more insurgent groups engage in armed conflict with the 
state, we should expect more suicide terrorism and perhaps 
more terrorism. [… However, w]e find scant support for the 
idea that the number of insurgent groups increases the 
likelihood of suicide terror and no support for the notion that 
outbidding increases terrorism generally (Findley and Young, 
2012: 707). 
 
Findley and Young stress that outbidding theory was partially developed 
from studying the conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups, and 
conclude that it might be specific to that case. They argue that “Israel is 
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unique for many reasons, such as heavy third-party involvement in the 
region by major powers that may make the dynamics in Israel quite different 
from other cases” (Findley and Young, 2012: 720). In fact, others have 
questioned the validity of the outbidding theories even for the case of 
Israel/Palestine. Brym and Araj in particular criticised the theory as overly 
simplifying, generalising and too focused on single causes (Brym and Araj, 
2008: 499-500). Instead, they call for “multivariate models that account for 
variation over time and place” (Brym and Araj, 2008: 500).  
The militias involved in the Lebanese civil war did not include female fighters 
to distinguish themselves from competing groups. Women’s participation as 
fighters was used by the various militias to assert their position, yet on a 
different level. The militias used female involvement in combat to stress 
their ideological stance as opposed to the (alleged) position of their 
enemies. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Christian militias were 
accused by members of the leftist groups of including women to prove their 
alleged modernity and progressiveness in relation to their (mostly) Muslim 
opponents. For the leftist groups that employed female fighters, the 
inclusion of women in combat roles was a way to stress their belief in 
secularism and gender equality. In the case of Amal and the PSP, the 
exclusion of women from combat roles provided them with an opportunity 
to stress how highly valued women were to them – so highly valued in fact 
249 
 
that they would protect them from any direct involvement in combat 
activities whenever possible. This latter approach was described in existing 
literature. Alison (2009) claims that in a situation of group competition with 
varying degrees of female inclusion in the various organisations, female 
involvement in some groups can lead to female participation being shunned 
by the group's rivals or opponents. She explains this dynamic in the case of 
the conflict in Northern Ireland: 
 
It is possible that part of the loyalist resistance to women's 
full participation in paramilitaries was due to the fact that 
women were known to be fully active in republican 
paramilitaries. As in any nationalist conflict, the opposing 
groups in Northern Ireland construct themselves in 
opposition to the other. Thus women's involvement as 
combatants may have been seen by loyalists as being too 
radical, too revolutionary, too much against the grain of 
prevailing gender relations, too feminist – and too republican 
(Alison, 2009: 228). 
 
Whilst it is not entirely impossible that this played a role in the militias‘ 
decision-making on whether or not to include female fighters during the 
Lebanese civil war, it was certainly not one of the main reasons. Threat 
perception, as discussed above, clearly seems to have been a much more 
important motivational factor.  
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6.4 | Avoiding detection  
 
Lastly, one of the most commonly found explanations for the inclusion of 
female fighters in non-state armed groups is that it allows illegal 
organisations to avoid detection. The deployment of female operatives in 
order to avoid detection in an extreme security environment has been 
documented with reference to a number of conflict contexts, including (but 
not limited to) Israel/Palestine (Cunningham, 2003: 184-185; Bloom, 2005: 
143-144; Bloom, 2011: 129), Northern Ireland (Bloom, 2011: 88-89), and Sri 
Lanka (Bloom, 2011: 141).  
Avoiding detection can be crucial in a situation in which the security context 
causes extreme external pressure to non-state armed actors. In many violent 
conflicts, such a situation arises when the non-state group’s opponents have 
far-reaching control over the territory, in which the conflict is taking place, 
and successfully implement strategies countering their military adversaries. 
Such a security environment often severely restricts the mobility of male 
operatives in non-state armed groups. The employment of female fighters, 
in turn, can provide non-state armed organisations with a decisive tactical 
advantage. As Bloom argued, “[t]he use of the least-likely suspect is the 
most-likely tactical adaption for a terrorist group under scrutiny” (Bloom, 
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2005: 144).25 In such a context, when male mobility is either highly limited 
by checkpoints and security controls or even completely curtailed, female 
operatives can often move more freely and avoid detection. This can be 
explained by two reasons: prevailing gender stereotypes and cultural 
sensitivities. 
Traditionally, in most societies, women are considered to be more prone to 
peace and non-violence and to be less likely to engage in violent (let alone 
combat) activities than men (Cunningham, 2003, Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015, 
Henshaw, 2016). Even in societies, which are relatively gender-open, where 
both men and women assume active roles in public and political life, women 
still often tend to be seen as the weaker, more gentle and less violent gender 
(Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). In situations of violent conflict and war, women 
are often perceived to be victims of violence, while their role as perpetrators 
or inciters of violent activities is largely overlooked (Cunningham, 2003: 
172). When employing female combatants, many non-state armed 
organisations capitalise on these notions of assumed female non-violence. 
The groups exploit “gender expectations that revolve around the idea that 
females by nature are averse to committing violence” (Ness, 2008a: 18). In 
some cases, women pretend to be pregnant while hiding weapons under 
                                                          
25 This is why for many non-state violent groups who employ women, the next step 
is to use very old or young women, in some cases even children, to achieve the same effect 
(Bloom, 2011: 214). 
252 
 
concealing clothes (Cunningham, 2003: 172). Using these gender 
stereotypes to a non-state armed group’s advantage tends to be even more 
effective in situations in which the women in question belong to a religious 
or ethnic minority, which is perceived to be “oppressed”, as these women 
tend to be seen as having even less agency (Cunningham, 2003: 172). In such  
situations, it is both gender-related and ethno-religious stereotypes that are 
exploited by the armed group.  
The second reason female fighters are often more likely to avoid detection 
than men is cultural sensitivities around gender and women prevailing in 
many societies (Cunningham, 2003: 172). In many countries, it is not 
acceptable for male security members to body-search women. However, 
female staff at checkpoints in conflict-afflicted zones continue to be the 
exception rather than the norm. This leaves female fighters with a distinct 
tactical advantage, which has been described with regards to a number of 
violent conflicts worldwide. Bloom, for example, describes how during the 
2003 Iraq war, cultural sensitivities provided female operatives of non-state 
armed groups with clear tactical advantages (2011: 210).  
Interestingly, even though avoidance of detection is mentioned as one of the 
main reasons for the inclusion of female fighters in existing literature, this 
factor was not seen as a key aspect in women’s participation as fighters by 
most interviewees in Lebanon. Some categorically denied that it played any 
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role (interviewees 6, 8, 18, 19, 21). This was most likely due to geopolitical 
factors and the nature of the conflict. For most of the war, especially in 
Beirut (but also in other parts of the country), the opposing camps were 
clearly separated. “There wasn’t the other camp that one had to penetrate”, 
a former female military commander in one of the groups of the far-left 
contended, “you’d divide up a region, there were demarcation lines” 
(interviewee 6). A former female commander in Kataeb was of the same 
view. She described their fight as classical combat between two camps 
divided by clear lines and stressed that most of the time they were wearing 
uniforms during combat duty (interviewee 19). This division along 
demarcation lines brought with it the advantage of having a safe space to 
retreat to. The lack of such a sanctuary has been described as one of the 
main reasons why non-state armed groups replace male operatives with 
female fighters. Geographical factors have been described as being of 
particular relevance in this context, as avoiding detection becomes more 
difficult in certain types of terrain. Inaccessible mountain areas or barely 
penetrable rainforests, for example, can serve as particularly effective 
sanctuaries for non-state groups operating in the area. Such safe spaces can 
be hard to access and navigate by opposing groups, especially if their 
members are not familiar with the area. If non-state armed actors have 
access to a safe space, it has been argued, the employment of non-
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traditional operatives (such as women) is less likely, as the tactical advantage 
their inclusion would provide is peripheral (Dearing, 2010: 1084). 
Dearing illustrates this claim by comparing the dynamics between US and 
international forces and non-state armed organisations operating in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (2010: 1085). In Afghanistan, international forces were 
much less successful in countering non-state armed actors than in Iraq. 
Dearing explains this with a lack of military resources and a focus on 
provincial centres in Afghanistan, which allowed non-state military actions 
outside these centres to go widely undetected (2010: 1085). In Afghanistan, 
the tactical disadvantage of the international forces (due to the lack of 
control over the territory) was exacerbated by geographical characteristics 
of the region. The extremely long, highly permeable and difficult-to-control 
Afghani-Pakistani border, for example, provided the insurgents with a 
considerable advantage. Neighbouring Pakistan served as a secure refuge, 
from which logistical, financial and moral support was provided. Moreover, 
vast parts of the inner-Afghani landscape were also in favour of the militants: 
 
Many […] routes into, outside and around the country are 
unchartered territory to outside observers, yet have been in 
use for hundreds, if not thousands of years. The leverage is on 
the insurgent’s side as he can easily maneuver around 
counterinsurgents, conduct smallscale ambushes, snipe from 
higher terrain, or leave improvised explosive devices in areas 
difficult to detect (Dearing, 2010: 1084). 
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Thus, since the mobility of male fighters remained largely unrestricted, 
resorting to non-traditional, female, combatants was not considered a 
necessity. Meanwhile, non-state armed organisations in Iraq did not enjoy 
the same operational advantage. The desert landscape of much of the 
country made it much easier for the international forces fighting local 
insurgents to gain control over the territory. This hugely restricted the 
mobility of male operatives of non-state armed organisations. In an attempt 
to balance out this tactical disadvantage, non-state armed groups in Iraq 
resorted to a type of fighter more likely to avoid detection than the groups' 
male operatives: women. 
In Lebanon, due to the nature of the conflict and the fact that, in large parts 
of the country, the non-state armed groups involved in the war were soon 
divided by demarcation lines, involving female fighters in order to avoid 
detection was not as high on the agenda as was in Iraq, for example. While 
avoiding detection was not a major reason for the deployment of female 
fighters, it did play a role in the inclusion of women in non-combat roles in 
the non-state armed groups operating in Lebanon during the war. This was 
stressed by many interviewees (interviewees 6, 7, 14, 19, 22, 37, 38, 39, 54, 
58; see also Bechara, 2003: 47). Women were involved in intelligence and 
information gathering (interviewees 6, 7, 19), they drove cars (interviewee 
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6; Bechara, 2003: 47), helped move weapons (interviewees 22, 58), and 
conveyed messages (interviewee 14). By using women to smuggle weapons, 
the militias exploited both cultural sensitivities and dominant gender 
stereotypes. A former male fighter with far-left and Palestinian groups 
explained his groups’ tactics as follows:  
 
During the Israeli invasion in Lebanon, for most of our 
messages to contact fighters et cetera, I used to send women. 
Because sometimes it is hard for the Israelis to stop a woman. 
The community will be against them and if it’s a woman, 
nobody will suspect anything (interviewee 14). 
 
A former male fighter who used to fight with the LCP and Fatah confirmed 
that, “[m]ost of the roles that were given to women were in intelligence, 
because their movement was much easier. They could pass through 
checkpoints much easier without raising suspicion” (interviewee 17; see also 
Bechara, 2003: 47). Women were also involved in hiding and moving 
weapons. One interviewee described how female members of Amal would 
hide weapons under their abayahs (interviewee 58). This tactic was also 
described by a former (male) LCP leader from the South who recounted how 
“women were used as tools against the Israelis, because she was not 
searched and could smuggle stuff like explosives” (interviewee 54). 
Stereotypes around motherhood were also employed to mislead opponents, 
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as a former CAO fighter, who remembered how he and his wife hid weapons 
under his new-born baby’s clothes in 1991, recounted (interviewee 22). On 
the other hand, several of the members of Amal I interviewed stated that 
the tactical advantage provided by including female operatives against the 
Israeli army diminished in the later stages of the conflict with Israel, as the 
Israeli soldiers realised that women, too, were part of the resistance 
(interviewees 37, 38, 39). As a consequence, hundreds of Lebanese women 
in the South were captured, imprisoned and tortured in prisons run by the 
Israelis and their local allies (interviewees 37, 38). 
Lastly, the case of Soha Bechara, a female member of the LCP emerged in 
many of the discussions I had on this question of avoiding detention in 
Lebanon. Soha Bechara infiltrated the house of Antoine Lahad (the leader of 
the Southern Lebanon Army, a right-wing Christian militia in the South) and 
tried to assassinate him (Bechara, 2003). However, several interviewees 
stressed that Soha Bechara not only had the tactical advantage of being a 
woman, but she was also Christian, which, in the view of several 
interviewees, contributed Antoine Lahad and his entourage’s perception 
that she was less dangerous by (interviewees 6, 17). This points to the 
importance of a multi-factor multi-level analysis, which takes into account 
not just gender, but also other factors intersecting with it, such as religion, 
ethnicity, race, age and others.  
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6.5 | Conclusion 
 
When war broke out in Lebanon in 1975, women’s insistence to be included 
was the most important factor leading to female participation as fighters. 
Organisational factors then decided which militias immediately included 
women as combatants and which did not. In the case of those militias whose 
organisational characteristics were not conducive to the inclusion of female 
fighters, women’s participation was nevertheless made possible if the 
security context was perceived as extreme enough by the militias to justify 
the involvement of women.   
In Chapter Four, it was argued that the security context was the main reason 
for individuals to decide to join the war. Security pressures had a similar 
effect on organisations. They motivated individuals to join and created an 
opportunity for the women who wanted to get involved in the organisations 
beyond roles traditionally assumed by women. Exactly how the perception 
of these security pressures or threats were perceived differed from 
organisation to organisation. Whether these perceptions were an accurate 
reflection of the situation on the ground is not the issue, as perceptions were 
sufficient to motivate group decision-making. The groups of the far-left, such 
as the LCP, CAO and PFLP, and others, such as Fatah and PSP, saw their fight 
as a revolution. By definition, in a revolution, members of all parts of society 
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need to be involved – including those not usually directly involved in combat. 
The Christian militias, on the other hand, saw their struggle as a fight for 
survival. A numerical minority (both in Lebanon and in the wider region), 
they saw their communities and their interests threatened by the presence 
and activities of Palestinians on Lebanese soil, and by calls for a new socio-
political order made by Lebanese and Palestinian organisations operating in 
Lebanon. The relatively sudden outbreak of the war and the unpreparedness 
of the Christian militias especially created a window of opportunity for 
women to join their family members, friends and neighbours in the fight in 
their neighbourhoods. As for Amal, women were initially not included, for 
inner-group and ideological reasons. This changed when the security context 
changed considerably after the invasion of large parts of the south of 
Lebanon by the Israeli army in 1978. The fight against the external invader 
Israel, who was considered “the absolute Evil” by Amal founder Musa Sadr, 
led to Amal overcoming organisational barriers to the inclusion of female 
fighters. Women started to assume combat roles. In the case of the PSP, the 
threat perception was not sufficiently high to overcome organisational 
barriers to the inclusion of female fighters, as much of the fighting was 
delegated to Palestinian groups allied with the PSP.  
The need to take into account the evolving nature of the security context is 
highlighted by the varying numbers of involvement of female fighters over 
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time and in different locations. The increase of female fighters in the militias 
of the LNM in 1975, followed by a decrease after the Syrian invasion in 1976 
and a second increase in 1982, shows clearly how security pressures affected 
involvement figures. In contrast, numbers of female militants in Kataeb 
continued to rise as the group (and its constituency) did not experience a 
similar security juncture during the war – except perhaps for a short time, 
when pressures on the group were rising during the Mountain war. The 
number of female fighters in Kataeb did, nevertheless, decrease after the 
first round of fighting in 1976/77, when the temporary pause of fighting gave 
the militia an opportunity to reorganise. This reorganisation was followed by 
an increased exclusion of female fighters from frontline position. In Amal 
and in those LNM-affiliated groups operating in the South, numbers of 
female fighters were not subject to the same cycle of involvement as 
experienced by LNM groups operating in other parts of the country. This can 
be explained by the fact that due to the continuous presence of the Israeli 
army in the South of Lebanon, for those groups operating in the South, 
security pressures largely remained the same or even increased over time, 
and were not subject to as much change as they were in other parts of the 
country.  
According to the vast majority of interviewees, the inclusion of female 
fighters was not a necessity in military terms. Instead, in addition to 
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individual and organisational factors described in the two previous chapters, 
the militias who included women during the war did so for the following 
security-related factors: to seek the attention of current or potential 
members and supporters and to assert a position in the civil war. Avoiding 
detection and outbidding competitors (which are two factors emphasised in 
existing literature) did not play a major role in the inclusion of female 
fighters during the civil war. This was mostly due to the nature of the war 
and the fact that, very early on, large parts of the country were divided into 
territories under the control of one militia, with demarcation lines clearly 
separating it from areas under the control of their opponents. However, 
women were employed in non-combat roles, such as weapon smuggling or 
intelligence gathering, in order to avoid detection. While the outbidding 
theory was criticised by existing literature, the claim that female fighters are 
included in order to avoid detection remains widespread in most 
publications on female political violence. The findings of this thesis question 
the assumption that avoiding detection is a crucial factor in all conflict 
contexts in which female fighters are employed. Instead, the findings of this 
study highlight the need to take into account the specificity of each 
particular conflict context. 
Having examined the role that individual motivations, organisational 
characteristics and security-related factors played in organisational decision-
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making on the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese civil war, I 
will discuss the extent to which societal aspects influenced the militias’ 
decision-making during the war in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7 | Societal factors 
 
Non-state armed groups are not isolated actors. Even the most clandestine 
organisations operate in a strategic environment which influences and 
shapes their decision-making. As described in Chapter Six, one key aspect of 
this strategic context is the security situation an armed group operates in. 
Another is societal factors, and more specifically, attitudes within the 
community that the armed group perceives to be their constituency. This is 
critical since most non-state armed groups depend on the direct, indirect or 
(at the very least) tacit support of the community outside their organisation, 
and must therefore take common attitudes into account. As Drake notes:  
 
To a greater or lesser extent, a terrorist [sic] group depends 
upon the support of people who are not core members of 
their group, but who operate on its fringes or merely give it 
tacit support by withholding assistance from the group's 
opponents. […T]he world outside the terrorist group can 
prove to be very important to the terrorists (1998: 144). 
 
Social approval and cultural legitimacy “cannot be understated because 
these groups must have support to operate and survive” (Poloni-Staudinger 
and Ortbals, 2013: 89). In the long run, no non-state armed group can exist 
without at least minimal support by their constituency. The relationship 
between non-state armed groups and the community is thus of a reciprocal 
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nature, as stated by Drake in the case of terrorist groups (which applies in 
the same way to other non-state armed political organisations): “Whilst a 
terrorist group may wish to affect society, society can in turn affect the 
terrorist group” (Drake, 1998: 144).  
In practice, this relationship between the armed group and the community 
can take at least two forms (Drake, 1998: 148). If the community is in favour 
and supportive of certain forms of violence, their support can encourage the 
armed group to continue using or even escalate a certain strategy. If, on the 
other hand, the community disapproves of the violence, this can make the 
armed organisation reconsider it (Bloom, 2011: 25).  
This does not mean that non-state armed groups entirely respect all societal 
or communal attitudes, norms and expectations, but rather that there are 
very few organisations that can fully ignore such norms and attitudes. Non-
state armed groups usually override some societal norms, but respect or 
attempt to reframe others. The extent to which a non-state armed group 
follows public opinion has been claimed to depend on the degree to which 
the organisation relies on society’s moral (and financial) support (Drake, 
1998: 153). 
In consonance with this line of argumentation, existing literature on female 
political violence tends to assume that societal and communal factors are 
essential in the decision-making of non-state armed groups on the inclusion 
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of female fighters. This is believed to be the case because “[j]ust as women 
are members of the organization, they also belong to a family and social 
sphere” (Dearing, 2010: 1083). Communities often have specific 
expectations of women’s roles and activities and may be rebuked if the 
group’s activities diverge too much from these norms and expectations. In 
the existing literature on female participation in non-state armed groups, 
there is much focus on the ways in which societal factors constitute barriers 
to the inclusion of women in armed organisations. Some scholars claim that 
very gender-conservative societies, such as Afghanistan during the Taliban 
regime (where female participation in public life was limited to a minimum) 
tend to be more reluctant to allow female participation (Dearing, 2010). On 
the other hand, societal support is claimed to facilitate the inclusion of 
female fighters, even in otherwise relatively gender-conservative societies 
(Cunningham, 2003: 183-184, Bloom, 2005: 150, Ness, 2005: 365). Some 
contend that female participation in combat is encouraged in gender-
conservative societies, which see women as less valuable members of the 
community (Berko and Erez, 2007a, Berko and Erez, 2007b).  
In this chapter, I show how, during the civil war, many members of Lebanese 
society accepted female participation in combat roles, as the communities 
felt under pressure by the changing security context. Security pressures 
affected individual and organisational motivations, as discussed in Chapters 
266 
 
Four and Five. They also had a similar effect on societal and communal 
attitudes towards female participation in the war. A change in attitudes 
towards women’s roles in public life (which had started in the 1960s and was 
amplified by the war) further facilitated women’s inclusion in the militias, 
including in combat roles. However, despite these changes, Lebanon 
remained a relatively gender-conservative society. This impacted individual 
motivations; while some women were highly motivated to join the militias, 
others refrained from participating as female participation continued to be 
considered undesirable by large parts of society. It also had an impact on the 
militias who were trying to manoeuvre this situation by reframing female 
participation, and by transgressing some norms but respecting others. These 
findings largely support claims in the existing literature. However, they also 
stress that the specificity of each particular context needs to be taken into 
account, as it (1) influences which specific factors influence communal 
attitudes and (2) shapes exactly how non-state armed actors manage their 
relations with local communities. 
Societal and communal norms and expectations are, of course, neither 
monolithic nor static, but tend to be multi-layered and change over time. 
Local and generational differences often exist, and socio-economic factors 
such as class, education or religion may also play a role. Moreover, during 
the civil war, many Lebanese identified with a community (often defined in 
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sectarian and/or political terms) rather than the country as a whole. This 
sentiment was of notable significance to the Palestinian residents of 
Lebanon, for whom international alliances often were of particular 
importance. This complexity is the reason why in this chapter, I look at both 
communal and societal factors (which overlap at times and differ at others).  
Together with the security situation, societal factors shape the strategic 
context in which non-state armed organisations operate and make 
decisions. For reasons of clarity, I analyse the security environment and 
societal factors in two separate chapters. However, this is not to imply that 
the two are not often closely intertwined and overlapping.26 
The remaining part of this chapter consists of four sections. The first section 
looks at societal factors that facilitated the inclusion of female fighters in the 
militias operating during the Lebanese civil war. The second section looks at 
the ways in which societal factors inhibited female participation. In the third 
section, I discuss inter- and intra-community differences, and in the fourth 
section, I analyse the ways in which militias managed societal gender 
expectations. I show that society’s reluctance to fully embrace female 
participation in combat roles was one of the main reasons why the numbers 
of women in the militias (both in combat and supportive roles) was 
                                                          
26  For examples of how others have decided to present the multi-layered nature of 
the strategic context in which non-state armed groups’ decision-making on the inclusion of 
female fighters is shaped, see for example Dearing 2010: 1081 and Cunningham, 2003: 172. 
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considerably lower in the Lebanese civil war than in other armed conflicts 
described in the literature. 
 
7.1 | Facilitating factors 
 
Societal approval 
 
Many interviewees reported high levels of support in their communities 
(interviewees 6, 7, 11, 14, 23, 24, 25, 41, 45, 55, 59, 64, 66). One former 
female fighter in one of the smaller Christian militias recounted: 
 
[P]eople were proud to see the girls. At the checkpoints, on 
the barricades, the girls changed everything. They were more 
polite, they were more gentle, they talked to people 
differently. That’s why after a while we put the girls at the 
checkpoints (interviewee 11).  
 
A leader of another small Christian militia remembered how a father brought 
his two daughters – who were 18 and 19 years old – to the militia so that 
they could fight with them (interviewee 60). Several other interviewees also 
stated that whole families were fighting together, especially in the Christian 
militias during the first round of the war when much of the fighting was very 
community-based (interviewees 2, 11, 14, 19, 25, 41, 44, 45, 55, 56, 57, 60, 
66, see also Sneifer, 2006, El Murr, 2014, Duplan and Raulin, 2015). The fact 
269 
 
that family members often fought together in the first round of the war 
made it easier for some parts of the communities to accept female 
participation in the militias, as they felt reassured that fighting with their 
fathers, brothers and male cousins, their daughters and sisters were 
chaperoned (interviewees 19, 41). A male member of Kataeb explained how, 
the fact that the women were known to the community, facilitated their 
acceptance by the community. He remembered that in the beginning it was 
difficult for the community to accept female participation and that people 
would ask what these women were doing in the militias. However, once they 
recognised them as the daughter or sister of a member of the community, it 
was easier for them to accept the women’s involvement (interviewee 56). 
The same interviewee also believed that a major barrier was overcome when 
the Christian bourgeoisie decided to allow their women to participate in the 
fighting. “That was it, it was not just the common people any more, but the 
bourgeoisie”, he said, stressing how the acceptance of the middle and upper 
middle class was decisive in the overall acceptance of female involvement in 
the fighting (interviewee 56). 
Just like many interviewees formerly affiliated with one of the Christian 
militias, several former LNM militants also described high levels of support 
for the women fighting during the war (interviewees 14, 23, 29, 48). One 
female LCP militant who was trained, but did not fight, remembered how 
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the training took place at their house. A cousin and his friends trained her 
and a group of other girls including her sister (interviewee 47). Similarly, a 
former journalist who worked in Beirut during the war (where she claimed 
to have “met a lot of Palestinian female fighters”) stated that to her, “they 
seemed like esteemed, respected members of society” (interviewee 26). A 
former fighter with the PSP remembered how in his village, to this day, the 
contribution of the eleven women who got injured fighting the Israeli troops 
is commemorated every year (interviewee 9).  
However, several interviewees claimed that attitudes in the community 
regarding the inclusion of female fighters were divided (interviewees 6, 7, 
16, 19, 46). I will look at this in more detail in Section Three of this chapter.  
 
Societal changes 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanon was a society undergoing considerable 
change, especially (though not exclusively) in the urban centres of the 
country (Abisaab, 2010, Traboulsi, 2012). Women were increasingly joining 
the work force (Abisaab, 2010, Traboulsi, 2012). Working class women 
worked on the tobacco fields in the South and in factories, notably in Dahiye 
and Tell-el-Zatar in Beirut (interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 18, 21, 29, 30, see also 
Abisaab, 2010). They had also started to come to the cities from the villages, 
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to find work as helpers in better-off urban households (interviewee 21). 
Women were involved in strikes and other protest and gradually started to 
enter the political sphere (interviewees 12, 21, see also Abisaab, 2010). They 
were involved in charities and increasingly in political parties (interviewee 
32, 65). The leftist parties in particular (who were campaigning for socio-
economic change) were on the rise (interviewee 8, 22, 28, 32, 65). As one 
former female military commander in the LCP recalled, “people started to 
realise they have rights and can make demands, so everyone did [join], 
workers et cetera, and women started, too. Women [were] in all parties…” 
(interviewee 32). One interviewee remembered the strike in the Ghandour 
factory in 1972 (which was one of the biggest strikes at the time) and 
stressed that one of the killed strikers (Fatima Hawajja, an LCP member) was 
a woman (interviewee 21, see also Traboulsi, 2012). Middle class women, on 
the other hand, increasingly attended university and got a formal education 
(interviewees 9, 41). Many worked in administrative positions (interviewee 
2, 9, 25) or were involved in political working groups in schools or at 
universities (interviewee 41).  
As in other parts of the world, women’s entry into the work force and 
political sphere had consequences for gender norms and relations. As one 
former military commander in the CAO recalled: 
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The mood was an explosion of freedom and very liberal 
relations between men and women and [of] women breaking 
many societal rules […] From 1970 to ‘75, there was a very 
active social movement and women’s movement and a very 
active participation of women in the labour forces […] Society, 
by that time, had been shedding lots of traditions 
(interviewee 65). 
 
Several interviewees stressed how, they believed that, at the time, Lebanon 
was less culturally conservative than some parts of society are now 
(interviewee 22, 28, 41).  
To a certain extent, these changes in the 1960s and 1970s were as a 
response to a wider movement that had started in Europe after 1968 
(Eggert, forthcoming, 2018). Several interviewees mentioned the influence 
ideas and concepts reaching Lebanon from Europe and Northern America 
had at the time (interviewees 3, 11, 15, 19, 23, 31, 48). These cultural 
influences impacted both members of the Christian and leftist parties 
(interviewees 1, 3, 11, 19, 20, 41). However, for the leftist parties, regional 
developments and the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies in the fight against 
Israel, also played an important role. The failure of the army and the state in 
bringing about change was seen by some as a reinforcement of the notion 
that all parts of society, including women, had to get involved in the fight for 
change (interviewee 14). 
As one interviewee described it, these societal changes in Lebanon in the 
273 
 
1960s and 1970s were the “introduction, the precursor to the woman’s role 
in the civil war” (interviewee 21). This confirms claims in publications on 
other conflicts, which stress the link between women’s participation in 
public life and their likelihood to be included as fighters in non-state armed 
groups (Cunningham, 2003, Speckhard, 2008: 998-999, Dearing, 2010: 1081, 
1087-1089). 
 
Female participation in political parties 
 
One area in which women’s increasing participation in society manifested 
itself in Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s was in political parties (Abisaab, 
2010, Traboulsi, 2012). Women’s presence in the parties had at least three 
effects on women’s involvement in the militias during the war. First, it 
cleared the path for women to gain first-hand political experience in political 
activism which, as shown in Chapter Four, was an entry point for many 
women to the militias once the war broke out. Second, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, the existence of women’s units (which were a part of or closely 
associated with existing political parties) provided women with a further 
opportunity to gain experience in political campaigning and organisation. 
Third, female participation in the parties also helped to inform societal 
attitudes, as it further normalised women’s participation in political roles in 
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the eyes of the public. The shift from women’s involvement in non-violent 
political roles to their participation in violent political activities (though still 
a considerable shift) was not as enormous as it would have been had women 
not been involved in non-violent political activity prior to the war. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, female participation in non-violent political roles 
was described, both in existing literature on other conflict contexts and by 
research participants interviewed as part of this study, as a facilitating factor 
for women’s involvement in combat roles during war. In this context, 
women’s involvement in the party and societal attitudes towards their 
participation in political roles reinforce one another: the more women join 
political parties, the more their participation is normalised in the 
community. This, in turn, further decreases societal barriers for women’s 
involvement in the party.  
Women were involved in all parties before the war, but their percentage 
may have been the highest in the parties of the far left – such as the LCP, 
PFLP and CAO (interviewees 1, 22, 31, 32, 62). The LCP, in particular, had a 
pioneering role in the fight for women’s rights and gender equality prior to 
the war (interviewees 1, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32). Though the situation of women 
in the LCP was certainly not perfect (interviewees 6, 31) and women were 
underrepresented in leadership roles (interviewees 1, 31, 32), female 
militants were involved at all levels (interviewees 1, 18, 31, 32). One 
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interviewee recalled how in some of the pre-war political groups and 
committees in schools and at universities that were associated with the LCP, 
the number of women was higher than the number of men (interviewee 22). 
In the Christian parties in general, and Kataeb in particular, women were also 
involved in relatively high numbers in the party before the war (interviewees 
2, 11, 41, 44). Like in the parties of the far-left, this helped normalise female 
participation in political roles. In the case of Kataeb, this involvement of 
women in non-violent political positions played an important role in 
facilitating their later involvement as fighters. This was because the party 
was much more divided when it came to the role women were to have in 
the party (and in society more generally) as discussed in Chapter Five. The 
situation seems to have been similar in the Palestinian Fatah (interviewees 
20, 52).   
As far as Amal is concerned, women were involved both in the Movement of 
the Disadvantaged (the predecessor of the Amal Movement) and, later, in 
the party where they worked as doctors, teachers, scout instructors and 
other non-violent roles, before they started to participate in combat in 1978 
(interviewees 50, 58, 63). 
In the PSP, women were involved in the party (interviewees 7, 20, 42, 43, 51, 
53). However, both security-related and communal factors prevented a 
more far-reaching involvement of PSP women in the war.  
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Loosening of gender norms amplified by war  
 
The loosening of gender norms that had started in Lebanon in the 1960s and 
1970s was further amplified by the war (interviewee 65). This is a 
phenomenon which is widely described in existing literature on other 
conflict contexts (Cunningham, 2003: 185, 187, Speckhard, 2008: 1017; 
Bloom, 2011: 208). In the case of the Lebanese civil war, the loosening of 
gender norms was cited by members of all of the militias covered in this 
study. The only militia in which it played a lesser role was in Amal, where the 
involvement of female fighters in the group was largely kept secret by the 
militia (interviewee 63).  
A former fighter with the LCP and Fatah described how war changed societal 
attitudes:  
 
War creates its own atmosphere, social relations, values, 
stories. Things that were refused before the war, for a woman 
to come home late, where does she sleep – in war [they] 
become changed. […W]ar changes social values (interviewee 
17; see also interviewees 31, 45, 60, 64).  
 
The same interviewee claimed that war had the potential to change social 
norms because “people think about the battle”, as she put it, rather than 
societal conventions (interviewee 17, see also interviewee 31). The cause 
the group was fighting for helped temporarily overcome societal barriers 
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(interviewee 52). Society might still not be in favour of women participating 
in combat; however, they will temporarily accept it, as it is considered a 
necessity (interviewee 57, see also 20, 31, 48).  
In long protracted conflicts where the parties involved feel their identity or 
survival is at stake, female participation in combat often becomes 
particularly likely (Cunningham, 2003, Dearing, 2010). As discussed in 
Chapters Four and Six, security pressures caused both individuals and the 
non-state armed groups involved in the Lebanese civil war to consider the 
stakes to be too high to not mobilise as many members of society as 
possible. The same mechanism took place on the societal level, as the 
perception of an extremely high, imminent threat softened existing societal 
barriers. In the words of a former female Kataeb member, “we understood 
the price of the fight” (interviewee 25, see also interviewee 14). This is also 
the reason why in the LNM militias, societal acceptance was particularly high 
during the Israeli invasion – a fight which was perceived as much more 
existential than most inner-Arab battles during the war (interviewees 1, 18, 
22, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 47, 52). Once women had joined the armed struggle, 
their presence opened space for others. This was mentioned by several 
interviewees. For example, in the case of Kataeb, Jocelyne Khoueiry was 
seen by many as “the woman who started it” (interviewees 16, 57). Over the 
years, other women in the party “proved themselves” and “earned their 
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respect” after fighting for their inclusion in the militia (interviewee 16, see 
also interviewee 7). 
Lastly, if this process of loosening of traditional gender norms and 
expectations was amplified by the war (which opened a temporary window 
of opportunity for women wishing to join the militias as fighters), this 
process was halted again after the end of the war. In the words of one 
former fighter:  
 
During battles, this negative atmosphere against women [in 
the form of restrictive gender norms and expectations] 
becomes less, because people think about the battle. When 
things calm down [after the end of the hostilities], they 
[society] start again [to restrict women’s options for 
participation] (interviewee 6). 
 
Another former fighter and military commander remarked (almost cynically) 
that “female fighters don’t affect [patriarchal] structures” (interviewee 6). 
This supports claims in the existing literature which stress that one reason 
why women are accepted in combat roles is because they can easily be 
pushed back into non-military roles after the war (Cunningham, 2003: 185).  
 
7.2 | Inhibiting factors 
 
While changes in dominant gender norms and expectations in the 1960s and 
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1970s (which were amplified by the breakout of the war) facilitated female 
participation in the militias, other society-level factors inhibited women’s 
full inclusion into these various groups. Despite societal changes, Lebanon 
remained a relatively gender-conservative society. Women had been 
included in most political parties; however, their roles in the parties 
remained limited (International Alert, 2011). While the escalating security 
situation facilitated women’s participation in the militias, the war also 
contributed to limiting women’s involvement in public roles, notably out of 
fear of sexual violence and rape. These different factors will be discussed 
below, while the role of socio-religious norms (which constituted another 
inhibiting factor) will be discussed in Section Four. 
 
Conservative gender norms and expectations 
 
The majority of interviewees believed that more women did not join the 
militias because of societal opposition to female involvement. This supports 
claims made in the existing literature on other conflicts, which highlights 
how societal opposition to female employment often prevents non-state 
armed groups from including more women (see, for example, Cunningham, 
2003: 174). 
Even though traditional gender norms had been increasingly challenged in 
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Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s, many interviewees (regardless of their 
affiliation with a militia) contended that the country remained a gender-
conservative society opposed to women’s involvement in the militias, let 
alone in combat roles (interviewees 1, 6, 22, 26, 27, 28, 53, 54, 60, 62, 67, 
68, 69; see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 47). Several interviewees stressed 
how, despite the fact that Lebanon was often considered to be a more 
gender-progressive society than many other Arab countries, patriarchal 
traditions were deeply entrenched (interviewees 8, 22, 28, 31, 54). Societal 
reluctance to allow female participation in the war affected the decision-
making of both the militias and the women who may have otherwise 
considered joining (interviewee 28). Several interviewees stressed that this 
affected even the members of the secular groups, whose ideological beliefs 
did not erase their previous socialisation in a relatively gender-conservative 
society (interviewees 31, 54, 62). This is not to imply that differences 
between various locations, communities or even families did not exist (I will 
look at these in more detail in the following section of this chapter), but 
rather that very few members of Lebanese society at the time were not 
affected by commonly-held attitudes and beliefs on gender norms and 
relations. 
In Lebanese society prior to and during the war, men’s and women’s roles 
were often clearly defined and divided by gender. Interviewees recounted 
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that, in many families, women tended to be expected to place value on their 
outward appearance and occupy themselves with domestic chores such as 
cooking and looking after their family (interviewees 20, 41, 53, 57, 62; see 
also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 21, 25, 47, 54). Several interviewees claimed 
that the belief that a woman’s priority should be her family was the 
dominant narrative until today (interviewees 6, 20, 41, 62). The idea of a 
female fighter directly challenged these gender expectations. Indeed, 
several former militia members recounted that female fighters had 
difficulties finding a potential spouse from outside the militia, as “people 
would be afraid to marry her” (interviewees 14, 22, 58). The same effect has 
been described by researchers working on other conflicts (see, for example, 
Alison, 2009). As far as gender roles in the family were concerned, one 
interviewee described dominant cultural narratives, according to which the 
husband or father was considered the leader of the household and who (at 
least in theory) had the right to veto decisions made by his daughters or wife 
(interviewee 28, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 33, 54). This role of the 
father (and the family more generally) had the potential of limiting the 
options of both men and women. Indeed, one journalist who used to cover 
the war remembered that the reason he did not get involved as a fighter was 
his family opposing his participation in violence (interviewee 24). However, 
he was the only interviewee (out of 69) who recounted such an experience, 
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which indicates that women were much more affected by familial opposition 
to their involvement in the militias than men. 
The belief that women belong in the domestic sphere (rather than in public 
life and politics) posed considerable challenges to those in favour of female 
involvement. A former male fighter with the LCP contended that “the 
patriarchal society plays a very big role in Lebanese politics” (interviewee 
27). One interviewee, a male militant with the PSP, explained that “it took 
us a lot of time to change this attitude slightly” (interviewee 43). A former 
female CAO militant spoke of her frustration with regards to these attitudes: 
 
“The war of woman is more [considered to be] in the private 
space, not in the other [public] space. [This is due to] our 
culture, our values, the division between role of men and 
women. Many people believe women belong in the private 
space, the house. […] [Until n]ow, all political party and all 
militias prefer women inside the party, in the private space, 
not in elected committees. [This is] because in the political 
party there is masculine domination and we have no 
democracy in the party. Society? They don’t like it… Our 
family and the committee, they were against [women’s 
participation in the militias] (interviewee 62).  
 
Women’s non-violent roles in the militias and political parties 
 
One of the factors facilitating female involvement in the militias during the 
war was their previous participation in non-violent roles in the party or 
militia. However, women’s roles in the parties remained limited. For 
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example, women reaching leadership positions remained the exception 
(interviewees 1, 2, 16, 18, 31, 32). This is one of the reasons why female 
participation in the militias did not reach higher levels. It also explains why, 
compared with the Christian militias, for example, the levels of female 
participation were considerably higher in the militias of the far-left. This will 
be discussed below. 
In Kataeb (and later the LF), the number of women in leadership positions 
was particularly low. Asked if he remembered any female leaders in Kataeb 
or the LF, a former male party member first responded that he did not. After 
thinking for a moment, he named Madees Aswad – the sister of Amin 
Gemayel – who was responsible for a socio-political foundation, in a non-
military role (interviewee 2). Another interviewee (a former member of the 
LF, who received military training but did not fight) gave a similar answer 
stating that she did not remember any female leaders except for Jocelyne 
Khoueiry, the head of the political unit for women in the Kataeb, and “two 
or three women in the headquarter, but not at a very high level” 
(interviewee 2). 
In the leftist organisations, and the groups of the far-left in particular, the 
situation was different – with more women assuming leadership roles 
(interviewees 9, 18, 48, 52). In fact, three of the women of the far-left I 
interviewed assumed regional leadership positions during the war 
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(interviewees 6, 31, 32). Moreover, the number of middle-ranged female 
leaders and women in charge of military operations was also higher in the 
militias of the left (interviewee 18). Nevertheless, the percentage of women 
in leadership roles (even in the militias of the left) remained limited 
(interviewee 1, 6, 62). In the parties, female leaders were often the sister or 
wife of a respected member of the party (interviewees 2, 48) – a 
phenomenon which can still be observed in post-war Lebanon (International 
Alert, 2011). In many cases, women did not participate in training abroad 
(often due to her husband or father being reluctant to let her travel abroad 
on her own) which further minimised their chances of gaining leadership 
positions in the party or militia (interviewees 1, 27). 
Existing literature on other conflict contexts notes that if women hold 
leadership positions in non-state armed groups, this facilitates the inclusion 
of more female militants (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). The fact that this was not 
the case in Lebanon during the war supports these claims in previous 
publications on female political violence. 
 
Fear of rape 
 
In the existing literature, experiences of sexual violence or fear of rape are 
often described as a mobilising factor for women during times of violent 
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conflict or war (Alison, 2009, Bloom, 2011).  
On the other hand, fear of rape is also described as an inhibiting factor of 
female involvement. Cunningham (2003), for example, contends that in 
some societies, societal reluctance to accept women partaking in combat 
activities is less related to an ideal of women being confined to the private 
space than to fears of sexual abuse and rape. She highlights the example of 
Sikh combatants in India in this context: 
 
Among Sikh militants, women have participated in an array of 
roles including armed combat. Importantly, Sikhism does not 
distinguish between male and female equality forming a 
religio-societal grounding that neither precludes female 
combat nor categorizes that role as uniquely masculine (or 
“unfeminine”). Rather, societal resistance to female combat 
roles is fostered by well-founded fears of sexual abuse, rape, 
and sexual torture of women if captured (Cunningham, 2003: 
180). 
 
If, at first sight, this reasoning does not seem to be related to gender norms 
and expectations as much as fears for the women’s well-being, it is also 
essentially based on normative gender structures. As a matter of fact, both 
men and women can be raped. Thus, if a society is more reluctant to allow 
female participation in combat than male involvement despite both genders 
being subject to the same threat in principle, this indicates that men and 
women are treated differently based on gender norms and expectations.  
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In the case of Lebanon during the civil war, fear of rape constituted an 
inhibiting factor for female involvement in the militias. It was mostly 
mentioned by interviewees referring to the Shia community. For example, 
one interviewee (whom I had asked if fear of rape of captured female 
fighters was one of the reasons Hezbollah and Amal were hesitant to employ 
women in combat) contended: 
 
It’s fine with them if you are killed – but not raped. “Don’t 
leave us with a bad reputation” – that’s how they think, the 
community, the society. It has all to do with inequality, that’s 
why they use women indirectly [in non-combat roles] 
(interviewee 4). 
 
A former male fighter with Amal also referred to the fear of rape as a major 
inhibiting factor, both because of the harm it could cause for the women and 
their families, but also because of its inherent potential to cause the conflict 
to escalate: 
 
Because in Islam, we have some restrictions for girls. Maybe 
their father, brother or husband are against [their female 
family members’ participation in combat]. That’s why we 
couldn’t allow them to fight, because society was against it. 
Because what would happen to her if she was caught? She 
would get raped and then tortured… And if she was raped, the 
relatives would take revenge, kill someone – the problems get 
worse. That’s what happened by Israel and [Antoine] Lahoud 
in [the notorious Israeli prison] Khiam [in the South of 
Lebanon], they would threaten for women to get raped, rip 
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off part of their clothes (interviewee 58). 
 
Fear of rape was mentioned less often by members of other communities 
(in addition to the two previously quoted examples, only one former female 
fighter with the LCP invoked it – namely interviewee 31). However, the 
status of women as members of society who need to be protected was 
mentioned by several interviewees from a variety of different backgrounds 
(interviewees 1, 8, 9, 23, 25, 26, 48, 49, 52, 55, 57, 59, 60). Many 
interviewees stressed that regardless of individual backgrounds, social 
traditions were often shared by different members of Lebanese society, an 
aspect I will look at in more detail in the following section on local 
differences. With regards to sexual violence in particular, one interviewee (a 
male civil society representative) contended that “[b]oth Muslims and 
Christians in Lebanon come from the same social tradition. Rape is very 
difficult [to deal with for members of all communities]” (interviewee 12). 
 
7.3 | Inter-community and intra-community variation 
 
Societal and communal attitudes, on any given topic, are rarely uniform. This 
is why, when assessing the role of societal and communal factors that 
affected organisational decision-making during the Lebanese civil war, it is 
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essential to take into account variation between and within different 
communities. In this section, I discuss the extent to which communal 
attitudes towards the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese civil 
war differed in various parts of the country. In addition to examining spatial 
variation, I consider the role religious, educational and class-related 
differences played in the attitudes of communities towards the inclusion of 
female fighters. The fact that there was a wide spectrum of societal attitudes 
towards female participation in the militias was stressed by several 
interviewees (interviewees 1, 2, 7, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 46, 51, 64). One 
former male PSP fighter contended that this was due to the highly complex 
social fabric on which Lebanese society, which is made up of an 
extraordinarily diverse combination of “different groups, different parties, 
different religions”, was based (interviewee 51). He specified that “involving 
a woman in the war is not the same in each group, each religion” 
(interviewee 51). Another interviewee (a male former LCP fighter) recounted 
how, at times, this diversity of norms and values, manifested itself 
differently in two families living in the same building. He recounted how one 
family had allowed their daughter to have a boyfriend, whilst her (female) 
neighbour was not even allowed to leave the house after seven o’clock in 
the evening (interviewee 22).  
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Local differences 
 
The importance of taking into account local variation when studying societal 
gender norms and expectations has been stressed in the existing literature 
(Dearing, 2010: 1088, 1101, footnote 96). Indeed, most individuals 
interviewed as part of this study saw considerable local variation with 
regards to societal attitudes towards female participation during the war. 
Most interviewees agreed that attitudes in the Mountain were more gender-
conservative than in any other part of the country. While one interviewee 
contended that the absence of female fighters in the Mountain was linked 
to harsher conditions (interviewee 21), most explained it by communal 
resistance to the inclusion of female combatants (interviewee 9, 18, 20). 
Some thought this was the result of higher levels of social conservatism 
amongst the Druze communities in the Mountain (interviewees 18, 20), but 
this notion was rejected by two former PSP fighters I spoke with 
(interviewees 8, 9). One of them explained: 
 
[It was] because of the communities, the conservative 
communities. It’s not a characteristic of Druze women not to 
fight, but of women of the Mountain. There were Druze 
women who fought in other militias, in Beirut for example 
(interviewee 9). 
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A former comrade of the same fighter stressed that even within the 
Mountain, there were local differences. He explained that he was from the 
Matn, which was different in culture to the Shouf region, as it was “closer to 
the city [of Beirut]” and “people used to emigrate from the Matn to the city 
earlier, so it was closer to the city culture” (interviewee 10). He went on to 
contend that the “social component of the Druze community in the Matn 
created a margin for women to participate more” (interviewee 10, see also 
interviewee 18). 
In addition to describing the Mountain as one of the most socially 
conservative areas of Lebanon, many interviewees also described a more 
general rural/urban divide in communal attitudes towards female 
participation. Many interviewees remembered that female participation in 
the militias was more visible in the cities and that women’s involvement was 
more accepted in urban areas (interviewees 1, 2, 8, 9, 17, 18, 20, 48, 54). 
Beirut, in particular, was often given as an example of a place with higher 
levels of acceptance of female militancy (interviewees 9, 18, 20).   
On the other hand, a (small) number of interviewees believed that levels of 
communal resistance to female participation in the militias were higher in 
the cities (interviewee 1, 49, 54). Interviewees believed this to be the case 
due to higher levels of religiosity (interviewee 49) and business interests of 
the merchants in cities such as Beirut, Tripoli, Saida and Jounieh, who, other 
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than the farmers in rural areas, had more to lose and were thus generally 
opposed to the fighting (interviewees 1, 32). 
This apparent contradiction (between those stating that cities were a more 
hostile environment for female participation and those believing that this 
was in fact the case in rural areas) can probably be explained by two factors. 
First, most fighters in the cities originally came from rural backgrounds 
(interviewees 1, 2, 18, 48). Far from their communities back home, they 
enjoyed more freedom to transgress traditional gender norms (interviewee 
48). For a lot of these women, it was easier to join a militia in the bigger cities 
than it would have been in their rural home communities. Second, levels of 
social conservatism were not the same in all cities. Saida, for example, was 
described by many as being particularly socially conservative (interviewees 
1, 12, 29, 32). Thus, while the Mountain was one of the most socially 
conservative regions of Lebanon at the time (with the Shouf being much 
more conservative than the Matn), Saida was similarly conservative. 
However, most other big cities in the country were more open to female 
participation – especially if the fighters were from other parts of the country. 
The region most open to female involvement during the war were Beirut and 
villages in the South. 
Female participation in the South (outside of Saida) is likely to have been 
more accepted by local communities for three reasons. First, women in the 
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villages had been working with men for decades, notably on the tobacco 
fields (interviewees 12, 32) – which would support the argument laid down 
in the second section of this chapter, per which involvement in public roles 
facilitates female war-time participation. Second, levels of religious 
education and practice tended to be lower in the villages and, as farmers 
and workers, many villagers were more receptive to leftist ideology than 
inhabitants of the cities, many of whom were merchants (interviewees 1, 12, 
29, 32). Third, the close proximity to the border with Israel meant that the 
villages of the South were much more exposed to the effects of the war with 
Lebanon’s southern neighbour. This, in turn, made communities in the South 
more open to female participation in the war, as described in Chapter Six 
(interviewees 24, 29, 30). 
 
Religious differences 
 
Interviewees often saw religion as being a major inhibiting factor for the 
involvement of female fighters (interviewees 1, 27, 29, 32, 42, 49, 51, 53, 54, 
58, 61, 69). Some interviewees contended that religion became more 
important as a reference point for communities (as well as individuals and 
organisations) after the initial stages of the war when the conflict started to 
be increasingly seen as being of sectarian nature (interviewees 18, 22, 26, 
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29). They argued that with the growing importance of religion in public 
discourses and the emergence of new actors (who increasingly framed their 
participation in religious terms) at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 
the 1980s, women were pushed back into more traditional roles 
(interviewees 18, 26, 29).  
However, not all interviewees saw religion as being of equal importance in 
all of the different communities. In the words of one interviewee, “Lebanese 
society is a combination of different groups, different parties, different 
religions” and “[i]nvolving a woman in the war is not the same in each group, 
each religion” (interviewee 51). 
The belief that Muslim communities were particularly gender-conservative 
was often expressed (interviewees 7, 12, 26, 28, 29, 45, 51, 62). Of those 
interviewees who differentiated between different Muslim groups, most 
interviewees thought that Sunni Muslims were more gender-conservative 
than Shia Muslims (interviewees 7, 31, 54, 51). Only one interviewee (a Shia 
Muslim himself) believed that Shia communities were more conservative 
when it came to the role of women in the community in general, and in the 
militias in particular (interviewee 58). This difference between attitudes in 
the Shia and Sunni communities is likely to be linked to differences in class 
and education. Compared to their Shia fellow countrymen, most Sunni 
Muslims in Lebanon tended to be from more privileged backgrounds 
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(interviewee 1, see also Traboulsi, 2012). I will discuss in more detail how 
this is likely to have affected communal attitudes towards female 
participation – in the following section on the role of class and education. 
The Druze community was also seen to be very gender-conservative, 
including by Druze interviewees themselves (interviewees 7, 9, 62).  
It was disputed amongst interviewees whether the Christian communities 
were more gender-progressive than their Muslim counterparts. Ten 
interviewees contended that Christians in Lebanon were more gender-
progressive than Muslims (interviewees 2, 11, 12, 19, 22, 28, 45, 56, 57, 66). 
The spectrum of their opinions ranged from “Christians were a little more 
open than Muslims” (interviewee 28) to “Christians have never been 
conservative” (interviewee 26) to “Christianism does not discriminate 
against women” (interviewee 11). These views stand in contrast with the 
statements of eleven interviewees who believed that social conservatism, 
especially in question of gender norms and expectations, was dominant in 
both Muslim and Christian communities (interviewees 6, 7, 12, 30, 28, 41, 
48, 51, 56, 60, 62). The two positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
(if one foregoes the view that “Christians have never been gender-
conservative”), as it is possible that levels of gender conservatism were 
generally high in all communities in Lebanon, with slightly lower levels 
amongst Christians.   
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However, it is noteworthy that eight of the ten interviewees who believed 
that Christians were more gender-progressive than Muslims were Christians 
themselves (interviewees 2, 11, 19, 26, 45, 56, 57, 66). Amongst those who 
stated that Christians were similarly gender-conservative than their Muslim 
fellow countrymen, only two (or three) out of eleven interviewees were 
Christians (interviewees 56, 60, 62). This indicates that the self-image of 
interviewees differed considerably from how their community was 
perceived by members of other sectarian groups. 
Whilst religion was seen as an important factor in the shaping of 
communities’ attitudes towards female participation during the war, several 
interviewees stressed that religion alone could not explain variation in 
societal reluctance with regards to female involvement (interviewees 1, 2, 7, 
9, 26, 31, 42, 51, 54). Amongst the other factors which interviewees believed 
should be taken into account in order to understand inter- and intra-
community variation, class and educational backgrounds were mentioned.  
 
The role of class and education 
 
While many interviewees mentioned inter-community variation in societal 
attitudes towards the inclusion of female fighters (as discussed in the 
previous section), some also described differences that could be found 
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within the various communities. Class and education were the two most 
commonly cited factors. Secular education was described as a facilitating 
factor (especially in the case of recently educated members of the working 
class), whereas religious education was perceived as an inhibiting factor (in 
the case of Muslim communities). As far as class is concerned, it is not 
possible to come to a definitive conclusion on what role class played in 
shaping societal attitudes towards the inclusion of female fighters. 
In the case of the Christian communities, a middle-class background was 
considered by some to be conducive to higher levels of acceptance of female 
fighters (interviewees 4, 62). Interviewees linked this to higher level of 
education and of political awareness:  
 
“They [the Christian community] were more open-minded, 
more determined…. They had been sending their children to 
school. They had read more and were fully educated, 
[whereas] many people in Dahiye [a Shia-dominated working-
class suburb of Beirut] had come to Beirut from the 
countryside. When you, as a human being, start thinking 
about freedom and revolution and what it takes to get this 
freedom [you are more determined] […] The Christians knew 
the idea of freedom, maybe their fathers or brother had 
taught them about it (interviewee 4, see also interviewees 14, 
25, 62).  
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One interviewee believed that once the Christian bourgeoisie had come to 
accept female participation, this further legitimised the involvement of 
women in the militias (interviewee 56). 
On the other hand, in the case of the Muslim communities, higher levels of 
education, and religious education in particular, were perceived by some as 
factors contributing to communal hostility towards female participation 
(interviewees 12, 31). As far as all of the different communities are 
concerned, some interviewees contended that middle-class members of 
society were more reluctant to accept female involvement in the militias 
(interviewees 1, 32). They contended that the middle-class merchants were 
opposed to the fighting in general, and particularly so female participation. 
They believed that this was related to higher levels of social conservatism 
and the business interests of the old Lebanese middle-class (interviewees 1, 
32). The view that many middle-class members of society tended to be more 
opposed to female involvement is supported by the fact that the majority of 
fighters had a rural background (interviewees 1, 7, 18, 48). One reason why 
Shia communities seem to have been more accepting of female fighters 
could be that they tended to be from less privileged class and educational 
backgrounds than many Lebanese Sunnis (interviewees 7).  
Of course, societal attitudes were also not constant throughout the war and 
subject to change. In the case of the role class played in this context, the 
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statement of a former fighter with the LCP is noteworthy. He recounted 
how, during the first round of the war, more individuals from a middle-class 
background participated in the militias, whereas when the conflict started 
to become messier, when criminal elements started to infiltrate the militias, 
and sectarian interests started to dominate, many middle-class individuals 
in general, and women in particular, stopped joining the militias 
(interviewee 22). One factor influencing this process was probably that for 
the Lebanese middle-class, female participation in the war was more 
acceptable when the war was still perceived to be a legitimate conflict over 
political issues – which was much less the case during the later stages of the 
war. 
 
7.4 | Managing societal expectations 
 
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, in large parts of society, 
female participation in the war was not seen favourably by members of the 
communities. However, female militants were involved in all of the militias 
– with some of the groups allowing women to participate in combat. 
Managing the dichotomy between societal attitudes and female 
participation required the militias to employ a number of strategies in order 
to avoid alienating local communities.  
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Risk-awareness 
 
The degree to which the militias were aware of the risk of alienating society 
by the inclusion of female fighters and whether or not the organisations took 
this into account in their decision-making divided interviewees. 
Some interviewees were of the opinion that societal attitudes were not 
taken into account at all by the militias during the war (interviewees 14, 23, 
28, 48, 50). One former SSNP fighter contended that “during the war, there 
is only the word of the militias, and they did not care the least [about societal 
attitudes to their behaviour]” (interviewee 48; see also interviewee 31). 
In contrast to that, several other interviewees believed that the militias’ 
decision-making was influenced by societal attitudes towards the roles of 
women in the militias (interviewees 1, 6, 18, 20, 22). One interviewee (who 
used to be a fighter and military leader in the LCP during the war) 
acknowledged that even though women were, in principle, treated as equals 
in his organisation, the group’s options were limited by the fact that they 
were still part of a relatively gender-conservative society (interviewee 1). A 
former fighter with the Student Brigades of Fatah recalled heated 
discussions with some of the women in his group who insisted on an 
increased involvement in the militia which he, and some other members of 
the organisation, opposed (interviewee 20). He disagreed with the women’s 
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agenda as he feared a backlash from society. In his mind, societal 
expectations needed to be respected on the short and mid-term in order to 
reach the organisations’ long-term goals:   
 
You have to decide whether you want to act as liberated 
women – or do you want to liberate the Palestinian women. 
The way you do things will not encourage ordinary fighters to 
include his sister, mother et cetera in [the] fight. They will not 
accept them smoking, mixing with men, [for there to be] no 
difference with men. [If you think like that, y]our problem is 
that you remain a minority, you don’t add anything to [for] 
the women, on the contrary. We have to go backwards a few 
steps to get thousands of women to join the fight. [We have 
to] act more conservatively. […] I prefer a thousand women 
developed only one step in the political area rather than 
seeing ten women act as ordinary fighters (interviewee 20, 
see also 18). 
 
He argued that one of the weaknesses of Arab leftists at the time was that 
they were seeking to import what he saw as Western concepts to Lebanon, 
which large parts of the Lebanese society were not ready for (interviewee 
20). One of his former comrades in arms stressed that, in this regard, Fatah 
was warier of societal gender norms and expectations than groups of the 
far-left such as the LCP (interviewee 18). Some interviewees also pointed to 
the fact that, regardless of political convictions, the members of all militias 
were socialised in Lebanon and a product of its relatively gender-
conservative society (interviewees 18, 31). 
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In practice, most militias sought to find ways to reconcile societal norms and 
expectations with their organisations’ aims, which often resulted in a 
compromise between the two. In the words of a former female military 
leader in the CAO: 
 
Communal norms are very imposed in the Orient. It would 
have been completely stupid if we had not respected these 
norms, if we had tried to provoke. Of course, you don’t 
respect them in their totality, but enough to get by 
(interviewee 6).  
 
Her view was supported by a former fighter with Fatah who claimed that 
“few reclaimed a total rupture with [societal gender] traditions” 
(interviewee 18). This support claims by scholars working on other conflict 
contexts, who have shown that non-state armed groups have an interest in 
good relations with the communities they are operating in (Arjona, 2016: 4, 
9-18). 
  
Practical steps 
 
The aim of militia members who took into account societal gender norms 
and expectations was, in the words of a former male fighter with Fatah, to 
“establish a relation of confidence”, while “defending some ideas that could 
be accepted [by the society] step by step” (interviewee 18). This balancing 
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act by non-state armed groups is described in existing literature on other 
conflict contexts (see, for example, Cunningham 2003, Eager, 2008, Dearing, 
2010). 
In practice, this situation caused the militias to encourage exemplary 
behaviour by the members of the militias (interviewees 6, 18, 22, 29, see 
also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 54, 84). One former male LCP fighter from 
Beirut remembered that “the Communist Party used to do their best to 
please other communities, to set a good example, and to show that they 
fight for a good cause. […] They didn’t steal, rob” (interviewee 22). Another 
former LCP fighter from the South recounts how complaints from members 
of the community about fighters standing on the balcony in their undershirts 
resulted in this behaviour being stopped (interviewee 31). In Fatah, male and 
female members of the group who liked each other were encouraged to get 
married to comply with societal norms and expectations (interviewee 18). In 
Kataeb, women who were found to take drugs were sent home in order not 
to give their opponents any pretext to stop the involvement of female 
fighters (Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 54, 84).  
This was important as the reputation of militia members had an impact on 
how members of the community saw the involvement of female members 
of their families. In this context, one former LCP fighter recalled how the 
father of his future wife did not object to her being involved (in a non-
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combat role) in the LCP, as he “saw that some of the leaders of the 
Communist Party had a very good reputation, so for him it [his daughter’s 
participation] was not a shame, it was good” (interviewee 29). A former 
female fighter recounted that one of her responsibilities in the LCP was to 
recruit women, as she was considered to be a respected member of the 
community and a woman that people respected and looked up to. She would 
befriend family members of potential recruits to reassure them that their 
girls would be safe with the LCP (interviewee 31, see also interviewee 32). 
This strategy also entailed that if the party knew that (due to local mores) 
they were more likely to be looked at benevolently if they sent a male (rather 
than a female) militia member to a certain village, they would do so 
(interviewee 31). 
One major concern for many members of the communities was 
unchaperoned mixing of men and women in the military camps and on the 
frontline (interviewees 20, 41, 44, 58, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 39). 
Female (and, to a certain extent, male) militia members were often accused 
of promiscuity (interviewees 6, 8, 20, 21, 45). This was a problem both 
Christian and LNM militias faced. One way of dealing with it was to ensure 
that sleeping arrangements were gender-segregated (interviewees 20, 41, 
44, see also Duplan and Raulin, 2015: 39). One former CAO commander 
recalled how they showed members of the community around the camp, in 
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order to alleviate fears of unrestricted gender relations (interviewee 6). 
Communal reluctance to accept unchaperoned mixing of the genders was 
also one of the reasons why some of the militias established women-only 
combat units – as described with regards to other conflict contexts (Alison, 
2009).  Female-only units existed in Kataeb (and later the Lebanese Forces) 
(interviewee 18, 19). In addition to that (a female-only unit, which was close 
but not formerly associated with the PSP) existed in the Mountain, in the 
Ibdiye area (interviewee 20). 
In Amal, the risk of alienating the community by the inclusion of female 
fighters was less pronounced since, for security reasons and to avoid 
targeted attacks by Israel, the participation of women in combat was largely 
kept secret – even from fighters in other units of the militia (interviewee 63). 
 
Narrative approaches 
 
When attempting to reconcile operational goals of non-state armed groups 
with societal norms and expectations, non-state military actors often resort 
to narratives that help frame and contextualise behaviour, which would 
otherwise be considered deviant (Dearing, 2010: 1081). These narratives are 
aimed at opening spaces for female involvement in combat (Dearing, 2010: 
1081). By reframing female fighters’ participation, the organisation seeks to 
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alleviate society’s fears (Ness, 2005: 354-355). As Dearing noted, “a 
structured language, history, and collective memory devoted to explaining 
female” political violence is developed (2010: 1083). This reframing often 
constitutes a balancing act between highlighting socially accepted and 
deviant practices (Ness, 2005, Eager, 2008: 139). 
A common strategy of reframing female political violence is to stress the 
severity of the conflict situation and to rhetorically prioritise the non-state 
armed group’s operational goals (such as freedom or the fight for survival) 
over traditional gender roles. Female political violence is presented as being 
without alternatives. This strategy is often used in wars of national liberation 
(Eager, 2008: 131 – 132). It also proved to be successful during the Lebanese 
civil war. As discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the perceived severity 
of the threat led individuals and organisations to see female participation as 
a valid option in an extreme situation. The same narratives helped convince 
communities to, at least temporarily, accept female participation in combat, 
by framing it as a necessary contribution to “the Revolution” (in the case of 
the militias of the left), the “fight for survival” (in the case of the Christian 
militias), or the fight against the “absolute Evil” (in the case of Amal). 
References of collective memory or religious terminologies constitute an 
essential part of reframing practices. “Thus, what would otherwise be 
interpreted as aberrant behavior becomes contextualized in a history of 
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accepted ideas” (Ness, 2005: 362; see also Dearing, 2010: 1084). Religion 
was mostly used by the Christian organisations and Amal in order to 
legitimise the inclusion of female fighters in their respective militias, albeit 
in very different ways. Whilst the Christian groups mostly used religion to 
differentiate themselves from Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians who were 
presented and perceived as being more gender-conservative because of 
their religion (interviewees 2, 7, 9, 12, 16, 19, 22, 28, 45, 57, 62, see also 
previous section), members of Amal framed women’s participation in the 
fight against Israel as a religious right (interviewees 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 50, 58, 63). Female Amal members compared their involvement during 
the war to the role of women in Islamic history, such as Khadijah. Since Amal 
is a Shia group, Fatimah and Zaynab were cited even more frequently 
(interviewees 37, 39; see also Deeb, 2006: 204-205). One woman said she 
felt that if the Prophet needed the help of women, maybe she needed to 
contribute to the fight against Israel, too (interviewee 37). Religious sayings 
by the founder of their group, Musa Sadr, were repeatedly quoted by nearly 
all Amal interviewees (interviewees 38, 50, 63). 
Another factor, which can be found in the existing literature on other conflict 
contexts, and that is often claimed to play a central role in reframing 
narratives on female political violence, is the idealisation of sacrifice, with 
women’s participation being presented as a selfless act for the community 
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(Cunningham, 2003: 180-181, Ness, 2005: 367, Bloom, 2005: 160, Alison, 
2009). However, this notion emerged in only two of the interviews I 
conducted in Lebanon. One former female Kataeb party member described 
the female Christian fighters as women who had “understood the price of 
the combat” and who were “offering their life” (interviewee 25). Comparing 
levels of female involvement in the Shia groups Amal and Hezbollah with 
women’s participation in the Christian militias, a civil society representative 
made a connection between higher levels of education of many (Maronite) 
Christians and farther-reaching levels of participation in Kataeb. She 
contended that higher levels of education amongst many Maronite 
Christians meant that they were more familiar with philosophical and 
historical concepts of freedom and revolution, and thus more aware of the 
sacrifices that might be necessary in the fight for the interests of their 
community (interviewee 4). The concept of sacrifice thus does not seem to 
have played a very central role in the reframing of female participation 
during the Lebanese civil war. This can likely be explained by local gender 
ideals which do not place as much emphasis on sacrifice as some South Asian 
cultures, for example, do.  
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Role-models 
 
Another factor linked to the promotion of narratives encouraging female 
participation in war is the existence of role-models for potential future 
female fighters. Existing literature claims that in societies in which such role-
models exist, the inclusion of female fighters is facilitated, as the 
participation of women in combat is embedded into historically accepted 
notions of female involvement. In addition to legitimising female 
involvement on the societal level, role-models can encourage individual 
participation (Alison, 2009: 222-223). In the civil war in Lebanon, role-
models (such as Soha Bechara, Lola Aboud, Leila Khaled, Sana Mhaidli, Dalal 
Moughraiby and Yassar Mrouhi) seem to have been of more importance in 
LNM groups (interviewees 2, 7, 17, 22, 23, 27, 31; Bechara, 2003: 47-48). 
This is likely due to the fact that women’s involvement in LNM-associated 
groups went much farther than in the other militias. While Jocelyne Khoueiry 
(one famous female fighter with Kataeb and later the LF) was seen as an icon 
by some Christians (interviewee 2, 7, 11, 16, 57), others claimed not to have 
had any specific role-models (interviewee 16, 25, 26). One former female 
Kataeb fighter said her role-models were the women who were involved in 
the fighting in 195827 (interviewee 19), whereas a male fighter with one of 
                                                          
27  In 1958, fighting broke out in parts of the country for about three months, until 
an intervention by the US Army ended the immediate crisis (Salibi, 1976).  
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the smaller Christian groups referred to Jeanne d’Arc (interviewee 45). Role-
models drawn from religious contexts were, not surprisingly, mostly invoked 
by members of Amal, as foregrounded above, even though one nominally 
Muslim member of one of the leftist groups also referred to female warriors 
in the first years of Islam (interviewee 6). This highlights how even members 
of the formally secular groups were versant in religious narratives. 
 
7.5 | Conclusion  
 
Female participation during the Lebanese civil war was facilitated by pre-war 
changes in communal attitudes towards the inclusion of women in public 
and political roles. This shift in traditional gender norms and expectations 
was amplified by the war. It provided the militias with a societal context not 
entirely opposed to the inclusion of female fighters. Despite this slow 
loosening of traditional gender norms, and despite the fact that considerable 
differences existed between and within the different communities, Lebanon 
remained a society characterised by relatively high levels of gender-
conservatism. The militias which employed female fighters adopted a variety 
of strategies to manage societal gender expectations. These included 
practical steps (to reassure the communities that all gender norms were not 
transgressed) and the narrative reframing of women’s participation in the 
310 
 
militias. While this helped lessen communal resistance to female 
participation, societal reluctance to allow female involvement in the militias 
remained relatively high. The nature of the war (which took place in several 
rounds with some parts of the country being relatively unaffected by the war 
for extended periods of time) played a considerable role in this context. It is 
not unlikely that societal acceptance of female involvement would have 
increased, if the war had intensified. Communal reluctance to accept female 
participation impacted individual motivations (of women who might have 
otherwise joined the militias) and organisational decision-making. It explains 
why the overall numbers of female fighters during the war were 
comparatively lower than in other conflicts – even in those organisations 
which would have otherwise been open to the involvement of female 
fighters. These findings largely support claims in existing literature, whilst 
also stressing the need for multivariate analyses – which do not simply take 
gender into account, but also consider the role of other factors such as class, 
education and differences between different communities and sub-groups 
of society.
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Chapter 8 | Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis posed the question of why some of the non-state armed groups 
(or ‘militias’) operating during the Lebanese civil war employed female 
fighters whilst others did not. It argued that the main reason for female 
involvement as fighters was the women’s insistence to actively participate 
in combat. It showed that organisational characteristics and the security 
context were the second and third most important factors, and that societal 
aspects prevented higher numbers of women joining the militias.  
The analysis undertaken in this thesis was based on a comparison of 
Lebanese and Palestinian armed organisations involved in the war and 
included the LCP, PFLP, Fatah, PSP, Kataeb, the LF and Amal. It thus included 
both groups which involved female fighters during the civil war and groups 
which did not. Examining individual motivations, organisational 
characteristics, security-related factors and societal aspects, this study 
highlighted the factors which can explain the employment of female 
combatants (and lack thereof). The study was based on the analysis of semi-
structured interviews with 69 former militia fighters, party members, civil 
society representatives, researchers and journalists, as well as three 
(auto)biographies of female former militants and other secondary source 
materials.  
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This final chapter of the thesis summarises the key findings of this study. It 
first traces the processes which led to the inclusion of female fighters in 
some of the militias but not in others. Then, in the second section, I will 
discuss the contribution made to existing literature on political violence in 
general, and female militants more specifically. The third section looks at the 
limitations of this study. In the fourth section, I will discuss new questions 
that arise from this study that further research could examine in more detail, 
before outlining implications for practitioners and policy-makers working in 
conflict transformation, peacebuilding and related fields in the fifth section. 
The sixth section of this chapter contains an epilogue. When presenting my 
research at conferences and workshops during the last four years, I was 
often asked about the roles and experiences of the female militants I 
interviewed after the end of the war. Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of 
the post-war experiences of the former militia members I spoke with during 
the course of this research project is beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, some key themes related to the former militants’ post-war 
lives, which emerged during a number of interviews, shall briefly be outlined 
in the epilogue.   
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8.1 | Organisational motivations for the inclusion of 
female fighters in the Lebanese civil war 
 
Individual motivations: women’s insistence to be included 
 
The most important factor leading the militias involved in the Lebanese civil 
war to include female fighters was the women’s insistence to be included. 
There would not have been any female fighters in Lebanon during the war, 
if women had not insisted to be included. The involvement of women was a 
bottom-up process. Contrary to the findings of some terrorism and conflict 
scholars working on female participation in other contexts (McKay, 2007: 
171, Coulter, 2008: 55, Eager, 2008: 128, Alison, 2009: 139-141, Parashar, 
2009: 137, Katto, 2014: 544), coercion did not play a role. All interviewees 
(except for two) confirmed that they, or their female comrades, joined the 
militias out of conviction and because they believed in the cause the militia 
was fighting for. Men and women largely named the same motivations. The 
main reasons for both men’s and women’s involvement in the war were 
reasons related to the perceived injustice and the security context. In the 
case of the leftist militias, men and women saw their involvement as 
participation in “the Revolution,” fighting for a new socio-economic order, 
against Christian Maronite dominance of the state, and for Palestinian rights 
in Lebanon. The Christian militias, on the other hand, were fighting to 
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maintain the socio-economic system, preserve Maronite privileges, and to 
limit the presence and activities of armed Palestinian groups on Lebanon. As 
a religious minority in the largely Muslim-dominated Middle East, they saw 
their participation in the civil war in Lebanon as a fight for survival. In the 
case of Amal, women (and men) were motivated to join the militia in order 
to fight the threat by an external invader who was considered “the absolute 
Evil,” namely Israel. In addition to these motivations that were shared by 
both men and women, some interviewees also named gender-specific 
reasons. For example, some women joined the militias because they saw 
their participation as an opportunity to free themselves from the restrictions 
society placed on them as women. However, only a small minority of 
interviewees mentioned women’s liberation as a motivational factor. As far 
as individual backgrounds are concerned, there were no major differences 
between the men and women who joined the militias. Both tended to be 
young and they often had family members or friends who had been involved 
in the militias or the political parties associated with them before their 
involvement. Many had also participated in non-violent political activism 
before joining the militias as fighters. Having lobbied and campaigned with 
their male friends or family members before the war, they did not see why 
they should not be involved in the fighting as well. Women joined 
organisations that included women’s rights and gender equality in their 
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agenda, as well as those upholding more gender-conservative values and 
traditions. As to the question of why more women did not volunteer to join 
the militias (especially as fighters), interviewees believed that societal 
attitudes hostile to women’s involvement constituted the main reason for 
women’s reluctance to join the war. 
 
Organisational characteristics 
 
The second most important factor after women’s motivations were 
organisational characteristics – and, most importantly, the militias’ gender 
ideology. When the women insisted on being included as fighters, they were 
included in those organisations that formally subscribed to women’s rights 
and gender equality. As a result of their very permissive gender ideology, the 
organisational barriers to women’s inclusion were the lowest in the militias 
of the far-left (such as the LCP, PFLP and CAO). In those militias that had a 
more ambiguous position on women’s roles as a result of both secular and 
religious influences (like Kataeb, Fatah and Amal), ideological barriers to 
female participation were considerably higher. Thus, the percentage of 
female fighters in these militias was lower than in the militias of the far-left. 
The main reason why women were not included as fighters in the militias of 
the PSP was the party’s gender ideology. The case of the PSP stresses the 
importance of looking beyond official labels when assessing an 
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organisation’s gender ideology. Officially, the PSP was a ‘progressive 
socialist’ party; however, de facto, the party was very influenced by 
traditional Druze gender norms and expectations. The fact that some Druze 
women formed a separate all-female unit on their own and that Druze 
women fought with other leftist militias during the war highlights how 
women were motivated to join but were not allowed to join as fighters in 
the PSP’s own militias. Similarly, Amal did not allow women to join as fighters 
until 1978, as their gender ideology only allowed female participation in 
combat under very specific conditions (such as the fight against an external 
invader who was considered the “absolute Evil”).  
Internal structure and dynamics also played a role in facilitating (or 
inhibiting) female participation during the war. The militias involved in the 
Lebanese civil war were of course not monolithic organisations. Instead, 
they consisted of members from a range of different backgrounds. Even in 
the militias of the far-left, female participation in combat was contested to 
a certain degree. The role of the leadership was crucial in this context. In 
those militias in which the leadership was undivided in their opposition to 
female deployment, women did not participate in combat (namely in the 
PSP and in Amal before 1978). In the militias in which the leadership was 
divided (such as in Kataeb and Fatah), external security pressures and 
women’s insistence to be included ultimately led to women’s involvement.  
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Lastly, there is evidence that organisational structure was also decisive in the 
later inclusion of women as militants and fighters, in so far as nearly all the 
organisations, which employed female combatants, had had a long tradition 
of engaging women in separate women’s units. Several interviewees saw the 
existence of these units as crucial in the later inclusion of female militants in 
general, and female fighters in particular. These units provided women with 
the space to organise and develop political confidence and they helped to 
normalise women’s presence and participation in the parties, albeit in a 
separate, female-only unit.  
External relations did not play the same role in all of the militias. While the 
Lebanese left was clearly inspired by the role of the women in the Palestinian 
revolution, female members of the Christian militias did not have similar 
role-models for female involvement. This might be one of the reasons why 
the percentage of female fighters in the Christian militias was considerably 
lower than in the militias of the far left. Lastly, organisational aims did not 
play an important role, as both organisations with domestic aims as well as 
those with an international agenda included female fighters. However, there 
is some evidence that once inner-fighting and criminal activities started to 
dominate the militias, many women were turned away from the militias for 
these reasons. Moreover, there is some indication that the type of project 
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the different militias had for the nation-state they were fighting for also had 
a positive impact on the inclusion of female fighters. 
Lastly, organisational age and size did not play a significant role, as both 
older and younger organisations included female fighters. Of the two 
organisations that did not deploy female combatants, the PSP and Harakat 
Amal (before 1978), one was one of the oldest parties in Lebanon at the time 
(the PSP), whereas the other (Amal) had only just recently been founded.  
 
The security context 
 
In those militias with organisational characteristics that were not conducive 
to the inclusion of female fighters, security pressures facilitated female 
participation – if the security pressures were perceived as serious enough to 
warrant the inclusion of female fighters. This was the case in Kataeb, Fatah 
and Amal. Kataeb and Fatah were (on an ideological level and as far as their 
leadership were considered) divided on the inclusion of female fighters. 
However, increasing security pressures at the beginning of the war led to 
ideological concerns to be overcome – at least temporarily. The same 
perceived injustice and security pressures that had led individuals to join the 
militias at the beginning of the war facilitated female involvement on the 
organisational level. The escalating security situation opened a window of 
opportunity for women to get increasingly involved in the militias.  
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In the case of Amal (an organisation whose leadership and ideology were 
both opposed to female participation), the invasion of large parts of the 
South in 1978 by Israel led the organisation to reconsider its resistance to 
female employment. This is the reason why in Amal, women were employed 
as fighters against Israel from 1978 onwards. Women continued to be 
excluded from combat positions in the PSP because at the beginning of the 
war, much of the intense fighting was undertaken by the PSP allies, such as 
different Palestinian groups. Security pressures were thus not directly felt by 
the militia itself as much, and the inclusion of female fighters did not seem 
necessary or justified. When the PSP felt under higher threat (during the 
Mountain war), the party’s rationale for the war had shifted to a fight for 
“the land and the family” (interviewee 9). Due to this shift, including female 
fighters was not a possibility as this would have directly contradicted their 
slogan and the belief behind it.  
When assessing the role of the security context in the decision-making of 
both individuals and the militias, it is essential to consider the levels of 
involvement in the different groups throughout the war. For example, in the 
groups of the left, female participation rose sharply at the outbreak of the 
war when security pressures were particularly high. Female involvement 
decreased again after the first round of the war when the Syrian army 
entered the country in 1976 (which calmed the situation down), until the 
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next round of fighting started. In 1982, with the invasion of the Israeli army, 
female participation increased again. In the case of Kataeb and the smaller 
Christian militias, numbers of female fighters were particularly high at the 
beginning of the war. High security pressures, the relative unpreparedness 
of the Christian militias and the resulting chaos at the beginning of the war 
facilitated the inclusion of female fighters. After the first round of the war 
(when the Christian militias had time to reorganise), this window of 
opportunity was closed and the percentage of female fighters in the 
Christian militias was never again as high as it used to be in the first years of 
the war. 
 
Societal factors 
 
Female inclusion in combat positions during the war was rendered possible 
through a combination of individual, organisational and security-related 
factors. However, the percentage of female fighters (even in the militias of 
the far left) was considerably lower than in other violent conflicts (see for 
example Henshaw, 2016). This can be explained by high levels of societal 
opposition to female participation in the war. Female involvement in the 
militias was preceded by a slow shift towards a more gender-progressive 
society in the 1960s and 1970s. Women had increasingly started to join the 
workforce and political parties, and more and more women were involved 
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in non-violent political activism from the 1960s onwards. These changes 
went hand in hand with a slow shift in attitudes on women’s roles in society. 
Following the outbreak of the war in 1975, these developments were 
amplified by increasing security pressures. The intensifying security context 
led not only individuals and militias, but also the communities, to consider 
female participation in the war a momentary necessity, and thus temporarily 
acceptable. However, due to the nature of the war (which, in many parts of 
the country, consisted of rounds of fighting with relatively calm periods in 
between), societal structures remained relatively intact in much of war-time 
Lebanon. Conservative gender norms and expectations remained 
widespread. As a result, opposition to female participation in combat roles 
remained relatively high.  
The fact that women’s roles in the political parties and militias involved in 
the war had remained limited also impacted their involvement in combat 
roles. The amount of female fighters never exceeded a few percent of the 
overall fighting force, even in the militias of the far left. In addition to 
conservative gender norms and expectations and the limited role women 
played in non-combat positions in the political parties and the militias, fear 
of rape was another important inhibiting factor. The social cost of a female 
fighter being raped would have been extremely high in the relatively gender-
conservative society that Lebanon was at the time of the war.  
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Societal barriers to female participation existed throughout most of 
Lebanese society at the time. Nevertheless, local differences existed. In 
particular, the situation varied considerably between rural areas and the big 
cities, but also between different cities and communities. The extent to 
which areas had been affected by the conflict played a role in this context – 
as the case of the South of Lebanon illustrates. Also, the extent to which 
religion was an inhibiting factor was contested by interviewees. Some 
interviewees (especially those formerly associated with Christian militias) 
believed Muslim communities were more gender-conservative than their 
Christian fellow countrymen. Many Muslim interviewees, on the other hand, 
claimed that both Christians and Muslims were influenced by conservative 
gender norms and expectations during the time of the war. Moreover, class 
and education were also seen as factors shaping attitudes on female 
involvement in the militias.  
Faced with the dilemma of women insisting to be included while large parts 
of the communities were opposing female participation in combat, the 
militias were aware of the risk of alienating communities by female 
involvement. Thus, those militias that included female fighters actively 
managed their relations with the communities, with a view of reassuring the 
communities whilst allowing the militias to continue to employ women. 
With that aim in mind, militias undertook practical steps (such as making 
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separate sleeping arrangements for male and female militia members) and 
developed narratives to reframe female participation. These steps helped 
the militias to successfully navigate gender expectations of the communities 
they were based in, and thus facilitated the inclusion of female fighters 
despite a relatively gender-conservative society. 
 
8.2 | Contribution to existing literature 
 
Literature on the Lebanese civil war 
 
As the first comprehensive study of organisational motivations for the 
involvement of female fighters during the Lebanese civil war, this research 
project filled an important gap in the literature on the civil war in Lebanon. 
Unlike most publications on the Lebanese civil war (Norton, 1987, Winslow, 
1996, Johnson, 2001, Fisk, 2001, El-Solh, 2004, Mackey, 2006, Hirst, 2011, 
Traboulsi, 2012, Hanf, 2014), this study took into account the roles and 
experiences of female militants and fighters. By focusing on female militants 
and fighters, this study challenged wide-spread views (which continue to 
dominate in academic literature and cultural contributions to the debate 
about the war) (Cooke, 1987, Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 1999, Labaki, 2011), 
that women in Lebanon were not involved in the destruction caused by the 
war. With regards to the (very) limited literature on female militia members 
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and fighters during the Lebanese civil war, it questioned assumptions made 
in existing literature, according to which the highest numbers of female 
fighters could be found in the Christian militias (Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 
1999). Unlike previous studies, which only focused on up to three different 
militias (Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 1999, 
Parkinson, 2013), this research project discussed the participation of female 
militants in nearly all of the major militias involved in the war.  
 
Theories on involvement in political violence and organisational 
decision-making 
 
This study supported findings of previous literature, which stresses the 
inaccuracy of viewing non-state armed actors as inherently irrational and 
unpredictable (Horgan, 2005, Kalyvas, 2006, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler, 
2006, Sageman, 2008, Shapiro, 2012, Shapiro and Siegel, 2012, Arjona and 
Kalyvas, 2012, Shapiro, 2013, Staniland, 2014, Arjona et al., 2015). It showed 
that the militias operating in the war were, as Shapiro put it, “intendedly 
rational” (Shapiro, 2012). In other words, they adopted a means-to-ends 
approach, chose from the number of options known to them the one they 
expected to provide them with the highest expected gain, and evaluated the 
expected outcome of their actions and act accordingly (Shapiro, 2012). This 
study also supported the findings of those who stress that involvement in 
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political violence is, in most cases, a process (Horgan, 2005, Taylor and 
Horgan, 2006, Horgan, 2009). Indeed, for many (male and female) fighters 
interviewed as part of this study, the process of getting involved as 
combatants started with non-violent activism and engagement with the 
respective group’s values and ideas. This study found that both structure and 
agency mattered in the Lebanese civil war. Moreover, this study showed that 
context matters in the study of political violence (as pointed out by previous 
studies) (Taylor and Horgan, 2006, Eager, 2008). Acknowledging the 
importance of context, this study highlighted the importance of tracing the 
different factors which shape the context, in which an individual, group or 
community operate. This is of utmost importance as the specific setting, 
which shapes individual, organisational and communal decision-making, can 
vary considerably – even within the same country, region, city, organisation 
or family. Thus, like previous studies (Horgan, 2009), the findings of this 
thesis challenged efforts to identify a “typical” militant profile or pathway 
into militancy. Instead, the findings of this study supported the claims of 
those scholars who call for multi-level approaches to the study of political 
violence and militancy in general, and female involvement in militant 
movements in particular (Cunningham, 2003, Horgan, 2005, Taylor and 
Horgan, 2006, Cunningham, 2008, Eager, 2008, Horgan, 2009, Cunningham, 
2010, Dearing, 2010, Davis, 2013, Eggert, 2015, Davis, 2017).   
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Individual motivations 
 
As far as individual motivations are concerned, the findings of this study on 
female (and male) militants’ backgrounds largely supported claims made in 
the existing literature on female fighters in Lebanon and other conflict 
contexts (Peteet, 1991, Vázquez, 1997, Bernal, 2000, Cunningham, 2003, 
Hamilton, 2007, Von Knop, 2007, Eager, 2008, Zedalis, 2008, Parkinson, 
2013, Henshaw, 2016). As described in existing publications (Weinberg and 
Eubank, 1987: 254, West, 2000: 186, Bloom, 2005: 235, Berko and Erez, 
2007a: 152, Berko and Erez, 2007b: 498, Eager, 2008: 108-109, 111, 122, 
148, 163-164, 176, 184, 204, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008: 106, Zedalis, 
2008: 50, Alison, 2009: 123, 143-144, Gayer, 2009: 4, Bloom et al., 2012: 66), 
whilst individuals from a range of different backgrounds joined the militias, 
the majority were young and had personal links to the militias or the 
respective political movements. The findings of this study on women’s 
motivations to join the war support claims made in conflict studies 
(Henshaw, 2016, Eager, 2008), which challenge conclusions some terrorism 
studies scholars have come to. In particular, the assertion that women join 
for “personal” reasons whilst men do so for “political” reasons, is not 
supported by findings of this study, despite continuing to dominate much of 
the literature on female political violence written from a terrorism studies 
perspective (Victor, 2003, Bloom, 2005: 145-146, 163, 235-237, Pedahzur, 
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2005, Berko and Erez, 2007b, Jacques and Taylor, 2008: 321, O'Rourke, 2009: 
707-710). Moreover, in line with the criticisms voiced by a number of conflict 
studies scholars (Eager, 2008), the findings of this study question the 
usefulness of distinguishing between “personal” and “political” reasons. 
Since conflict and terrorism studies scholars often focus on the same 
conflicts and groups, this difference in findings is likely to be due to biases in 
the terrorism studies literature. This is because sometimes (unfortunately), 
terrorism studies literature is characterised by problematic perspectives on 
political violence, which essentialise and other non-Western cultures, 
peoples and individuals (see, for example, Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008, 
Bloom, 2011, Margolin, 2016). Similarly, the question of whether feminism 
was a motivational factor for women to join the militias was found not to be 
nearly as important as the sometimes excessive focus on this question by 
some Western researchers may imply (Gayer, 2009). As far as the debate 
over the salience of greed and grievances is concerned (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004, Gurr, 2012), this study showed that for the women and men 
interviewed as part of this study, political grievances clearly trumped more 
materialistic aims. Indeed, several interviewees claimed they decided to quit 
the militias when intra-sect fighting over power and influence started.  
As to the impact of organisational characteristics on individual decision-
making to join the war, this study adds to the criticisms of the work of 
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Gonzalez-Perez (2008), who claims that groups with domestic aims are more 
likely to include female fighters. This study showed that women were 
neither deterred by international aims of organisations nor by gender-
conservative ideologies of the groups they joined. This supports previous 
findings of other scholars working on armed groups with gender-restrictive 
policies (Cunningham, 2008). Moreover, the fact that perceived injustice and 
security pressures were seen as the main motivational factor to join 
supports the claims of those scholars who stress that the fight for a bigger 
cause (such as nationalism) often trumps women’s aspirations for gender 
equality or women’s rights (Alison, 2009).  
Lastly, the findings of this study, which concluded that neither coercion nor 
the search for protection constituted motivational factors for women joining 
the militias during the Lebanese civil war, contradict claims on the role of 
coercion and protection made in many publications on female political 
violence in other contexts (Eager, 2008: 128, Alison, 2009: 139-141, 
Parashar, 2009: 137, Katto, 2014: 544,). This contradiction can likely be 
explained by the nature of the Lebanese civil war. Firstly, it took place in a 
very politicised environment (at least at the beginning of the conflict), so 
both men and women were mainly motivated by political arguments. 
Secondly, in large parts of the country, the war consisted of intensive rounds 
of fighting followed by intermittent peaceful periods. As a result, the war did 
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not reach the same levels of intensity as, for example, many conflicts in 
Africa (a region much of the coercion literature focuses on) (Eager, 2008, 
Katto, 2014). For most women living in Lebanon at the time, the relative 
short periods of intensive fighting in most parts of the country meant that 
joining a militia was not necessarily the most optimal strategy to seek 
protection. While personal experiences or fear of rape is a motivational 
factor in many other conflict contexts for women to join armed groups 
(Bloom, 2005: 163-164, Von Knop, 2007: 400, Alison, 2009: 136-137), the 
findings of this study support those who claim that the role fear of rape plays 
varies from context to context (O'Rourke, 2009: 712-714). In Lebanon during 
the civil war, fear of rape inhibited female participation. However, conflict-
related rape was not widespread during the Lebanese civil war. It is thus 
likely that the reason fear of rape was an inhibiting (rather than encouraging 
motivational factor) is related to the relative lack of war-time sexual 
violence. This is an indicator that fear of rape would constitute a more 
important motivational factor for women to join militias in conflicts in which 
sexual violence is used as a systematic tactic of war. 
 
Organisational characteristics 
 
As to the role that organisational characteristics play in group decision-
making on female participation, this study supports findings of previous 
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literature on the importance of ideology (Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2008, 
Dalton and Asal, 2011). However, unlike some other studies, this thesis 
argued that it is a group’s gender ideology (rather than its general political 
orientation) that should be at the centre of focus. The case of the PSP, in 
particular, stressed the importance of looking beyond official labels and 
analysing de facto policies, rather than formal positions. Moreover, this 
study stressed the need for literature on non-state armed actors to view 
violent organisations as diverse and multifaceted groups. When studying 
decision-making processes for example, it is particularly important to take 
into account divergent views within organisations. Methodological issues 
are often one of the main reasons why non-state armed groups are not 
portrayed as the internally diverse organisations they tend to be. For 
example, gaining access to (former) fighters or internal documents can often 
be challenging, which is likely to be one of the main reasons why internal 
dynamics and structures are sometimes not given as much attention in 
existing literature as they should. Nevertheless, taking intra-organisational 
diversity into account, is essential in the study of armed groups.  
Another factor, which is sometimes omitted in studies of armed political 
groups’ decision-making, is external influences. This study highlighted how 
important the example of female participation in the Palestinian revolution 
was for the leftist groups operating in Lebanon. It also showed how the fact 
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that the Christian militias operating in Lebanon did not have a similar 
example of like-minded armed groups including female fighters is likely to 
be one of the reasons for the lower percentage of female combatants in the 
Christian organisations. As far as organisational aims are concerned, as 
discussed above, the findings of this study challenge Gonzalez-Perez’s claims 
on the role of domestic vs. international aims of non-state armed groups 
(2008). The findings of this study support previous criticisms of Gonzalez-
Perez’s work (Narozhna, 2009). They are yet another indicator that 
Gonzalez-Perez’s claims do indeed not withstand empirical testing. 
However, there is some evidence that the specific project the various militias 
had for the nation-state they were fighting for was decisive, as discussed by 
Yuval (1997) and Alison (2009).   
 
The security context 
 
As far as the security context is concerned, this study showed that during the 
Lebanese civil war, security pressures was an important factor motivating 
individuals, groups and communities to support female participation in the 
war. This supports findings of previous literature on female political 
violence, which highlights the importance of security pressures 
(Cunningham, 2003, Cunningham, 2008, Eager, 2008, Dearing, 2010, Bloom, 
2011). Security pressures were deemed so important that even those 
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groups, which would otherwise be reluctant to include female fighters, 
allowed women to join. By claiming security considerations have the 
potential to trump ideological positions (Cunningham, 2003, Cunningham, 
2008, Eager, 2008, Dearing, 2010, Bloom, 2011), previous literature have 
reached similar conclusions.  
This study stressed the importance of taking variation into account in how 
security threats are perceived over time when analysing security pressures. 
The findings of this research project support claims made in existing 
literature, according to which some non-state armed organisations include 
female fighters in order to seek the attention of (potential) supporters and 
recruits (Ali 2005, Bloom, 2005: 144, Von Knop, 2007: 400-401, Speckhard 
2008, Zedalis, 2008: 50, 57), whereas others avoid employing women so as 
to stress their moral superiority (Alison, 2009). Most publications on female 
political violence claim that female fighters are included in order to avoid 
detection (Cunningham, 2003: 184-185, Bloom, 2005: 143-144, Bloom, 
2011: 88-89, 129, 141). This claim is not supported by findings in this 
research project. This apparent contradiction between findings of this study 
and previous literature can be explained by the nature of the war in 
Lebanon. The frontlines between territories under control of the various 
militias were set early in the conflict and did not change considerably in large 
parts of the country. The use of unconventional, less suspicious operatives 
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was thus not as important as it can be in conflict zones where movement in 
enemy-controlled territory is an essential part of non-state armed groups’ 
tactical repertoire.  
The claim that adopting unconventional tactics (such as the inclusion of 
female fighters) can be a move to outbid competitors (Bloom, 2005) was not 
supported by the findings of this study either. This can be explained with the 
comparatively high levels of resistance to female involvement in combat 
roles, which remained dominant in Lebanon during the war. In such an 
environment, attempts to outbid competitors could have quickly backfired 
and caused considerable backlash by the communities, which would have 
outweighed any advantages gained in the competition with rival or 
competing organisations. 
 
Societal factors 
 
Lastly, the findings of this study support some previous claims on the role 
societal factors play in organisational decision-making on the inclusion of 
female fighters. The question of whether gender-conservative societies 
inhibit female participation (because the communities oppose non-
conventional female roles, see Cunningham 2003: 183-184, Bloom 2005: 
150, Ness, 2005: 365), or encourage female involvement (because women’s 
lives are not valued, see Berko and Erez 2007a, 2007b) is contested in the 
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existing literature. The findings of this study support the position in this 
debate which contends that societal resistance to female participation can 
be explained by communal opposition to women’s inclusion in non-
traditional, unconventional roles.  
Moreover, the fact that women’s involvement in the militias in Lebanon was 
facilitated by their previous participation in non-violent public roles supports 
the argument that a loosening of traditional gender norms can lead to 
increasing female participation at times of war and violent conflict 
(Cunningham 2003, Speckhard, 2008, Dearing, 2010). In this context, this 
study stressed the importance of undertaking nuanced analyses of female 
participation in public life and the role it plays in the decision-making on 
women’s involvement in war. For example, it is essential not only to take 
women’s numerical participation into account in such analyses, but also the 
level and nature of their involvement.  
As this study showed, female participation in the war did not reach higher 
levels, because although female involvement in the militias in Lebanon was 
facilitated by women’s previous participation in public life, female party 
leaders remained an exception. As far as the effects of security pressures on 
communal attitudes are concerned, this study provided further evidence 
that even gender-conservative communities can be persuaded of the 
temporary necessity of female participation in the war – if the overall 
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security context is perceived to warrant it. This effect has been described in 
the existing literature (Cunningham, 2003, Eager, 2008, Alison, 2009), the 
findings of which are supported by the conclusions of this study.  
This study stressed the need to take local variation in societal attitudes on 
female militancy into account. In previous publications (especially in 
terrorism studies), societies are sometimes portrayed in highly simplistic 
ways and depicted as monolithic and uniform entities (Berko and Erez 
2007a, 2007b, Speckhard, 2008, Bloom 2011, Margolin, 2016). By including 
inter-group and intra-group variation in communal attitudes and taking 
spatial and temporal differences into account (as well as factors such as 
class, education and religion), this study directly challenged such simplistic 
accounts of societal attitudes on female political violence. 
Lastly, in the debate on the relation between non-state armed groups and 
their constituent communities, the findings of this study support the 
argument of those who claim that violent armed organisations have an 
interest in being on good terms with the society in which they are based or 
operating (Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, Cunningham, 2008, Eager 2008, 
Dearing, 2010). The findings of this study challenge the views that non-state 
armed organisations do not take communal attitudes to their behaviour into 
account and that they act completely independently of their communities. 
Similar to previous publications on how non-state armed groups manage 
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community relations (Cunningham, 2003, Ness, 2005, Cunningham, 2008, 
Eager 2008, Dearing, 2010), this study showed that the militias operating 
during the Lebanese civil war employed a number of practical and narrative 
strategies in order to reassure and not alienate local communities. 
 
8.3 | Limitations of this study 
 
While this study makes a number of important contributions to existing 
literature on female political violence on the one hand, and the Lebanese 
civil war on the other, it has several limitations.  
Firstly, the geographical and temporal focus of this study is the Lebanese civil 
war. It is one of the very few studies examining female participation in the 
militias during the Lebanese civil war – and the first taking the roles of 
women in nearly all of the major militias involved in the war into account. 
However, the extent to which the findings of this study can help to explain 
why non-state armed groups involved in other conflicts decide to employ 
female fighters remains to be seen. The unusual diversity of Lebanese 
society, the high number of different internal and external conflict parties, 
the extreme volatility of alliances during the war, as well as the overall 
regional and international context, made Lebanon during the civil war a very 
specific context. Moreover, especially in the beginning of the war, it was a 
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highly politicised conflict. This is likely to have affected the dynamics of the 
conflict in ways that might not have occurred in the same manner in other 
civil wars (especially those in which conflicting ideologies play a less 
important role). It is thus important to note that the main contribution of 
this study is an analysis of the factors influencing organisational decision-
making on the inclusion of female fighters during the Lebanese civil war, 
rather than a theory of female political violence in general. Nevertheless, in 
many areas, this study reached similar conclusions to those of other studies 
of female political violence, which is an indicator that at least some of the 
arguments made in this thesis also apply to other conflict contexts beyond 
the singular case of the Lebanese civil war. At the very least, it provides 
further empirical support for several claims in existing literature – which is 
not to be underestimated in a field of study that is often characterised by its 
lack of empirical studies. 
The second major limitation is related to the sample of this study. During 
sampling and interviewee recruitment, all efforts were made to take factors 
such as age, gender, position in the militia, educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds as well as origin within Lebanon, into account. Nevertheless, 
this study cannot claim to include a representative sample. This is a 
challenge many qualitative social sciences studies face, which was further 
complicated by the focus of this project, as the overall number and 
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characteristics of the population of former militia members in Lebanon is 
unknown. In fact, as discussed earlier in the thesis, some former fighters 
interviewed claimed to know (but where unwilling to share) numbers on, for 
example, the overall size of their militia’s fighting force during the war. As 
pointed out in Chapter Three, sharing specific details (such as numbers or 
names of militants) was particularly sensitive in the case of the Palestinian 
militias and the Amal Movement. The passing of the Lebanese amnesty law 
of 1991 created a climate that is much more conducive to academic research 
on political violence than is the case in many other post-war contexts. This 
is because it gave interviewees the possibility to share details of their 
involvement in the war without fear of legal repercussions. However, the 
scope of this Lebanese law does, of course, not extend to external actors, 
which is why interviewees whose militias used to be (or still are) in a state of 
conflict with Israel were much more reluctant to speak about details of their 
(former) comrades’ involvement. Rather than presenting a representative 
study of female political violence and organisational decision-making, this 
project thus offers an analysis of some of the key themes, as discussed by 
the interviewees I succeeded in gaining access to. Considering that this study 
is the first comprehensive analysis of female political violence in all militias 
involved in the Lebanese civil war, this caveat seems less problematic than 
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the alternative, which would have been to not conduct research on the topic 
at all. 
Related to this is the fact that it was not possible to gain access to former 
members of all militias involved in the Lebanese civil war. As discussed in the 
methodology chapter, repeated attempts were made to secure an interview 
with Hezbollah officials, which in the end, turned out to be impossible. I 
suspect that, in many ways, the decision-making on the inclusion of female 
fighters in Hezbollah was affected by similar factors to the Amal Movement. 
However, without gaining access to (former) Hezbollah members, it is 
impossible to make any definitive statements on female participation in the 
organisation. Similarly, this study would have benefitted from the inclusion 
of the (mostly Beirut-based) militia Mourabitoun, as another example of a 
militia that did not include female fighters during the war. However, it was 
not possible to include this militia in this study either, as access could not be 
gained. I also regretted not being able to conduct more interviews with 
(former) members of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP). I 
succeeded in securing interviews with two former SSNP fighters, but gaining 
wider access was not possible. Including the SSNP in a study of female 
political violence during the Lebanese civil war would be particularly 
interesting due to the party’s very specific mix of left-wing and right-wing 
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ideological beliefs – which could potentially help shed light on the role of 
ideology in the inclusion of female fighters.  
 
8.4 | New questions 
 
While this research project has addressed several important questions, 
future studies of female perpetrators of violence could look at a number of 
other questions. 
Notably, future research on the topic of female fighters in Lebanon could 
attempt to examine organisational motivations of some of the militias not 
included in this study, such as Hezbollah, Mourabitoun, SSNP or some of the 
Baathist and Nasserist groups involved in the Lebanese civil war. While it is 
likely that other researchers will encounter similar challenges when trying to 
contact former fighters from these groups, studies including an even 
broader set of armed organisations would be highly valuable. In the case of 
Hezbollah in particular, it is possible that a change in the overall political 
context in the region would increase the chances of external researchers 
gaining access to former fighters. Thus, even if it is currently not possible for 
external researchers to interview former Hezbollah fighters, there is a 
possibility that this will change in the future. Studies focusing on the role of 
women in groups where interviewing former militants is difficult at the 
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moment could instead collect data in other ways and resort to documentary 
analysis for example, in the case of those groups on which sufficient 
documents are available.  
Second, considering that this study is based on interviews with ‘only’ 69 
interviewees, future projects could try to include a bigger sample of research 
participants. This could, for example, be achieved by focusing on single 
groups and conducting in-depth single-n studies of some of the groups 
examined in this research project. This would be of particular value in the 
non-Christian and the non-Palestinian groups (such as the LCP, CAO or the 
PSP), as although a number of studies have focused on women in the 
Palestinian national movement (such as Peteet, 1991, Sayigh, 1993, 
Parkinson, 2013), and on women in the Christian militias during the civil war 
to a lesser degree (Karamé, 1995, Shehadeh, 1999), there are still very few 
publications on other armed groups operating in Lebanon, like the LCP, CAO 
and the PSP. The same is true for Amal. Whilst there is a substantial amount 
of literature available on Hezbollah (Jaber, 1997, Harik, 2005, Cordesman, 
2006, Azani, 2011, Norton, 2014, Levitt, 2015), including some journalistic 
publications on women in Hezbollah, there is much less academic work 
published on Amal (one notable exception being Norton, 1987), let alone on 
the role of women in Amal. Nevertheless, even in the case of the Christian 
and Palestinian armed groups operating during the Lebanese civil war, more 
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in-depth studies of these organisations would be highly valuable to help us 
understand better why women were included as fighters during the war. 
In addition to in-depth single-n studies of the militias involved in the 
Lebanese civil war, further research could approach the topic from a 
comparative perspective. Comparative studies could, for example, adopt a 
Most Similar, Different Outcome (MSDO) design and examine different 
Christian, Shia groups or Lebanese and Palestinian leftist organisations. 
Alternatively, it would be possible to undertake cross-alliance studies, 
comparing LNM-affiliated groups with organisations that were part of the 
LFr, or study how shifting alliances between different groups affected their 
inclusion of female militants. The relatively large numbers of different 
organisations involved in the Lebanese civil war provides manifold 
opportunities for comparative research on the role of female militants 
during the war.  
Moreover, further insight could be gained by comparing single organisations 
or groups of organisations involved in the Lebanese civil war with non-state 
armed actors in other wars. For example, future studies could compare 
single leftist, right-wing, Shia or Palestinian militias involved in the Lebanese 
civil war with similar groups in the wider Middle East. Leftist and Palestinian 
groups, in particular, were very active in a number of countries in the region 
(and beyond), which provides ample opportunities for comparative studies 
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with the potential to help shed new insights on the inclusion of female 
militants in non-state armed groups. Beyond the region of the wider Middle 
East, Latin American groups constitute particularly interesting cases in these 
contexts, as many of these groups were also active in the 1970s and 1980s – 
sometimes with direct ideological links to some of the groups operating in 
Lebanon during the civil war. Moreover, comparative studies could be 
extended to include, for example, the leftist movements of Europe and the 
US of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.   
In terms of questions new research could examine, future studies could 
explore several of the issues highlighted in this project in more detail. For 
example, this study showed that the role of class and education in the 
inclusion of female militants (on the individual, organisational and societal 
level) would deserve to be studied in more detail. The same applies to the 
question of local differences in societal attitudes to female participation in 
the war. Future studies could explore in more detail how local differences 
on the levels of sectarian affiliation, religious practice, gender norms and 
expectations, and female participation in public life and politics impacted 
female involvement in the militias. Moreover, the question of how different 
militias learned from each other, and how various militias managed their 
relations with their constituent communities, could be explored in more 
detail. Also, existing literature claims that once women get involved in non-
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state armed groups, the number of female militants in the groups rises 
(Gonzalez-Perez, 2008) – something this study briefly looked at. Future 
projects could examine this claim in more detail. Lastly, this study showed 
that material benefits seemed to be less of a motivational factor for women 
than for some men. This claim could be further considered in future studies. 
As far as methodological approaches are concerned, whilst this study 
undertook a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews and written 
(auto)biographical accounts, authors of future studies could consider 
adopting different methods of data collection and analysis, including more 
quantitative approaches. As far as the difficulty of gaining access to some of 
the militias involved in the Lebanese civil war (such as Hezbollah and the 
SSNP) is concerned, this challenge could potentially be overcome (at least 
partially), by basing the analysis on audio, video and printed material from 
the time of the civil war. However, this would of course only apply to those 
militias whose archives were not destroyed in the course of the war or since 
its end. 
Finally, future studies could include an analysis of the roles and experiences 
of former female fighters after the end of the civil war in Lebanon. They 
could examine whether male and female militants encountered similar 
challenges (if any), when reintegrating back into civilian life and if there are 
any differences in how men and women view their involvement in the war 
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retrospectively. Future studies could also explore the roles and experiences 
of male and female militants in the many subsequent violent conflicts 
Lebanon has experienced since 1990, notably the Lebanon war of 2006, the 
violent protests and clashes in the mid-2000s, and the series of bombings in 
the mid-2010s.  
8.5 | Implications for practice and policy 
 
The main aim of this study was to conduct an academic analysis of why non-
state armed organisations decided to employ female fighters in the 
Lebanese civil war. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify implications for 
practice and policy. The findings of this study are of particular relevance to 
practitioners working on violence prevention, conflict transformation and 
post-war recovery.  
First, this study showed that despite non-state armed organisations often 
being portrayed as irrational and unpredictable actors in academic – and 
even more so in political and media – discourses (Horgan, 2005, Taylor and 
Horgan, 2006, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler, 2006, Sageman, 2008, Horgan, 
2009), the militias operating in Lebanon during the civil war were, as Shapiro 
put it, “intendedly rational actors,” who made decisions based on the 
knowledge available to them (2012). The former militants interviewed as 
part of this project described their decision to join the militias during the war 
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as a deliberate choice. The portrayal of militias and their members as 
generally irrational and unpredictable actors is thus misleading. It can even 
be counterproductive, as denying militia members their agency can lead to 
channels of communication (which could otherwise be used to negotiate 
political solutions) being closed. Therefore, portraying non-state armed 
actors in simplistic ways should be avoided – especially if such portrayals 
involve denying the groups (and individuals) in question their agency. Rather 
than vilifying individuals and organisations as irrational, unpredictable 
actors, the aim should be to understand the factors that motivate them to 
engage in violence. 
Moreover, recent research has stressed the importance of viewing 
involvement in political violence as a process, in which context matters 
(Horgan, 2005, Taylor and Horgan, 2006, Sageman, 2008, Horgan, 2009). 
These previous findings are supported by this study. For many of the 
individuals interviewed during this research project, involvement in the 
various non-state armed groups studied was a process, which often started 
with non-violent activism. Moreover, context mattered. The individuals and 
organisations examined in this study were part of their societies; they 
responded to developments in society and to how their behaviour was 
perceived by society. For practitioners and policy-makers, it is thus essential 
to be aware of the wider context in which political violence occurs. This 
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entails knowing and, if possible, engaging with key stakeholders, including 
community leaders, civil society representatives and members of wider 
society. Practitioners and policy-makers aiming to prevent, end or transform 
political violence would be well-advised to be aware of common trajectories 
into political violence. Whilst it is not possible to identify “profiles” of the 
“typical militant”, there are nevertheless characteristics many militants have 
in common. Knowing the grievances and motivations, which lead individuals, 
groups and communities to support violent movements or engage in 
political violence themselves, can help to prevent or counter violence by 
working on non-violent solutions to the issues in question instead.   
This study showed that women were involved in all of the militias operating 
during the Lebanese civil war. In most of the major militias, women 
participated as fighters. If women are involved in perpetrating political 
violence, gender-specific prevention and reintegration programmes must be 
available. However, most prevention and reintegration programmes 
(including measures implemented by governmental agencies, international 
organisations and civil society groups) tend to overlook the needs and 
experiences of women in non-state armed groups (Eggert, forthcoming, 
2017). If gender is taken into account at all, many of these programmes 
reflect and reproduce widespread gender stereotypes of women as either 
victims of political violence or actors for peaceful change (Eggert, 
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forthcoming, 2017). Simplistic portrayals of women’s and men’s roles at 
times of conflict continue to dominate public discourses on the civil war in 
Lebanon (Eggert, forthcoming, 2017). Instead, the needs, concerns and 
experiences of both men and women should be taken into account in 
programmes aimed at preventing and countering violence and facilitating 
former fighters’ reintegration. 
As far as individual motivations are concerned, this study showed that men 
and women were involved in the war for largely the same motivations. In 
post-war Lebanon, comprehensive locally rooted initiatives to deal with the 
past remain the exception. Activists and practitioners deplore this lack of 
programmes addressing the civil war, its legacy, and the numerous violent 
episodes post 1990 (Barak, 2007, Haugbølle, 2012, Launchbury et al., 2014). 
Considering the findings of this study, taking the experiences of both male 
and female militia members into account is essential in this context in order 
to fully understand the impact the war had on both men and women. Most 
interviewees mentioned perceived injustice and security threats as the main 
motivational factors for their involvement in political violence. These same 
grievances were also decisive in shaping organisational and communal 
decision-making. Were it not for these grievances, it is highly unlikely that 
the majority of militants would have joined the war. The decrease in 
numbers of female (and male) militants after the first round of the war 
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clearly illustrates this point. Thus, addressing grievances should be the main 
focus of any conflict prevention and transformation programmes – ideally 
before the conflict escalates and mobilisation for armed campaigns starts. 
The fact that such an approach has not been prioritised in post-war Lebanon 
(and in the region) is highly worrying in this context. In fact, the lack of 
comprehensive conflict transformation approaches in Lebanon is probably 
one of the main reasons why the country has been experiencing a series of 
high-intensity fighting – including one full-blown war, since 1990.  
While most interviewees mentioned perceived injustice and security 
pressures as the main motivational factor, for some female militants, 
women’s liberation was another reason to join. In order to help prevent 
female involvement in political violence, the fact that gender equality is 
rarely achieved in most non-state armed groups could be highlighted by 
practitioners working on conflict prevention. In this context, former 
militants could be involved in depicting a realistic image of what involvement 
in political violence entails. In order for such counter-narratives to reach the 
widest audience possible, it would be essential to include the experiences 
and perspectives of both men and women from a variety of different 
backgrounds. 
As far as organisational characteristics are concerned, this study showed 
that women joined and supported nearly all of the militias involved in the 
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Lebanese civil war – regardless of the organisation’s position on gender 
equality and women’s rights. Moreover, relatively gender-conservative 
positions on the roles of men and women did not prevent these 
organisations from including female fighters when the group perceived the 
security situation to warrant it. Nevertheless, stereotypes according to 
which women do not join gender-conservative or religious armed groups as 
militants, let alone combatants, continue to be widespread. These 
misleading assumptions provide non-state armed groups with a tactical 
advantage, as they allow the organisations to employ operatives without 
their opponents perceiving them to be a threat. It is thus essential for 
practitioners working in conflict prevention and transformation to 
understand that possible organisational barriers to women’s involvement in 
non-state armed groups are often overcome. This includes organisations 
which external observers may perceive as upholding traditional gender 
norms and/or even contradicting women’s interests. 
A second important organisational factor which must be taken into account 
by practitioners and policy-makers is the diverse membership of many non-
state armed organisations. Non-state armed groups are rarely monolithic, 
uniform organisations. This was certainly not the case in the militias 
operating in the Lebanese civil war. This study showed that the inclusion of 
female fighters was debated – even in those militias in which organisational 
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barriers to their involvement were practically non-existent (such as the 
militias of the far-left). Understanding this diversity within non-state armed 
organisations can help practitioners and policy-makers tailor their responses 
to armed movements even more effectively. 
Lastly, this study highlighted that in addition to individual and organisational 
motivations, it is essential to take into account communal attitudes in order 
to explain female political violence. This thesis showed that high levels of 
resistance within most communities were one of the main reasons the 
percentage of female fighters was much lower in Lebanon during the civil 
war than in many other conflict contexts. The militias were aware of the 
potential impact communal attitudes could have on their operational 
capability. All of the militias examined as part of this study took the 
communities’ positions into account and managed their relations with the 
communities with a view to maintain good relations. If communities can help 
to prevent political violence or, at the very least, the inclusion of certain 
groups of society (such as women), programmes focusing on conflict 
prevention and transformation must take into account the role of the 
community. Whilst including communities is essential before and during 
active violent phases, it is particularly important after the violent stage of 
conflict has ended, as many former female militants report high levels of 
hostility from within their communities when they return to their pre-war 
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civilian lives (interviewees 58, see also Cunningham, 2003). Lastly, it is 
noteworthy that while the communities in Lebanon were largely against 
female involvement in political violence, this view changed when faced with 
extreme security pressures and perceived injustice, which, again, stresses 
the need to prioritise addressing perceived injustice and security threats as 
part of conflict prevention and transformation. 
 
8.6 | Epilogue: post-war perspectives 
 
After more than fifteen years of violent conflict, the signing of the Taif 
agreement marked the beginning of the end of a war that had devastated 
the lives of millions of people in Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2012). One year later, 
the fighting finally stopped when the Syrian army entered the country – and 
stayed as an occupying force for the next fifteen years (Hirst, 2011). In March 
1991, the Lebanese parliament passed an amnesty law, which pardoned 
most political crimes committed during the war. Two months later, with the 
exception of Hezbollah (which ‘rebranded’ itself as a militia focused on the 
fight against Israel), all non-state armed groups were dissolved (Traboulsi, 
2012). This time, it was not merely another relatively calm period of peace 
before yet another round of fighting would break out. This time, the war was 
indeed over. Or was it? The arguments of those who contend that the 
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fighting may have stopped, but the war never did, are compelling 
(interviewees 46, 49, 64, see also Traboulsi, 2012). More than forty years 
after the outbreak of the war, the majority of the grievances which caused 
it in the first place, remain unaddressed (Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012). 
Moreover, Lebanon has witnessed a number of violent conflicts, including a 
full-fledged war, in the twenty-seven years since the official end of the civil 
war (Hirst, 2011, Traboulsi, 2012).  
Like all members of Lebanese society, the men and women who were 
fighting in the militias had to rebuild their lives after the war. A detailed 
discussion of their roles and experiences in post-war Lebanon is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, a brief overview of the interviewees’ post-war 
experiences shall be included in this epilogue. What struck me most whilst 
speaking to the former militia members I interviewed for the purpose of this 
study was how disillusioned many of them were (interviewees 1, 2, 23, 31, 
32, 46, 51, 59, 64, 66). During the war, they had fought for what they 
believed was the right thing. In fact, the sentiment that they had been 
fighting for a just cause and that the war had been forced on them by their 
opponents was a recurring theme in many interviews – regardless of the 
militia the interviewees were affiliated with during the war (interviewees 42, 
43, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 62). In the words of one interviewee, “every party was 
going into this war believing they do the right thing” (interviewee 43). Now, 
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many interviewees see the use of violence against their fellow countrymen 
as a mistake, even if they still believed in the political positions they stood 
up for during the war (interviewees 1, 2, 31, 53, 55, 62). I was often left with 
the impression that interviewees’ frustration at the turn that Lebanese 
society had taken after the end of the civil war was due to the very 
convictions that had made them join the war. Regardless of which side they 
had been fighting on, they had risked their lives for their vision of a better 
society. In many ways, post-war Lebanon disappointed in this regard. Most 
of the grievances remained unaddressed, violent clashes continued to break 
out regularly, and most communal groups saw themselves as losers in the 
war. Moreover, the extreme commercialisation of Lebanese society was 
criticised by several interviewees (interviewee 1, 66).  
For many of the former fighters, the end of the war brought with it personal 
changes as well. Many of the marriages between former militia members 
ended, because as one former LCP fighter put it: “people change after the 
war” (interviewee 23, see also interviewee 31). Some moved abroad 
(interviewee 45, 66), others took their own lives (interviewee 1). Many felt 
betrayed by the politicians and former militia leaders (interviewees 1, 46, 
66, 59, 64). In the words of one former LCP fighter:  
 
The leaders of the militias are still in power. To make peace, 
you have to pay a price. They didn’t. They have been in power 
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all the time for the last 26 years. Their own people, they throw 
them away [and tell them]: “find your way” (interviewee 1). 
 
The former members of the leftist organisations also had to come to terms 
with the fact that the influence of their party diminished considerably after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (which occurred at around the same time as 
the end of the war) (interviewee 22). While former members of the 
communist and socialist organisations had been fighting for a secular state 
in Lebanon, they were now faced with the rise of sectarian narratives and 
actors. “All those in the South who used to be with the Communist Party are 
now with Hezbollah,” one female former LCP commander deplored 
(interviewee 32). 
We know from many other post-war societies that female involvement 
during war often fails to be followed by an increase in the quality or quantity 
of women’s participation in society after the end of the fighting (Alison, 
2009: 222). In most cases, female participation in the war is accepted 
temporarily, before women are pressured back into more traditional gender 
roles (Gayer, 2009: 22). This was also the experience of many of the female 
fighters during the war. While many female fighters faced hostile reactions 
from members of their communities (as discussed in Chapter Seven), one 
interviewee believed that it was easier for women to re-integrate into 
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civilian life after the war, as they could focus on their domestic roles, look 
after their families and raise children (interviewee 31).  
As far as the status of women in Lebanon more generally is concerned, 
several interviewees believed that the emergence of sectarian narratives in 
the 1980s in general, and the rise of Hezbollah and other Islamist parties, in 
particular, led to women in Lebanon facing increased challenges 
(interviewees 22, 28, 30, 31, 32, 41). As one former female fighter and 
military commander put it, “in the Seventies, there were no Hezbollah and 
other Islamic parties [who, when they emerged, largely side-lined women or 
allocated them gender-specific roles]” (interviewee 31). Another 
interviewee (a former male LCP fighter and military commander) did not see 
religion as the problem, but saw the issue as being rooted in societal mores, 
norms and expectations:   
 
In general, Lebanese society has a very backward and 
traditional thinking. They look posh, but actually have a very 
backward thinking. Even if, within a party, they see a woman 
who is successful, they will throw stones at her. We need a 
few hundred years until we see women as more than just 
[objects] for men (interviewee 54). 
 
I would like to finish the thesis with this quote, in the hope that it will take 
much less than “a few hundred years” for the many activists and civil society 
representatives I encountered during this research project to 
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democratically, peacefully and sustainably achieve the change they have 
been fighting for in Lebanon for decades. 
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Appendix 
 
Map of Lebanon  
and her neighbouring countries 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/lebanon.html (last accessed 26 
September 2017).  
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Map of Lebanon 
and her districts and regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mount Lebanon is called the Mountain (al-Jabal) in Arabic, which is how I 
refer to it in this thesis. 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.cometolebanon.com/about-lebanon/governorates-of-
lebanon (last accessed 26 September 2017)  
379 
 
List of major militias, parties and alliances 
 
Lebanese Front (LFr), later Lebanese Forces (LF) 
 
English name Arabic name Abbreviation 
   
Tigers of the Liberals   Numur al-Ahrar Tigers / Numur 
Guardians of the Cedar Hurras al-Arz (no abbreviation) 
Lebanese Kataeb Party Hizb al-Kata’ib al-
Lubnaniya 
Kataeb  
Lebanese Forces al-Quwwat al-Lubnaniya LF 
Lebanese Front al-Jabha al-Lubnaniya LFr 
National Liberal Party Hizb Al-Waṭaniyyin al-
Ahrar 
NLP / al-Ahrar 
Tanzim Tanzim (no abbreviation) 
 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) – Lebanese organisations 
 
English name Arabic name Abbreviation 
  
Communist Action 
Organisation 
Munazzamah al-‘Amal al-
Shuyu‘i 
CAO 
Lebanese Communist 
Party 
al-Hizb ash-Shuyuʿi al-
Lubnani 
LCP 
Mourabitoun Mourabitoun (no abbreviation) 
Progressive Socialist 
Party 
al-Hizb al-Taqadummi al-
Ishtiraki) 
PSP 
Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party 
al-Hizb al-Suri al-Quwmi 
al-'Ijtima'i 
SSNP 
 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) – Palestinian organisations 
 
 
English name Arabic name Abbreviation 
  
Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of 
Palestine  
al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiya li-
Tahrir Filastin 
DFLP 
Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation 
Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-
Filastiniyya 
PLO 
Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement 
Munazzamah al-‘Amal al-
Shuyu‘i 
Fatah 
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Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine  
al-Jabha al-Sha’biyyah li-
Tahrir Filastin 
PFLP 
 
Other (Shia) organisations 
 
 
English name Arabic name Abbreviation 
  
Amal Movement  Harakat Amal Amal 
Hezbollah Hezbollah (no abbreviation) 
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Interview guide 
Summer 2015 
 
Introduction 
o me, (my daughter), (interpreter) 
o context of research, publications 
o anonymity, quotes 
 
Facts / individual motivations 
o women in the party and militia 
o how many? when? which roles? leadership positions? who? why? 
o what about women’s roles in other groups? 
 
o interviewee’s personal background and reasons for involvement (or 
in the end) 
 
Organisational characteristics 
o ideology: left-wing/right-wing; gender image in group; official 
ideology vs. regular members 
o aims: domestic vs. international change; Volk-, Kultur-, Staatnation 
o age and size: medium-sized more likely to include? old more likely to 
include? 
o internal dynamics: (dis)agreement?; leadership vs. regular fighters? 
 
Security environment 
o avoid detection? 
o seek attention? (media; shaming of men) 
o assert a position? 
o necessity? 
o learned from Palestinians? 
 
Societal factors 
o gender-permissive culture > female participation in society 
o narratives of female violence 
o interplay between culture and security 
o 1958 vs. 1975? 
 
Resources 
o allies 
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o funders  
o diaspora 
 
End 
o Contact again if more questions? 
o Other potential interviewees? 
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Interview guide 
Winter 2015/16 
 
Introduction 
o me, (my daughter), (interpreter) 
o context of research, publications 
o anonymity, quotes 
 
Facts / individual motivations 
o numbers 
o backgrounds 
o motivations 
o difference in location 
o difference in time 
o which roles? 
o since when? 
 
o interviewee’s personal background and reasons for involvement (or 
in the end) 
 
Organisational characteristics 
o ideology 
o aims 
o age and size 
o internal dynamics 
o leaders vs. base 
o other groups? same camp, opponents 
 
Security environment 
o necessity 
o avoid detection 
o media 
o shame men 
o assert position (better than others / more dedicated) 
o messy war 
o sisters of men 
 
Societal factors 
o women in party, militia, community, society 
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o narratives, role-models 
o culture <> security 
o 1958 
o learned from Palestinians / West? 
o trustbuilding 
o regional differences 
 
End 
o Contact again if more questions? 
o Other potential interviewees?  
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List of interviewees 
 
Summer 2015 
21 July – 31 August 2015 (42 days / 6 weeks) 
21 interviewees (19 interviews) 
 
No Gen-
der 
Organi-
sation 
Role Location 
inter- 
view 
Lan-
guage 
inter-
view 
Others 
present 
1 Male LCP Former 
comba-
tant 
(com-
mander) 
Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
2 Male Kataeb / 
LF 
Former  
party 
official 
Private 
(work) 
English, 
French 
My 
daughter 
3 Fe-
male 
Civil 
society 
organi-
sation 
Civil 
society  
repre-
sentative 
Private 
(work) 
English, 
German 
Group 
interview 
4 Fe-
male 
Civil 
society 
organi-
sation 
Civil 
society  
repre-
sentative 
Private 
(work) 
English Group 
interview 
5 Male Media   Jour-
nalist  
Private 
(work) 
English Gate-
keeper 
6 Fe-
male 
CAO Jour-
nalist / 
re-
searcher 
/ former 
com-
mander 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
French N/A 
7 Male Civil 
society 
organi-
sation 
Re-
searcher 
Private 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
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8 Male PFLP Former  
com-
batant 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
9 Male PSP Former  
com-
batant 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
my 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
10 Male PSP Former 
com-
batant 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
my 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
11 Fe-
male 
Tanzim / 
LF 
Former 
com-
batant 
Private  French My 
daughter 
12 Male Court Judge Semi-
public 
(work) 
English My 
daughter; 
others 
13 Male Pales-
tinian 
organi-
sation(s), 
later 
Islamists 
Former 
com-
batant 
Private Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
gate-
keeper / 
inter-
preter   
14 Male Different 
Lebanese 
and Pales-
tinian 
LNM 
militias 
Former  
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
15 Male Civil 
society 
organi-
sation 
Re-
searcher 
Private 
(work) 
German N/A 
16 Fe-
male 
LF Former 
party 
official, 
Public 
(café) 
French / 
English 
My 
daughter 
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trained 
to be an 
officer 
17 Male Fatah, CP Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
18 Male Fatah Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
English / 
French 
My 
daughter 
19 Fe-
male 
Kataeb / 
LF 
Former 
com-
batant 
(com-
mander) 
Private 
(work) 
French My 
daughter 
20 Male Fatah Former 
com- 
batant 
Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter 
21 Male  CAO Former 
com-
batant 
Private 
(work) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
 
 
Trip winter 2015/16 
5 December – 3 January (30 days / 4 weeks) 
21 interviewees (20 new interviewees; 13 interviews) 
 
 
No. Gen-
der 
Organi-
sation 
Role Location 
inter-
view 
Lan-
guage 
inter-
view 
Others 
present 
22 Male LCP Former 
com-
batant  
Public 
(café) 
English, 
French, 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
viewee’s 
friend 
(inter-
preter) 
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23 Male LCP Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
English  N/A 
24 Male Media Jour-
nalist 
Public 
(café) 
English N/A 
 
25 Fe-
male 
Kataeb / 
LF 
Former 
party 
member 
Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter 
26 Fe-
male 
Media Jour-
nalist  
Private  English My 
daughter 
27 Male LCP Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
28 Male LCP Former 
com-
batant 
 
Public 
(café) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
29 Male LCP Former 
com- 
batant 
Semi-
public 
(garden) 
/ private 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
my 
daughter; 
gate-
keeper 
and his 
family; 
inter-
viewees’ 
daughter 
30 Fe-
male 
LCP Former 
party 
official 
Semi-
public 
(garden) 
/ private 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
my 
daughter; 
gatekeepe
r and his 
family; 
inter-
viewees’ 
daughter 
31 Fe-
male 
LCP Former Private English My 
daughter 
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com-
batant 
(com-
mander) 
---
18 
   Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter 
32 Fe-
male 
LCP Former 
party 
official 
and com-
mander 
Private  Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter; at 
the end: 
inter-
viewees’ 
family 
33 Male Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
34 Male Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
35 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
36 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
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keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
37 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
38 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
39 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
40 Fe-
male 
Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(mos-
que) 
Arabic-
English 
Group 
interview; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
and his 
wife 
41 Fe-
male 
Kataeb Former 
party 
member 
Private French My 
daughter 
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/ re-
searcher 
 
 
Trip summer 2016 
27 July – 3 September (38 days / 5.5 weeks) 
29 interviewees (25 new interviewees; 29 interviews)  
 
 
No Gen-
der 
Organi-
sation 
Role Location 
inter-
view 
Lan-
guage 
inter-
view 
Others 
present 
---1    Public 
(café) 
English 
 
My 
daughter 
42 Male PSP Party 
member 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
English  My 
daughter 
43 Male PSP Party 
member 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
---7    Private 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
44 Fe-
male 
 LF Party 
member  
Private 
(work) 
French N/A 
45 Male NLP Former 
com-
batant 
 
Private English N/A 
46 Male Arts Civil 
society 
repre-
sentative 
Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter 
47 Fe-
male 
LCP Former 
party 
official 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter; at 
the end: 
inter-
viewee’s 
colleague 
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48 Male SSNP Former 
com-
batant  
Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter; 
inter- 
viewee’s 
son 
49 Male SSNP Former 
com-
batant  
Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
50 Male Amal Party 
member 
Private 
(work) 
English, 
French 
My 
daughter 
---
31 
Fe-
male 
  Private  English My 
daughter 
51 Male PSP Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
52 Fe-
male 
PFLP, PLO Former 
party 
official 
Private Arabic-
English 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
53 Fe-
male 
PSP Party 
member 
Private 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
---2    Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
54 Male LCP Former 
com-
batant 
Private  Arabic-
English 
Inter- 
viewee’s 
wife; 
inter-
preter; my 
daughter 
55 Male Kataeb  Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
Arabic-
English, 
English 
My 
daughter; 
his friend 
(inter-
preter) 
56 Male Kataeb  Former 
party 
official 
Public 
(café) 
French My 
daughter 
57 Male Kataeb, LF Former 
com-
batant 
Private 
(work) 
French My 
daughter 
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(com-
mander) 
58 Male Amal Former 
com-
batant 
Private 
(work) 
English-
Arabic  
My 
daughter; 
gate-
keeper 
(inter-
preter) 
59 Male Kataeb Former 
com-
batant 
Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
(in 
beginning) 
60 Male NLP, LF Former 
com-
mander 
Private 
(work) 
French N/A 
61 Male Fatah Former 
com-
batant 
Private 
(work) 
English, 
Arabic 
My 
daughter 
62 Fe-
male 
CAO Former 
party 
official 
Public 
(café) 
English My 
daughter 
63 Fe-
male  
Amal Former 
com-
batant 
Private French My 
daughter 
64 Male Fatah Former 
com-
batant 
Private 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
65 Male CAO Former 
com-
mander, 
re-
searcher 
Private 
(work) 
English My 
daughter 
66 Fe-
male 
Kataeb Former 
com-
batant 
Semi-
public 
(garden) 
English My 
daughter 
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Trip autumn 2016 
21 – 30 October (9 days / 1.5 weeks) 
3 interviewees (3 new interviewees; 3 interviews) 
 
 
No Gen-
der 
Organi-
sation 
Role Location 
inter-
view 
Lan-
guage 
inter-
view 
Others 
present 
67 Male PFLP Former 
party 
Official 
Private English 
 
My 
daughter 
68 Male Fatah Former 
com-
batant 
Semi-
public 
(work) 
English  My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter; his 
colleague 
69 Male PFLP Former 
com-
batant 
(com-
mander) 
Private 
(work) 
English-
Arabic 
My 
daughter; 
inter-
preter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
